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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance for the modern society is to understand the influence of 
Nazi propaganda and information policy on the consciousness and moral and 
psychological state of the occupied territories of Ukraine and implications of 
this policy. 
The information activities of Nazi Germany has been studied by foreign 
and domestic scholars, including historians. Their writings analyze the process 
of formation of the National Socialist Party in Germany, its activities in the 
field of education and public relations, highlight the methods, tools and 
techniques of information warfare, which were used by Britain, the USA, 
Germany and the Soviet Union in World War I and II. The structure of Nazi 
propaganda apparatus was partly studied both in Germany and on the 
occupied territories of the USSR. 
Thus, despite the significant number of works, the activities of certain 
organs of Nazi propaganda practically was not studied. The aim of this work 
is to disclose individual structures of the Ministry of Education and 
Propaganda and the concept of its activities; its implementation in the 
occupied territories of the USSR. 
Studying the events, highlighted in the monographs, there were involved 
historical scientific methods, particularly in the study of Nazi government 
advocacy to know and take into account the socio-political, socio-economic, 
cultural, military development, the relationship with neighbor states, the place in 
the space of Europe. This system takes into consideration the principle 
achievements of not only domestic but also foreign historians studying the 
problem of information policy in the areas considered absolutely German by the 
Third Reich government. Synthesis method made it possible to synthesize a 
significant amount of information and its reconstruction on the data, particular 
situation that has emerged in Germany and Austria during the reign of the Third 
Reich. The method of synthesis allowed to state that the Nazi regime, which 
differed in various European countriese, contributed to the development of 
various forms of cooperation with the Nazi authorities. The statistical method 
was the basis for receiving, processing, selection and analysis of descriptive and 
statistical sources, which played a leading role in the structure of sources of this 
study. It gives an opportunity to determine people in percentage scale, who was 
really effected by Nazi information policy. 
Thus, it should be noted that the Nazi propaganda machine designed and 
used in 1933–1945 various forms and methods of action on its own 
population. The main purpose of propaganda services of the Third Reich was 
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to get the support of German citizens for the preparation and conduct of the 
war with the Soviet Union. Thus, the study of the nature and results of 
outreach impact on the minds of the German population in terms of 
preparation and conduct of the war was one of the main goals in the activity of 
the Ministry of Education and propaganda. 
The main reception, which Nazi propaganda used in its information policy, 
is the most primitive sensations that contributed Nazis sympathy to the broad 
of the masses in Germany. It used all methods to achieve its goals: from 
cinema to architecture, but radio was given the most important attention of all 
media. Using propaganda in the mass consciousness of the German people, it 
implanted hatred so-called “non-Aryan” nations, praising Hitler and German 
military might. 
To sum up, it should be noted that Nazi propaganda in 1933 promoted to 
the successful stabilization of the regime, which allowed to proceed in time to 
rapid reorientation of public consciousness. The system of Nazi propaganda, 
has become one of the pillars of the Third Reich along with the mechanism of 
state terror, and allowed its leaders to spend more and more radical internal 
and foreign policy without fear of resistance of the German people. 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
SECTION 1. 
THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION CONFRONTATION 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND THE USSR  
IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
The World War of 1939 to 1945 and War of 1941 to 1945 between 
Germany and the U.S.S.A. are considered to be the key events of the 
20th century. They have become an important factor in the change of 
civilizational values and reference not only for people who have suffered 
catastrophic losses and destruction, but also for all of humanity. That is why 
there is an interest of the public opinion to these Wars. It’s significant that 
historical science should study some certain issues and problems. In 
Ukrainian historical science and foreign historiography there is a wide 
range of interests to topics concerning these Wars. It is presented by works of 
many directions. Certain aspects of the problem seemed to become the subject 
of the discussion among Ukrainian historians. As a result of this there was 
published a large number of new documents and materials. There was 
appeared a lot of research works and papers according to the problem of 
information policy of Germany and the Soviet Union. As far as a complex 
study of information policy of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and 
information confrontation of warring sides according to the information-
psychological impact on the population is absent. It should be pointed out a 
few questions with regard to studied problem: Why did information and 
ideological system created by the two States on their own territory begin to 
confront one another during an active information and ideological influence of 
the invaders on the population of the occupied territories? Why did using of 
the most advanced information technologies and methods of dissemination of 
information of 20-s of the XX c. seem to be not effectively to satisfy the 
desire of the Nazi leadership and realize plans of aggressive financial official 
quarters of Germany? 
The theme of information confrontation between Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union in 1941–1945 is a new one because of notions “information 
technology”, “informational-psychological influence” weren’t used by 
historians in the 1950–1980-s. The vast majority of historians and politicians 
of the Soviet Union believed that the USSR became the winner in the World 
War of 1941–1945 only due to people who worked in the rear, powerful 
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weapons and the patriotism of the soldiers who were ready to give his life for 
the Motherland. In this context the value of the information policy of both 
countries practically wasn’t studied. by Soviet historians. It belongs to the 
problem of the means and mechanisms of the information-psychological 
impact on the population. Soviet historians studied mainly an ideological 
propaganda among the population at the head of the Communist Party as an 
organizer of the struggle against German fascist invaders. That’s no doubt, 
that the Communist Party really played the role of an active Organizer: It was 
also conducted by the Government’s information policy which had to affect 
the consciousness and behavior of the personnel of the Red Army and the 
population of the occupied territories. 
At the end of 80-s of the XX century Soviet and foreign historians began 
to analyze the methods and mechanisms of Nazi’s in the period of occupation. 
As far as a policy and activity of the Soviet military leadership according to 
propaganda and a problem of information confrontation of both countries 
Soviet historians didn’t broach the question. Such analysis could have led to 
the conclusions that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had informational 
tools and means of equal worth in the period of war (Коваль 1988). 
Due to these facts it’s important that native historical science should give a 
deep study of information confrontation between two totalitarian States on 
occupied territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia during the World War of 
1941–1945. 
At the end of 1980-s a famous Ukrainian historian M. V. Koval began to 
investigate Nazi propaganda as a factor of impact on the moral state of the 
population of the occupied countries, including Ukraine. Studying the socio-
political life of the Ukrainian population he researched fascist propaganda and 
its basic principles. One of the most important achievements of his work was 
the study of the methods of Nazi propaganda which were to survey moral 
values and the Soviet outlook created by the Bolshevik Party. M. Koval 
investigated the activity of German popularization apparatus: ministries, 
departments, military propaganda departments. He carried out detailed review 
of the mechanisms of popularization effects on the local population. In his 
opinion “liberalism” which was demonstrated by the German occupational 
authorities in creating of local self-government bodies was extremely a 
powerful propaganda move. Nazi authorities found supporters among the 
local population who became to collaborate with local self-government 
bodies. Ethnic Germans (Fol’ksdojche) happened to be the background of that 
policy that created favorable conditions for them to work. The author wrote 
that an active information policy of Fol’ksdojche had provided a cooperation 
with the Gestapo, police and other German institutions. While studying the 
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socio-political life of the Ukrainian population during the German occupation 
M.Koval concluded that Nazi propaganda seemed to be inefficient one. 
In spite of activity of Nazi informational propaganda a large part of the 
population didn’t collaborate the cooperation with Nazi authorities. Moreover 
from spring 1942 people actively started cooperating with the Resistance 
(movement against Germany during World War II). Analyzing the moral and 
psychological state of the population, the researcher evaluates its activities 
from the positions of the Communist Party (Коваль 1999). 
The impact of Nazi and Soviet propaganda on the population of the 
occupied territories as information weapons is a subject of study of historians 
A. Ivlev and A. F. Udenkov. Their work is devoted to the political activities of 
the Communist Party on the occupied territories of the USSR during  
1941–1944. These historians offer a huge amount of actual material that 
illustrates the psychological impact of Nazi propaganda on the inhabitants of 
the occupied territories of the USSR. It should be noted that while considering 
the methods and techniques of Soviet propaganda the authors didn’t study 
profoundly the mechanisms of Nazi propaganda. Generally materials of their 
work give the possibility to compare and analyze German and Soviet 
advocacy activity (Ивлев 1988). 
The problem of informational policy of both totalitarian states and the 
advocacy structure of the Third Reich Government wasn’t the special subject 
of soviet historiography. Some aspects of this theme were studied by 
historians in the 80–90-s of the XX c. So the advocacy of Nazi Germany was 
studied in the works of historian D. A. Volkogonov, His works are devoted to 
information-ideological confrontation of the USSR and the West during the 
Cold war. “The author of the study showed that the Nazi propaganda 
techniques and methods had put into practice of Western Europe countries and 
the United States after the end of the World War II. It formed a bipolar world. 
The main aim of these studies was evidence of direct borrowing of NATO 
countries methods and techniques of Nazi propaganda” (Волкогонов 1983). 
Another Soviet historian Y. Orlov paid attention to the methods and 
principles of propaganda of the Third Reich on the base of profound analysis. 
The scientist denied on the myth that Nazi propaganda had been a perfect and 
professional one. The historian also criticized the principles of Nazi 
manipulation by people. In his work “The collapse of the Nazi-fascist 
propaganda during the War against the USSR” Orlov reveals the lie 
“technique” and the ideology of dictatorship, violence and racism. The 
scientist deals with the mechanisms of psychological warfare which Hitler 
fascism led against the peoples of the world. However, debunking the 
propaganda mechanism of Nazi Germany, the author doesn’t pay attention to 
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the research of the advocacy popularization structure of the Nazi apparatus 
(Орлов 1985). 
Studying an ideological and a political activity of the Communist Party of 
Ukraine during the War of 1941–1945 between Germany and the U.S.S.R. 
P.Grigorovich and other historians covered propaganda methods of Nazi 
Germany and ways of confrontation by the side of the Soviet Government 
(Григорович, 1976). The main idea of these works is considered to base on 
the conclusions that the Communist Party was the only consolidate power in 
the difficult conditions of the war to have directed the activity of all 
authorities and ordinary citizens by using this modern (for the time) the 
methods of ideological influence. 
At the beginning of the 1990s when Ukraine became an independent state 
native historians began to develop new directions in studying of the events of 
the World War II dealing with not only the activities of the Communist Party 
but also the activities of the OUN, UPA on the occupied territories. Ukrainian 
researchers had to investigate deeper this problem to coordinate their 
researches with works of foreign historians. Working not only with national 
archives and materials but also with the documents being published abroad 
Ukrainian historians began to take an active part at international conferences 
presenting new documental materials relating to the problems of the 
information space and information of propaganda. 
Due to the research of new archival materials and documents the World 
familiarized with scientific papers on various aspects of advocacy of Nazi 
Germany including the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Among 
these works there are some representatives of modern scholars: A. Kuchma, 
A. Nìkolajce, and G.Vetrov, A. Potil’ak, P. Rekotova, Y. Voloshin, and their 
Russian colleagues: MSemiragi. V. Tsymbala and G. Voronenkovoi. 
Important aspects of outreach policy of Nazi Germany were considered by 
native historians Y. Vološinim and A. Lysenko. Examining the situation of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the years of the Nazi occupation 
Y. Voloshin reviewed also the attitude of Nazi Germany to the Orthodox 
Church. Nazi attempts connected to the policy of collaboration among the 
local population by means of religious freedom propaganda is dealt with by 
Voloshin. In his work a scholar analyzes the anticommunist activities of the 
Orthodox Church in the western regions of Ukraine. He concludes that the 
clergy of the Orthodox and Catholic churches didn’t not only justify an 
aggressive policy of the Hungarian Government during the World War II but 
also provided financial assistance to conduct their policy (Волошин 1997). 
The work of A. Lysenko is devoted to the activity of religion’s authorities 
on the occupied territories of Ukraine during the Nazi-Fascist occupation.  
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The author coves the problem studying various aspects of the situation of the 
faithful and Orthodox Church: the position of the Orthodox Church to the 
Nazi-Soviet war, changes connected with occupation, a religious life of 
Ukrainian people on occupied territories that was intensified due to the special 
policy of the Nazi authorities. In the first months of the occupation there was 
renewed of the Church and the churches according to the goals of Nazi 
occupational administration to provide order and strengthen its position.  
O. Lysenko demonstrated the cooperation of the Ukrainian clergy with the 
occupying powers, and patriotic activities of religious figures who helped to 
survive the Jewish population against the Nazi regime. The religious question 
in the practice of Ukrainian nationalism is thought to be an important matter 
of his research Лисенко, 1998. As far as the study of the ideological aspects 
of the initial stage of World War II they present the most attractive pages of 
his work (Лисенко 2002). 
It’s important for the research of the ideologically-advocacy Nazi 
Germany on the occupied territories of Ukraine to analyze the work of 
Ukrainian historian V. Potilcaka. His scientific papers cover the ways of 
exploiting the occupied civil population labor of Ukraine by the leadership of 
the Third Reich. O. Potil’čak vividly reveals the propaganda activity of the 
German administration to provide to convince the local population to work for 
Germany by labor power. It should be pointed that some part of population 
agreed to work in Germany. The author concluded that there were people who 
were against Soviet power., and who really believed in the future of Ukraine 
under the tutelage of Germany. These facts proved to be arguments that the 
Nazi propaganda was rather effective at some stage of the ocupation 
(Потильчак 1996, 237). 
Nazi Germany waited for assistance and support in the creation of their 
own State from a large part of Ukrainians who didn’t satisfy the policy of the 
Soviet power on the territory of Western Ukraine, This idea of independent 
state of Western Ukraine attracted a significant number of Ukrainians and 
urged them to cooperate with the occupying authority. This question deeply 
was studied in the research of the historian A. Bolânovs’kogo. He analyzed 
activity of the self-determination movement in Ukraine. The author also 
reached certain conclusions. Firstly, the German leadership, despite his 
propaganda, never supported the intentions of the Ukrainian nationalists to 
create its own army, and especially the State. The existence of the same 
Division “Galichina” is known to have a little big impact on population not 
only of the District of Galicia, but also on the population of Rejhskomìsarìatu 
“Ukraine”, and the zone of military administration. A. Bolanovs’kij noted that 
the activities of the Division “Galichina” in the context of Ukrainian national 
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liberation movement had a moral and political influence on the population of 
Ukraine and had German propaganda to weak (Боляновський 2000). 
The work of the famous Ukrainian historian V. Serhiychuk, dedicated to 
Ukrainian national liberation movement to restore and strengthen the 
Ukrainian State on the occupied territories. In studying the author collected 
materials and documents about the leading mobile groups of OUN. They 
revealed the politiics of Nazi occupation Administration on the territory of 
Ukraine “Rejhskomìsarìatu” and the military administration. Thanks to the 
records of the OUN mobile groups the reaction of the local population to Nazi 
information and advocacy policy seemed to be a very valuable factor in this 
study. Serhiichuk carried out the facts that a part of the local population 
supported the “OUN’s underground” but Nazi propaganda did not give them 
the opportunity to join to this national liberation movement (Сергійчук 2005). 
In modern Ukrainian historiography there is studied the problem of the 
influence of the German propaganda on the socio-economic and cultural 
development of the occupied lands. The work of l historian I. M. Gajdaburi. 
“Exploring the Cultural and Educational Development of the Population of 
Ukraine “Rejhskomìsarìatu”, and the Zone of Military Administration”, the 
author stresses that with the invasion of Hitler’s army, most theaters began to 
work because the actors and Directors believed in the possibility of the revival 
of Ukrainian culture (Гайдабура 1998) “In this case Nazi propaganda – 
emphasized the author, – worked quite effectively, but only in the first months 
of the war”. The value of this research is dealt with studying not only the 
negative sides of cooperation of Ukrainian theatrical intelligentsia with the 
German administration. On other side, a lot of actors had the opportunity to 
work. And they tried to convey Ukrainian beauty and peculiarity of Ukrainian 
culture through theatrical performances to develop the State Ukrainian 
traditions and art. 
Applying innovative approaches of modern historical science historians. 
A. Skorobagatov and S.D. Gal’čak investigated the question of the influence of 
the German propaganda on soldiers of the Red Army and part of the population 
of the occupied territories. Considering the Kharkiv region and Podolia in the 
period 1941–1944 and revealing features of the life of the Ukrainian population 
in the German occupation these scientists analyze agitation-propaganda 
activities of the occupying administration. A. Skorobagatov explores the process 
of establishing a “New Order” when the cruel policy of the Nazis caused a 
complete breakdown of their outreach (Скоробагатов 2004). Gal’čak, studying 
documents and materials that affect the policy of the German invaders on the 
use of the “Eastern workers” for the strengthening of the Third Reich presents 
the histirians and the public opinion with separate propaganda materials that the 
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population of Podillya volunteered to go to Germany and work for the sake of 
the great future of new Europe. The author also reveals a picture of the horrific 
life and work of Ukrainian workers in Germany through the memories of most 
workers. Unfortunately, the question of the impact of Nazi propaganda wasdealt 
with the context in studying of general problems (Гальчак 2004). 
At the beginning of the new Millennium Ukrainian historians focus their 
attention on the moral and psychological state of the personnel of the Red 
Army, and the population of the occupied territories. Scientist’s goal is to 
understand the motives of men’s behavior in period of occupation and a total 
war. Having an idea of what is the “information policy” and “information 
space”, scientists examine the advocacy of Nazi Germany as a complex of 
measures aimed at the destruction of a significant part of the population of 
Eastern Europe. In this context attention is attracted by the work of 
“Renaissance Rose sharply on the German-Nazi occupation policy in the 
sphere of education”. Its author is J. Tarnawsky. There were studied the 
common problem of organization and activity of secondary educational 
institutions on the occupied territory of Donbass and the issue of the 
implementation of education policy, which was aimed at the humiliation of 
the Ukrainian people and its destruction. Exploring the politics of Nazi power 
on the territory of the Donetsk region he states that an occupying power in 
order to reduce the intellectual level of the Ukrainian youth purposefully 
undermined the education system. Through its facilitation and later complete 
elimination, Nazi Administration tried to deprive citizens of cultural traditions 
and turn them into obedient workers (Тарнавський 2005, 125). 
Studying the moral and psychological state of the soldiers of the Red Army 
and the mood of the population at the beginning of the Nazi-Fascist occupation, 
Ukrainian historian. Y. Nìkolaêc’ notes that part of the population did not want 
to go to defend the Soviet country because of being declared “enemies of the 
people”. But not all of the population believed the German propaganda began a 
coperation with Nazi regime. Y. Nìkolaêc’ notes that a large part of the 
population took waiting position and observed information from the fronts. 
Analyzing the moral and psychological state of the population, he concludes 
that with the progress of the war, the attitude to the Nazi occupation 
administration and the Hitlerite regime in General dramatically changed as a 
result of the victories of the Red Army (Ніколаєць 1999). 
To present the disclosure of the complete picture of the information policy of 
Nazi Germany is important to analyze the work of the famous Ukrainian historian 
B. Chernyakov. While studying the history of journalism he had devoted a 
considerable attention to the investigation of periodicals during World War II.  
It was completed by the newspapers and magazines which were released on the 
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occupied Nazi army. Scientists analyzed the conditions that it was formed when 
the press began functioning on the territory of Ukraine “Rejhskomìsarìatu” and in 
the area of military administration. Exploring the base instructions of the 
periodical printed devices, the author had defined the level of significance of the 
press for the Nazi occupation authorities and wrote that the press seemed to play 
the leading role in the Third Reich (Черняков 2006, 52). 
A modern historical science demands that the problem of studying such a 
common phenomenon as collaboration which was the result of a strong 
information policy of the Nazi Government on occupied territories should be 
studied by native and foreign historians. There is the obvious fact that a certain 
portion of the population was to collaborate with the new authorities under the 
influence of propaganda existed by the Nazi Germany on the occupied 
territories. For a long time the Soviet historiography has attempted to avoid 
coverage of the matter. Let us not forget about the fact that everyone who 
worked on the occupied territories unambiguously called “enemies of the 
people”, although the people ought to work for different reasons. This fact made 
them cooperate with the occupying powers. To understand this important 
matter, comprehend the phenomenon of collaboration helped the work of 
V. Šajkan “Collaboration on the territory of Rejhskomìsarìatu” “Ukraine”“ and 
“War Zones in World War II”. The theme of her research is closely linked with 
the problem, which is considered in this paper, because the cooperation of the 
population of the occupied territories with the occupational regime was directly 
dependent on the quality of the Nazi information policy. The researcher 
determined the objective reasons of collaboration among the population and the 
extent of the impact on this phenomenon of agitation-propaganda work by the 
German occupation Administration (Шайкан 2005, 234). 
Historian O. Lysenko suggests that new conceptual approaches should be 
adopted in studying of World War II. He singled out such an important trend 
in the research of native historians as social history. Having examined the 
social aspects of the occupation of the Ukraine he explored the social policy 
of the German Government and the reasons of collaboration of all strata of the 
Ukrainian population. The scientist critically notes that: “the Bolshevik 
government, the Nazi authorities did not propose for the local population 
fundamentally new ways of living. Agitation-propaganda campaign led by the 
German authorities on the occupied lands of Ukraine was carried out only in 
order to obtain voluntary labor for the economy of the Third Reich and to 
force peasants to work in collective farms. Analyzing propaganda campaign 
of Nazi power O. Lysenko concludes that the system of collective 
responsibility set by the Nazis was in not much different from the Soviet 
collectivism (Лисенко 2007, 7) 
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The work of V. Grineviča,is devoted to Stalin’s policy according to 
national minorities during World War II. Examining the overall problem the 
author highlights the advocacy activities of units of the Wehrmacht being 
directed at the education of soldiers of the German army with an aim to bring 
up men with ideas of racial superiority. V. Hrynevych states that the system of 
officer’s education was introduced with the use of such tools and techniques 
as: lectures, films, radio shows, carefully designed leisure park. The military 
leadership used the reports prepared the Nazi theorists (Гриневич 2005, 184). 
Ukrainian historians went further in the study of indicated problems. There 
was published a good deal of works devoting to Nazi propaganda on occupied 
territories of Ukraine. In particular the problem of Nazi propaganda in occupied 
Kiev was studied by M. Mykhaylyuk. In her papers there were covered the tools 
used by an occupying power to influence on the population of the city. Among 
them: radio-cinema-propaganda, newspapers and magazines that had printed on 
the territory of Ukraine “Rejhskomìsarìatu”. The work is a very valuable and an 
important one. But that the researcher sees propaganda as an instrument which 
was operated by Hitler’s power structure for the implementation of the impact 
on the population of the occupied territories of Ukraine. However the author has 
not explored propaganda as an element of global information policy of Nazi 
Germany (Михайлюк 2005, 288). 
The question of the impact of Nazi propaganda on the personnel of the 
Red Army and the population of the occupied territories through the means of 
propaganda created by Vermahtom, explored the Ukrainian historian 
D. Titarenko. Studying the reports of German battalions of propaganda the 
scientist revealed the system their activities on the occupied territories of 
Ukraine, the methods used by them, as well as determined the degree of 
impact of their activities on the population of the occupied territories of 
Ukraine (Титаренко 2005, 167). Unfortunately the author of the study does 
not illuminate the advocacy of German battalions propaganda as part of the 
whole of the information policy of the Third Reich on occupied territories 
(Титаренко 2010, 480). 
A great attention must be paid to the research of Russian, German, British 
and American scientists-historians and Essayists. The subject of their works is 
connected with the World War II. They introduced important captured 
documents, and the publication of bibliographic research and memoir 
literature to scientific circulation We are interested in analyzing of studies 
devoting to the themes of our research: “Information confrontation between 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–1945”; “Information 
technologies applied by the Governments of both countries to influence the 
consciousness and the moral and psychological state of its own population and 
the population of the adversary”. 
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The problem of informational influence on the awareness of the population 
of the occupied territories during the World War II virtually was studied’ in 
the period of the Soviet Union without introducing such notions “information 
technology”, “German information space”, “tools and mechanisms of 
formation of information space”. Despite the fact that in the USSR the 
mechanisms and means of propaganda influence on the population have been 
studied by experts of special services and administrations, historians studied 
mainly ideological propaganda among the population with the priority that 
demonstrated the advantages of Socialist life. Partially historians covered the 
methods and mechanisms of agitation and propaganda used by Nazi Guide 
and the German occupation authorities. 
In comparison Germany there is another situation. There the NSDAP came 
to power and began active opened work presented by the Ministry’s 
management of propaganda and education. This authority developed the 
mechanisms and means of influence on the population and the personnel of 
the army. So much attention to the means of information impact was caused 
by the horrible defeat in the period of the World War I. The first study of 
information policy of the Third Reich is known to have appeared in 60–70s of 
the twentieth century. 
During this period there were published works by Soviet historians which 
had analyzed occupation policy of the Nazi army on the territories of the 
U.S.S.R. The works of D. Melnikov, L Black, soviet writer I..Ginzburg reveal 
the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda. In his work “Those meetings” 
(“Potustoronnie vstrechi”) I. Ginsburg emphasized the personal responsibility 
of the leaders of the Third Reich according to the policy that they carried out 
on the occupied countries of Europe and in the Soviet Union. It coves the 
political priorities of Nazi Germany and the consequences of propaganda 
which was carried out on the occupied territories (Гинзбург 1990). L. Black, 
exploring the Nazi apparatus dictatorship and its advocacy activities, 
concluded that  Nazi Germany as a totalitarian state became a special form 
and control over all spheres of social and political life. It had been installed 
only the social democratic party. The work of l. Black is considered to be the 
first to have described the mechanisms of influence of the person or group of 
persons on the society in general and Germany in particular (Черная 1992). 
The attempts to establish an information blockade for the population of 
Germany in the context of information policy of Nazi Germany was studied 
by famous Russian historian I. Bezimensky. In his work “Third front. The 
Secret Diplomacy of the World War II” the author reveals the period of the 
military rise of the Third Reich and the true intentions of major European 
countries and the United States that arose in the early 30s of the 
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twentieth century. In his research the scientist tryed to uncover the 
information policy of the Western powers that sought the hands of Nazi 
Germany to solve the problem in Eastern Europe (Безыменский 2003). 
In the common work on the history of national socialism widely reported 
the ideology of German fascism and its ideological. In the biggest 
uzagal’nûval’nomu a study of German fascism – monographs A. Galkina-
national-socialist ideology and its implementation in the information policy of 
the Nazi Germany are examined in more detail than previous  the works of 
Soviet researchers. The author reveals the essence of the outreach activities of 
the National Socialist Party in Germany and its plans for the occupied 
territories of the USSR. As a research scientist for the first time were analyzed 
socio-psychological bases and socialist system component of Nazi ideology 
(Галкин 1967). 
It was stated above in the works of Soviet and modern historians the 
subject of studying is an ideological propaganda which was directed on the 
population of their own country and the armies. Unfortunately the concept of 
“information space” has not yet become the object of attention of scientists-
historians who have studied the problem of the World War II and great 
patriotic wars. The propaganda of the USSR and Germany seemed not to 
research by native historians as full information policy aimed at the 
population and the armed forces of the enemy in the 80–90-ies of the 
twentieth century. 
In the 1960–1970s works and papers of foreign historians due to the 
information confrontation and the mechanisms and means of popularization of 
its influence became the subject of scientific investigations. 
The first works on the territory of Western Europe, which also analyzed 
information policy of the Third Reich, were written by direct participants in 
the events of World War II: members of the Nazi Government, officials of the 
Ministry of propaganda and education in Germany in the 40–50-ies of the 
twentieth century. Western European historians and publicists started studying 
the events of World War II, using material collected and saved by the war 
event’s participants of 1939–1945. It should be noted that most of these 
researchers had accessed to the unknown Soviet historians materials which 
gave an opportunity to witness the events of World War II from a position of 
the observers. On the other hand the European historians didn’t know about a 
true situation on the front and in the rear as the Red Army and Wehrmacht. 
Despite this fact, the period taken in foreign historiography of an extremely 
important place. The German, British and American historians have even 
shared the writings of more deeply explore information policy in Germany 
and the Soviet Union, and their interrelationship and opposition. There were 
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works where priority was given to the investigation of certain aspects of 
socio-political, and socio-economic life of the population of the USSR being 
under Nazi occupation. Unfortunately there is no the generalized study in 
historiography’s heritage which would belong to the question of German 
information space and information confrontation of the USSR and Germany 
as a separate scientific theme. For a long period most this theme wasn’t the 
subject of the historical literature in order to give another characteristics of the 
occupation period in the USSR and other countries occupied by Nazi 
Germany. Some works of German historians A. Hadamovsky, N. Muller, 
P. Longerìha, R. Koela, etc. are thought to present the literature that had 
showed the effectiveness of information policy in Germany. It should be 
noted that German historians play an active role in studying this theme. If we 
analyze 10-th volume’s edition of the series “The German Reich and the 
World War II” we can know about the process of creating the National 
Socialist Party in Germany and unprecedented in the history of the world 
system of state manipulation of the human masses in the history, and the 
information space being controlled by Nazi leadership Accordingly a special 
attention was paid to the disclosure of questions concerning the preparation of 
Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union, and the formation of system for 
informational and psychological warfare against the Red Army and the 
civilian population. According to works of the historians the Nazi propaganda 
was supposed to shake the morale of the Red Army, and promote the 
disorganization of the Soviet rear and organize a work of the local population 
on the occupied territories A final goal was to form new stereotypes of Soviet 
citizens on the base of Nazi ideology. 
Propaganda policy of Nazi Germany,and its influence on the psychological 
state of the population in the period of the temporary occupation of Ukraine 
and Belarus was studied by the next Western European scholars and American 
historians D. Amstrong, G. Dzouet, I. Kersou, P. Longerìh, J. Fest, Balfor, 
Soesman, Vìperrman and others. A characteristic feature of their works is the 
widespread use of documents of the Nuremberg process, archival materials of 
European countries, and the participants’ memories of the Soviet partisans and 
members of Ukrainian national liberation movements. However, consideration 
of the features of the occupation regime established by the Nazis on captured 
territories became the main subject of historiography of World War II. A lot 
of historians investigate Nazi propaganda mainly in the period of formation of 
the National Socialist Party in Germany. The informational propaganda of the 
Third Reich directed on the population of the occupied territories of the USSR 
separately is not detached in German historiography. This side of the activity 
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of the Nazi leadership was considered only in the general framework of the 
investigations. 
The first step in examining of coming of the National-Socialist Party in 
Germany was the work of an eye-witness of the events Goebbels – 
O. Hadamovskì. Being a direct participant and witness of the activity of the 
Third Reich as a specialist-an expert of the formation of public opinion he 
explored mechanisms and technology influence by the means of propaganda 
on the population of Germany. Such activities caused O. Hadamovskì to carry 
out research in this area to determine its effectiveness. He concluded that an 
experience of exploring the propaganda techniques of the NSDAP was a very 
important to study by all historian scholars. He came to the conclusions that 
the propaganda and differentiated use of force had to supplement each other. 
They never are absolute opposites. The use of force should be a part of the 
propaganda. This principle, according to O. Hadamovskì, was ignored by the 
National-Socialist Party after coming to power in Germany (Hadamowsky 
1933). His works gave a great number of materials for the study of the themes 
for researches and opened the way to study such a global modern weapons as 
information policy. 
Many studies were carried out on the basis of a large array of archival 
materials, documents and diaries of the direct participants in the events of the 
World War. The work of J. Amstronga “Soviet Partisans in World War II” 
should be considered an important one in this context. This work was written 
on the basis of numerous documentary materials: reports and messages of 
Nazi political and military leaders and officials of the occupation 
administration and the Wehrmacht. The researcher highlights the activities of 
the propaganda departments of the Wehrmacht against the Soviet partisans on 
the occupied territories. According to the point of the historian view the 
activity of Soviet partisans really caused the influence of propaganda on the 
population to weak and forced occupation authorities to use all new 
techniques of influence (Armstrong 1964, 2007). Armstrong wrote about the 
nature and significance of the combative partisan movement during the 
World War II. Historians of Germany and the USSR concluded different 
statements in estimating of “spontaneous” patriotic reaction of the population, 
and of courage and organizational abilities of local party leaders who had 
guided the activities of the Central Party. His work is the first attempt to bring 
clarity on these issues through regular research of the large number of German 
and Soviet documents being presented at the end of the World War II 
(Armstrong 1964, 2007). 
The plans of Nazi Germany for capturing the living space of the USSR 
was dealt with famous German historian N. Müller. While focusing on the 
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main problem of the role of the Wehrmacht and its governing bodies in the 
implementation of the fascist occupation regime on the Soviet territory the 
author reveals the reason for the breakdown of the plans of the German 
occupation administration and, as a result, the collapse of the occupation 
regime. An important part of the work is devoted to the consideration of the 
matter of the failure of the attempts of fascist occupation authorities to create 
Nazi regime by political and social demagogy and information policy. The 
author has managed to uncover the true role of the Wehrmacht in the planning 
and implementation of occupation policy on the occupied territory of the 
USSR during the World War II. 
Analyzing the individual aspects of the information policy of Nazi 
Germany Mueller has made conclusions that the political goal of Germany 
was to eradicate Bolshevism and Communist ideology and Soviet State. 
In solving the economic problems of the Third Reich the Nazis planned to 
convert the captured territories in South-Eastern Europe in agro-raw 
appendage Grand Germany’s economic sphere and an important market for its 
industrial products (Мюллер 1974). 
A great interest of German researchers caused to the activities of 
institutions of the Nazi popularization system created by the NSDAP after the 
coming to power. German historian P. Longerìh explored the advocacy of the 
foreign Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the problem of 
using of radio by the Nazi leadership. He analyzed the structure of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs defining the place and role of the Department in 
the information policy of the Third Reich Longerih revealed the methods and 
technologies of influence on the population of Europe by means of the radio 
broadcasting and periodicals. The author observed that the radio had been 
used by the leadership of the Third Reich with the aim of psychological 
processing of the population and had become one of the main methods of Nazi 
information policy (Longerich 1987). 
An important aspect of the research of the historian is to study the activity 
of the punitive machine of Nazi Germany, and the role of Himmler in the 
party hierarchy, and organization of National Socialist terror and destruction 
of the Jews. The realization of the plans according to the destruction of the 
population of the occupied countries that did not relate to the “Nordic race” 
started existing after the beginning of the World War II. P. Longerìh covered 
the stages of formation of the consciousness of Himmler in terms of 
development and consolidation of the National-Socialist ideas. He presented 
compelling evidence that Himmler had become cynical, cold-blooded, creator 
and performer of the oppressive policy of the Reich. A massive punitive 
campaign in Poland, the Soviet Union and other countries, creating the vast 
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network of concentration camps, mass deportation of the population for slave 
labor in Germany were evidence of the  policy. The most terrible crime 
Himmler, according to researcher became the Holocaust, which had destroyed 
more than 6 million people of Jewish nationality (Лонгерих 2008). 
Unfortunately, in the context of these studies, P. Longerìh doesn’t not 
consider the information policy of Germany as one of the global causes of loss 
of political authority of Germany in Europe. 
R. Koel is one of European researchers who studied the decrees of the 
Nazi Government to create new German colonies in the occupied eastern 
territories and to form a new peasantry of Folksdoiche. The study of these 
documents helped to define what role the Nazi Government according to 
departure of German peasants on the occupied territory. One of the 
following decrees was the beginning of the brutal directives and orders 
which denoted German policy on the occupied territories of Ukraine. 
R. Koel made the conclusion that the results of such decrees were provided 
by a juxtaposition of different peoples on the occupied territory. It is 
significant that R. Koel managed to have analyzed the propaganda being 
conducted by an occupying power among the rural population, and its 
impact on the consciousness and behavior of peasants in the first months of 
the occupation (Koehl 1957). 
The structure of the popularization of the apparatus of the Wehrmacht and 
his activity among enemy troops were studied by a military historian 
A. Buhbender. His works are devoted to the study of Nazi leaflets distributed 
in the years of the World War on the fronts and in the field of fighting 
(Buchbender 1974). 
In his work he noted that the first phase of the war propaganda against the 
Red Army had the euphoria character connected with the success of Nazi army 
and the destruction of Red army moral and psychological state at the beginning 
of war. The historian stated that the leadership of Nazi Germany had understood 
that propaganda was a powerful tool for carrying out the desired policy. That 
was why a great attention had been paid to the activity at the front. Significant is 
the conclusions that The preparation of the propaganda war against the Soviet 
Union at the same time seemed to have been existed and have been trained a 
long before the events. April 1, 1939 when the Supreme command of the armed 
forces – RCC (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – OKW) was created by the 
“Wehrmacht-propaganda”. On the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union 
Ministry of propaganda organized “General Oriental Space authority” 
(Generalreferat Ostraum) headed by Eberhardom Taubertom, It is often referred 
to as well as Organization Vìneta which was transformed into the Department of 
the East (Ost Abteilung) in 1943. These institutions became the main centres of 
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the Organization at the forefront of propaganda front line among “Eastern 
volunteers” (Buchbender 1974). 
German historians G. Forsterch and G. Snìtter investigated the activities of 
Prus-German general staff in 1640–1965 including its work in the conditions 
of World War II in the context of this problem. They regarded the activities of 
the leadership of the Wehrmacht and its concept of war. G. Snìtter defined the 
role of propaganda in German acting army among the soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht and the troops of the enemy (Ферстерч 1966). The scientist 
concluded that the Department was in charge of all the activities that had an 
impact on the society of the Third Reich and its borders. G. Snìtter focused on 
three main directions of information policy of the Wehrmacht: the propaganda 
among the German population and military personnel; propaganda in the 
army; “the propaganda against the enemy”, i.e. the impact on the armed forces 
and the civilian population. 
Tthe works of Australian historian M. Balfora devoted to the study of 
advocacy and informational propaganda of Germany on the eastern front are 
considered to have important documental materials. In particular the author 
revealed a scheme due to Ministry of the Eastern occupied territories and of 
the Wehrmacht on the occupied territories of the USSR was built (Balfour 
1979). It is important to cover the external information policy of Nazi 
Germany in 1939–1945. There is studied a foreign propaganda aimed at the 
countries of Western and Eastern Europe by this historian. 
American researchers E. Dgovet and O. Donell studied ideological 
conception of A. Hitler and the National Socialist Party advocacy among the 
population of Germany. They distinguished the basic principles of Hitler’s 
propaganda ideas recommended by him. G. Dgovet stated that such advocacy 
had helped the NSDAP power to grab and control almost all spheres of life of 
German society for short term (Jowett 1992). 
A comprehensive information policy of Nazi Germany was researched by 
English scientist I. Kersou. Having studied activities of A. Hitler the author 
had examined the Nazi propaganda as a system. To I. Kersou’s mind the idea 
and the image of the new State was persistently implemented in the life of 
society and the consciousness of every German citizen. The method proved to 
be a very effective for psychological treatment. Examining the documentary 
sources I Kersou presented facts that had proved the effectiveness of 
psychological processing of large parts of society especially the middle class 
and the peasantry. In his work the scientist focuses on the fact that under the 
influence of information policy conducted by the Ministry of propaganda a 
significant number of peasants teamed up and created an organization of 
“peasants Union” which took the responsibility of agricultural production for 
the Third Reich (Кершоу 1997). 
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The agitation activity guide of the National-Socialist Party touched the 
working class. Carrying out this question American historian V. Soesman 
showed that A. Hitler and Nazi Germany realized the program which was 
directed to the workers as the main driving force in formation of Third Reich. 
The workers were said about a new social policy connected with the 
occupation of eastern territories. According to the researcher’s work oratory 
art of A. Hitler and Goebbels gave just shocking t results in the presence of a 
huge audience. In his opinion the development of broadcasting was expanded 
not only on the territory of the Germany but also in the territories of other 
countries, in particular on the occupied lands (Soeseman 2002). 
The German national idea happened to play an important role in the public 
opinion of the post-war Germany. As the German researcher Vìperrman 
concluded that nationalism represented such movement for the revival of the 
German national ideas and was widely used by A. Hitler in his speeches 
before the workers and other population of Nazi Germany. This type of the 
propaganda made post-war Germany rouse the masses in any case 
(Wipperman 1989). 
Analysis of papers of native and foreign scholars on the issue of the 
formation of the German information space in the zone of military 
administration and in areas controlled Rejhskomìsarìatu “Ukraine” in the 
years of the World War II allow to conclude that there is evidence that 
scientists use different methodological and informational and ideological 
principles and approaches in the study of this problem. Despite this fact the 
theme remains scantily explored. 
Historiographical overview indicates that the problem of information 
confrontation between Germany and the Soviet Union needs deep study and 
definition of certain important issues that require an objective judgement. It is 
desirable that the German information space and the rapid dissemination of 
Nazi propaganda among the population of the occupied regions of Ukraine 
should be studied covering complex political, military, social, and 
psychological situation that existed in the years of war. 
With the beginning of the German occupation there was began a massive 
information attack on the consciousness of the population of Ukraine. Local 
residents expressed a different attitude towards the occupation of the 
Administration. So a small part of the population was to collaborate with 
German soldiers with ideological motives. It believed in changes for the 
better. Other part of inhabitants took waiting position. Some of the inhabitants 
realizing the true plans of the Nazis tried to resist and support the Soviet 
partisans and underground fighters. There was also a certain part of the 
population who represented participants of the different directions of 
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Ukrainian Self-Government movement. The following categories of 
population were pressed by the influence of the German information policy 
and propaganda. It had the civilian population to be in a state of 
discouragement, loss, doom and terror. In our opinion such information and 
advocacy policy of the German occupation administration put questions 
before a large part of the population: who was a really an enemy? With whom 
and against whom to fight, and fight at all? An important factor of propaganda 
turned out to be Ukrainian national movements. They, on the one hand, 
offered locals an alternative to fight against all the creation of their own State 
and made situation be more difficult for the peasantry. 
Considering the individual works of foreign historians, it should be noted 
that the information policy of the Nazi Germany and its attempt to create in 
Europe and on the occupied territories a special information space happened 
to pay attention of historians and Essayists from Russia, Great Britain, the 
United States and Germany. Contemporary vision and understanding of the 
information policy, information space helps scientists to study 
comprehensively the events of World War II and the German-Soviet war. 
Information confrontation between the USSR and Nazi Germany increasingly 
attracts the attention of modern scholars and its study helps to cover a full 
picture of the events of 1939–1945. However it should be noted that historians 
of Germany, the United States and Great Britain dealt with Nazi propaganda 
on the territory of the Third Reich and its influence on the Red Army and the 
population of the occupied territories of the USSR mainly in the context of the 
Eastern policy of the Nazi Germany. 
90-ies of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 21st century were 
marked with the emergence of numerous works of Russian historians who studied 
ideological and political activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and the military leadership of the country during World War II. In the context of 
this theme there were studied the periodical printed publications, information 
Bureau, oral advocacy, propaganda among the personnel of the Red Army and the 
population of the occupied territories in Ukraine and Belarus. 
That’s no doubt that the work of A. Sirokorad is considered to be original 
one. The author investigates the activities of Central printed periodicals and 
their impact on the population of the rear and occupied areas of the USSR 
(Широкорад 2002). 
Basic principles of Soviet propaganda were also investigated by 
N. Kamenieva who had covered the activities of Party propaganda organs of 
the USSR, and the forms and methods of work of the female part of the 
population including the deliberations of the anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet 
women (Каменева 2004). 
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A great attention to the leadership of the Soviet Union during the war was 
focused on the creation of the image of the enemy-fascist. This idea became 
the key of the soviet propaganda in the activities of the party and the military 
authorities. This aspect was dealt with the work of the Russian historian 
A. Fateev. He noted that Soviet propaganda was not less efficient than 
German because there were modern techniques and technologies of 
ideological influence on the population and the personnel working as of its 
own and enemy armies (Фатеева 1999). 
Some individual Russian historians present material about the system of 
ideological impact that there was constructed in the USS, long before the start 
of the war. The work of M. Mazuricky is devoted to the changes according to 
the ideologically-advocacy having spread its influence on social 
consciousness and the consciousness of each individual in particular. He 
managed to reveal the directions of professional activities of librarians in the 
years of war (Мазурицкий 1995). 
In his work “Soviet Propaganda in the Great Patriotic War” Russian 
historian A. Gorlov gave the historical-political analysis of Institute of the 
Soviet Communist Party propaganda of the period of the Great Patriotic war. 
The author managed to identify the basic structure and resource potential of 
propaganda as well as to detect and identify the main stages of the outreach 
work among personnel of the Red Army and population in the rear during the 
war. While analyzing a significant number of documents the historian had 
determined the degree of effectiveness of the Soviet military propaganda 
expressed in the form of their manifestation (Горлов 2009). 
Having confirmed the thesis that the Soviet information and ideological 
influence was no less powerful than the Nazi. the work of I. Livsina and 
I. Orlova (“Soviet Propaganda in the Great Patriotic War, and Communication 
Conviction”) introduced a large number of archival documents and materials. 
The authors covered the structure and mechanisms of functioning of the 
Soviet propagandist’s apparatus during the War of 1941–1945 between 
Germany and the U.S.S.R. For the first time in the Russian historiography 
there were comprehensively investigated and published promotional materials 
of the Communist Party and State. They revealed various forms, methods and 
techniques of influence on the soldiers at the front and the civilian population 
in the rear and on the occupied territory. New found documents are known to 
denote the effects of Soviet propaganda on the rear and the occupied 
territories, as well as the depth and effectiveness of propaganda’s impact on 
mass consciousness wholly (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны: «коммуникация убеждения» и мобилизационные 
механизмы 2007). 
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It should be noted that such powerful information attack carried out by 
Nazi Germany made the USSR resist on it by not less powerful informational 
and ideological weapon. There was the Soviet leadership. The information-
ideological machine that had a big impact on the vast majority of the 
population of the State had been functioning successfully for 24 years. 
Recently the Internet network has become a necessary source of 
information and means to study the problems of military history of the 
World War II. There are being created the sites that dedicated to the activities 
of the Nazi administration on the occupied territories of Ukraine, and the 
activity of the Wehrmacht and military units formed with representatives of 
national minorities living on the territory of Ukraine “Rejhskomìsarìatu” and 
the military administration. These sites are completed by archival documents 
and photo albums (Допрос подсудимого Шпеера 1946). Internet gives 
opportunity to get an information about a foreign historiography. Computer 
technologies promote the use of new methodological and technological 
methods to study the sources, and to model the social processes, to do an 
operational systematization of all documents and materials. 
The Internet seemed to expand the historical source’s base devoting to the 
study of the information policy of the Nazi Germany in the occupied 
territories of Ukraine. The information policy of the Nazi Germany and the 
Nazis are being discussed on the basis of the wide use of directories of 
archival materials, documents, Ukrainian and Russian archives. 
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SECTION 2.1. 
UKRAINE IN THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY-POLITICAL 
STRATEGY OF NAZI GERMANY  
 
Throughout the 20th century Ukraine and its territory were under close 
attention of the European countries and the managements, at first the Russian 
Empire, after the USSR, and today – the Russian Federation. “The Ukrainian 
question” became one of the important aspects in geopolitical and military-
political plans of these states. In particular, in the thirties of the20-th century the 
Ukrainian lands happened to became a subject of military-political plans of Nazi 
Germany (“The Third Reich”). The political leadership of the “Third Reich” had 
concrete plans for the territory of Ukraine as “living floor space” for the German 
colonists and resource base in aggressive plans in the east of Europe. 
The military-political strategy of Nazi Germany expressed main objectives 
and tasks of the National Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (further – 
NSDAP). The German national socialists under the motto of “expansion of 
living floor space for Germans” actually sought to establish dominance in 
eastern countries and to reach the aggressive ambitions. 
The political concept developed by the political leadership of the Third 
Reich represented a complex of views of implementation of policy by the 
state, public organizations, certain citizens. In Germany conceptual 
framework of state policy actually became the doctrine reflected also for 
Party’s political struggle and turned into ideology. 
According to the political concept in Germany it was developed military-
political strategy which represented set of political actions in the field of 
safety and defense, to the state system of the military-political ideas, beliefs 
and practical measures, defined the purposes and the general orientation of 
political struggle, a form, methods and ways of its maintaining, reflected 
military aspects of the highest national interests and safety of the state. 
Military-political strategy of Hitler’s Germany of the 30th years consisted 
in the development and realization of a complex of the most important 
military-political tasks, Formation of the sequence of their performance, 
definition of the main directions and purposes of military policy at different 
stages of formation of the “Third Reich” and warfare, definition of the 
corresponding arrangement of military-political forces and development of the 
plan of their use for the longest period. 
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The main questions and the general orientation of military-political 
strategy of fascist Germany were defined on a national level. It systemically 
and purposefully considered features of a social-political system and the final 
purpose of the state, the actual level of its military power, economic, political, 
diplomatic abilities in favor of the solution of important military-political 
tasks by providing a whole country and regional security of the state. The 
military-political strategy of fascist Germany took the defining place in 
relation onto tactics of military-political actions. 
Hitler’s military-political strategy became an important setup of the 
military policy of Germany. It expressed socio-political, strategic and military 
and technical bases of the military doctrine, character and problems of 
military strategy of the state. 
According to the concept and the strategy of Nazi Germany the Hitler’s 
administration developed the principles of military policy: 
 Compliance to long-term political goals and a military-political situation 
in Germany, Europe and the world in the 20–30th years of the 20th century; 
 Use political, economic, diplomatic and military measures for the 
solution of constant military-political tasks; 
 Use of social and economic and strategic advantages of the country; 
 Identification and use of weak and weak spots in the military system of 
the state opponents And also contradictions in the system of their relations; 
 The solution of military-political and strategic tasks, with the minimum 
moral and political and material inputs; 
 The attraction of the party of the maximum number of allies and 
ensuring unity of joint efforts; 
Consecutive weakening of potential opponents. 
With the coming to the leadership of the Nazis in Germany gaining new 
“living floor space” for Germans as people of the highest race became a main 
goal of foreign policy as A. Hitler proclaimed in the work “Mayne Kampf”. 
He noted: “... For Germany the only possibility of carrying out healthy 
territorial policy consists only in gaining new lands in Europe... It is necessary 
to understand clearly that these objectives can be achieved only by war”. 
Today we speak to Noyesli about new lands in Europe, first of all, we have to 
mean only Russia and border states subject to it” (Hitler 1943, 147, 152–155, 
741–742, 766–767). The Nazi Fuhrer understood the western republics of the 
USSR, including Ukraine as the last. This thesis demonstrates that Hitler well 
understood that Germany had an uncountable raw richness of the Urals, the 
woods of Siberia, fertile plains of Ukraine – it would become a powerful raw 
basis of the Third Reich in the adoption of the domination over Europe, and 
eventually and over the world. 
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The leading role in the development of the foreign policy concept of the 
German fascism belonged to the monopolistic bourgeoisie of Germany to 
increase the capitals and to expand economic influence. Monopolistic circles 
paid much attention to east expansion in future. An example of it is the letter 
which was sent to Hitler in October, 1933 on behalf of the board of Deutsche 
Bank. In it was noted that the German people have an opportunity to receive 
territory in the east. According to bankers when a part of the German people 
finds the homeland in the east, then it will be possible to think also of 
occupation of other territories (Auf antisowjetischem Kriegskurs. Studien zur 
militarischen Vorbereitung des deutschen Imperialismus auf die Aggression 
gegen die UdSSR (1933–1941) 1970, 64). 
The German bourgeoisie and financial oligarchs sought for expansion of 
the field of the activity and east territories, according to them, were still a little 
more developed, not mastered. Territories of the USSR, in particular the 
Ukrainian SSR, they considered a perennial spring of cheap raw materials. So 
in November, 1938 large industrialists, the radical revisionists and aggressive 
anti-Semite entering in a political fraction led by A. Rekhberg sent to the chief 
of imperial office the appeal in which they noted: 2The space of Russia is 
object of expansion of Germany..., it has inexhaustible potential riches in the 
field of agricultural industry and raw material resources which are not 
developed yet. If we want that expansion provided to Germany 
transformations to the empire from sufficient for its needs agrarian and a 
source of raw materials, then it will be necessary to occupy all Russian 
territories to the Urals including areas where huge ore riches” (Айххольц 
2002, 62–89). 
About plans of the German financial oligarchy and Hitlerite management 
it is possible to judge also on record about a meeting of members of the 
economic headquarters “East” and methods of its realization which took place 
on May 2, 1941.Ttheir purpose was robbery of the Soviet areas which were 
planned to be occupied. At a meeting it was stated that it would be possible to 
continue war only if the armed forces of Germany on the third year of war 
were provided with food from Russia. At the same time most of the 
participants of the meeting recognized that downloading from the country of 
natural resources necessary for Germany, would lead to the fact that tens of 
millions of people would be doomed to hunger. Despite it the most important 
crops which will go as food for providing the German troops were defined. 
In this context it was important to restore the industrial enterprises. It was 
decided to restore only those which make scarce products. Among them: 
Plants on construction of vehicles; The plants on construction of the 
constructions used in various industries of delivery (steel constructions); 
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Textile Enterprises; The military enterprises – only such which are not enough 
in Germany. Also, it was offered to organize a large number of repair shops 
for military needs (Дашичев 2005, 23–24.). 
In spite of the fact that on August 23, 1939 between Hitlerite Germany and 
the USSR the Non-aggression pact was signed and the confidential additional 
protocol is signed, Germany continued to make plans of a campaign in the 
East. Germany allocated the special place in the aggressive plans to the Soviet 
Union, including Ukraine. In its territory Germany intended to create the 
German military settlement which population had to become “the dominating 
race”. In the context of this policy the program of creation of country farms 
from ethnic Germans was developed. 
The Hitlerite political leadership and management systematically made 
plans for occupation of east territories. On July 21, 1940, for the first time 
reporting military command about the intention, to attack as soon as possible 
the USSR, A. Hitler, by the way, declared the next political goals of Germany, 
in particular plans concerning the fate of the Ukrainian statehood, Federation 
of the Baltic states and Belarus. Certain Hitlerite leaders expressed opinion on 
as soon as possible to occupy east territories, so vital Germany for the solution 
of the more global geopolitical problem. Among them there are I. Goebbels, 
G. Himmler and G. Goering (Гальдер 1969, 60). In the late thirties these 
thoughts were often discussed by the famous German politicians who 
considered that for the weakening of Russia it was necessary to tear off from 
it Ukraine, which, maybe, would become the independent state focused on 
Germany stated and would always serve as a counterbalance of Russia. 
This discrepancy in plans of certain political figures reached the greatest 
intensity at the beginning of March, 1941 when preparation of the German 
attack on the USSR was already finally resolved the issue. The Supreme 
command developed then “The leading installations on the special questions 
connected with directive No. 21 (the plan Barbarossa)”. As a special question 
future policy in the occupied Soviet territory was allocated. 
In this regard on December 18, 1941 the chief of staff of military operation 
presented to the leadership of the military forces of Germany the advanced 
draft of the plan taking into account all remarks of Hitler and the document 
Guidelines with special questions as the addition to directive No. 21 – “The 
Plan Barbarossa”. It is necessary to notice that in the document it is accurately 
noted that the campaign, which is planned is something bigger, than just 
military fight, is the conflict of two outlooks. In the previous version of the 
project, it was necessary to consider scaling of the territory of the USSR, and 
in this regard the Soviet country needs to be divided into a number of the 
certain states with own governments which would be ready to enclose peace 
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treaties with Germany and further to cooperate with it. Also the fact that it is 
necessary to think over and develop the general principles of behavior and 
cooperation with these states for the creation of such governments was noted. 
According to the leadership of Hitlerite Germany, the old bourgeois and 
aristocratic, Jewish and Bolshevist intellectuals will interfere with the 
cooperation process therefore it is offered to destroy it (Розанов 1970, 60). 
One of the important questions, according to Hitler, was not to allow 
fomation of the nation state because as a result it would become the enemy of 
Germany again. The formation of the national states was not in Hitler’s plans 
therefore to directive No. 21 changes were made. It is offered to create not the 
states, but geographical units, in particular to one of them had to enter Ukraine 
and the Crimea with the center in Kiev (Розанов 1970, 60). 
Kiev was defined by the center because the long historical period it had 
been the considerable cultural and political center, since Kievan Rus’, later the 
constant rival of Moscow. The main political line in this region was to 
encouragement of aspirations Ukrainian for national independence, to 
potential creations of own statehood or reunification of Ukraine with the Don 
region and the Caucasus. Such an association, according to the Hitler’s 
leadership it would be the Black Sea Union, which would resist to Moscow 
would make it continuous threat, protecting the german living floor space 
from the East. At the same time this area would form a powerful source of 
raw materials of the Velikogermansky empire. 
Creation of a political counterbalance of Velikorossiya and conditions was 
an important aspect of this concept. It would lead to its easing. According to 
the Hitler’s leadership plans, it was for this purpose it’s necessary to attach the 
suburban areas which were earlier a part of the Russian space: part of the 
Kursk and Voronezh regions. 
Generally in the directive it is offered to create the action plan which 
would provide formations of the central body for coordination of actions in 
the territory of the USSR. Among tasks we see the development of obligatory 
political instructions for separate administrative units taking into account a 
concrete situation and a goal; ensuring important military deliveries from all 
occupied areas in favor of the empire; development and solution of the 
general questions, essentially important for all areas, such as financing, 
transport, production of oil, coal and food products. 
The directive also provided accurate differentiation on the competences of 
local governing bodies of certain administrative districts which represent the 
closed national or economic and political units, for the solution of local and 
other tasks («Совершенно секретно. Только для командования» 1967, 
149–153). 
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According to the formulated foreign policy concept of the “Third Reich” 
in the “Plan Barbarossa” the plan of use of future territory occupied by the 
German army in the east was developed. It is called as “Oldenburg”. It was 
developed and approved in March, 1941Ito provide the plane right after the 
end of military operations by holding grandiose economic actions for use of 
resources of the occupied territory of the Soviet Union. It was created the 
economic headquarters, which was completely separated from the General 
Staff. The plan supposed to transport in the Reich the most valuable industrial 
equipment, and all the rest, it iwsa not required for the German industry – to 
destroy. The territory of the USSR was planned to be decentralized economy 
and to make a raw-material producing appendage of Germany (Загорулько 
1980, 17). 
The establishment of complete domination in Europe could not be realized 
without the destruction of the USSR. The Hitler’s leadership saw the key to 
success in implementation of the major political, economic and strategic tasks. 
But the leadership of Wehrmacht understood that the western countries 
wiould not prevent Germany to carry out aggression in the East until it did not 
develop into real danger to them. The Hitler’s leadership tried to avoid 
dragging-out war on two fronts. Therefore the first steps which were carried 
out by fascist Germany were drawing the first blow of France and a 
conclusion of war on England. Attack on the Soviet Union had to take place 
only after the solution of tasks in the West. This political concept was also 
reflected in the known work of Adolf Hitler “Mein Kampf” and became 
fundamental in the Nazi military doctrine. At a meeting of the governmemt of 
Wehrmacht on November 23, 1939 Hitler noted: “Russia does not constitute 
danger now. Today it is weakened owing to many internal processes. Besides, 
we have a contract with Russia. But contracts are observed until they are 
expedient... We can oppose Russia only when we are released in the West” 
(Дашичев 1967, 76–77). 
In this regard the Military doctrine of fascist Germany was developed on 
the basis of military knowledge of the famous German theorists A. Shliffena, 
E. Lyudendorf, F. Berngardi, X. Ritter, R. Sudan and many others.  
It incorporated experience and a new approach in the military theory and 
practice of construction of the armed forces of England, France, Italy, Japan, 
the USA (Дашичев 1967, 76–77). 
In developing the military doctrine leadership of the “Third Reich” paid 
much attention to information and propaganda activity of one and all 
ministries of the “Third Reich” both in Germany, and beyond its limits 
(Фрунзе 1951, 148). 
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In this way the basic principles of the general strategic concept of Hitler’s 
command consisted in weakening and dividing the main opponents of fascist 
Germany to avoid simultaneous war against England, France and the Soviet 
Union and not to allow creation of the anti-German coalition; to embody the 
idea about drawing the first blow in the West for the purpose of defeat of 
France and a conclusion from war of England, and to further begin military 
operations against the countries of the East. The implementation of the plan in 
such sequence would have to provide to Hitler’s Germany total domination in 
Europe and further expansion of its world expansion. Also calculations were 
made on the fact that Italy would undermine strategic positions of Great 
Britain in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea, and Japan will distract the main 
forces of England, and further and the USA, from Southeast Asia and also was 
blocked by the Soviet Union on the Far East borders (Weltgeschichte der 
Gegenwart in Dokumenten. Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 1954, 38). 
This policy of fascist Germany brought the results. Because the European 
states did not believe in Hitler’s intentions, his government quickly enough 
managed to decide destiny of the countries of Central, Southeast and Northern 
Europe and at their expense considerably to improve a strategic and economic 
situation of Germany, promoted further warfare. 
Along with conducting military operations in Europe, the German leaders 
embodied the tasks set for the German economy and armed forces till 1939. to 
be prepared for global war. In the memorandum of economic preparation for 
war created in August, 1936 it was noted: “War has demanded so large 
amount of raw materials in world history never before was a case who really 
managed to create stocks for a long time...”. Here Hitler sets two main 
objectives for the German economy: “... I set the following tasks: 1) in four 
years we have to have an efficient army; 2) in four years the economy of 
Germany has to be ready to war” (Дашичев 1967, 76–77). 
Since the mid 1940s the colonial program of Nazi Germany seemed to be 
developed by Hitler’s leadershipt. In the last version of the program the object 
was set to create the German colonial empire in Africa including all German 
colonies. About colonial ambitions and plans it is possible to judge on 
Claudius, Korsvant, Ritter’s memorandums. All of them came down to one 
that after the victory over France and England they planned to take freely 
economic positions in the Middle East (Schmokel 1964, 124). 
How seriously German leaders prepared for colonial conquests you can 
judge by the fact that in 1940 in Germany the Colonial Office led by Von Jepp 
was secretly created and began to form colonial troops which number was 
planned to be brought to 100 thousand People (Дашичев 1967, 30). Till 1943. 
The Hitler’s government did not lose hope for the creation of the German 
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empire and accession of new attached territories in the east and the Southeast. 
This thought confirmed by Trevor-Ropera’s work “Hitler’s Table Talk  
1941–1944” where the author noted that the fascist German leaders expected to 
achieve these objectives after defeat of the Soviet Army. He reminds that in one 
of conversations in a narrow circle of adherents Hitler said: “That day when we 
establish our firm order in Europe, we will be able to turn the look into Africa. 
And who knows, maybe, one day we will be able to undertake achievements 
and other purposes” (Hitler’s Table Talk 1941–1944, 1953, 497). 
Development of the concept of Nazi policy in eastern occupied territories 
was the following step in the colonial program of the “Third Reich”. 
The policy which was pursued by the Hitler’sleadership in the occupied 
territories was a component of aggressive plans of Germany in World War II. 
To expand “the living floor space” of Germany it was planned first of all at 
the expense of territories of the Soviet Union and other Slavic countries. 
Already on the eve of war detailed plans about the device of Eastern Europe 
are developed. The first version of the plan “Ost” was developed by the 1941 
“Head Department Imperial Safety” and was presented on May 28, 1942.  
The employee of Management of the headquarters of the imperial 
commissioner for consolidation of the German people, the ober-Fuhrer the SS 
Meyer-Hetlingy under the name “Master Plan of “Ost”, Basis Legal, 
Economic and Territorial Structure of the East” (Дашичев 2005, 13). 
Unfortunately the full text of this plan is not found. At the trial, in 
Nurernberg the only evidence of the plan was the comments, remarks and 
offers of the Ministry of “East occupied territories” on the master plan of 
“Ost”, according to the user’s accusers the chief expert, the employee of the 
Ministry of “East territories” E. Vettsel after acquaintance with the draft of the 
plan prepared were on April 27, 1942 the only proof of existence of the plan 
PCXA (Замечания и предложения “восточного министерства” по 
генеральному плану “ОСТ” 2009). The main objectives of the Hitler’s 
leadership of Germany are reflected in the plan of “Ost” and directed on: 
– Political and military gaining the space taken and in the distant future by 
“eviction” of indigenous people, including mass destruction and colonization, 
that is “violent assimilation” (Umvolkung); 
– Social and imperialistic interest in strong fixing of own social base by 
means of “settlements”, that is by means of creation of the extensive, 
depending on the mode, economically strong layers of the German peasants 
and large landowners and also by means of association of the German city 
center; 
– the expansion of the large capital directed to raw materials operation 
(oil, ore, metals, cotton and other agricultural raw materials) on huge sales 
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markets of the consumer goods, on expansion of investment opportunities and 
the markets of export of the capital (in particular the military industry – weapon 
and military equipment) – military construction, airfields, “strong points” and 
the “German” settlements, country estates, industrial and transport structures of 
all types) and receiving cheap labor; interest in inexhaustible sources of food for 
“misters” for the unlimited period (Замечания и предложения “восточного 
министерства” по генеральному плану “ОСТ” 2009). 
The separate main ideas “The Master Plan of “Ost”“ are known to be 
developed and proclaimed during World War I. 
In the period of World War II this plan united barbaric racism and anti-
Semitism and for officially stated purpose of genocide, destruction of the 
whole races and the peoples. It is clear that this plan proclaimed the policy of 
the “Holocaust”. Including racist intention to destroy tens of millions of Slavs, 
“The Master Plan of “Ost” was also main experimental space for murder of 
Jews across the whole Europe and the whole world and had to provide 
territories for unlimited number of “a ghetto” and extermination camps. 
Unlike the “Holocaust” “The Master Plan of “Ost”“ provided the wide 
program of robbery and expansion. 
The interests of “East territories” were explained by “Bolshevist threat”, or 
the need for expansion of “living floor space” for Germans. One of the 
participants of “the Nuremberg process” gave evidences that at the beginning 
of 1941. Himmler explained to twelve heads of groups CC, the extermination 
of 30000000 Slavs was “the campaign purpose against Russia” (Der Prozeß 
gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof 
1947, 356). The same witness confirmed Soviet to the accuser, explaining the 
main reasons for fight against guerrillas, “that fight against the guerrilla 
movement was quite an important reason for extermination of the Slavic and 
Jewish population”. By the beginning of East campaign Hilter made the order 
that the busy areas “as quickly, as it is possible”, were calmed “best of all, 
shooting everyone who will glance slantwise” (Bd. 38. Nürnberg, 1949, 87). 
According to L.A. Bezymensky, the Plan “Ost” was developed step by 
step, at first it was “The Small Plan” (“Kleine Planung”), and then Makro 
(“Grose Planung”). “The small plan” should be carried out during war. The 
German government wanted to focus on “The big plan” after the war. The 
plan provided different percent of germanisation for various subdued Slavic 
and other people. Those which are not subject a germanisation have to be 
moved to Western Siberia. Thus, implementation of the plan had to provide 
realization of the colonial policy of the Reich, and the won territories gained 
purely German value (Безыменский 1972, 258). 
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The plan of “Ost” was thoroughly worked out.It contained tables, 
schedules, estimates that demonstrated serious intentions of the nazi 
command.. From the section “General Ideas of the Management” we see that 
capture and use of east territories, their transformations to full-fledged 
imperial areas is considered by the management of the Reich as noble of 
tasks. Also creation of the healthy peasantry was planned to settle of rural 
regions. For so global carrying out colonizer tasks, it was supposed to separate 
areas which had to be populated on ethnographic signs, creation of a uniform 
control system in all colonized regions (Безыменский 1972, 259). 
The conceptual principles of policy of the “Third Reich” in relation to the 
population of “east areas” are brightly reflected in Himmler’s note of May 25, 
1940 under the name “Some Reasons about the Address with Local 
Population of East Areas”. It was dispatched in all managements of the 
Hitler’s device on places. The document says that: “As for separate 
nationalities we do not seek for their consolidation and increases, especially 
for the gradual instilling of national consciousness and national culture in 
them. For the German population of “east areas” there should not be higher 
schools. It’s enough to have a four grade national school education to be able 
to count to 500, not to teach reading and ability to undersign, to suggest that 
the divine precept is in obeying Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. 
Except school of this kind, in “east areas” there should be no schools” 
(Безыменский 1972, 88–89). 
According to the “Master Plan of “Ost” aggressive economic plans 
concerning the people of the Soviet Union closely intertwined with 
ideological interests. Hitler’s speech at a meeting with generals on May 30, 
1941 where he noted that war with the USSR was a collision of two 
ideologies, ruthless war for the purpose of destruction of the Bolshevism 
demonstrates to it, it is a war in which, “cruelty – the benefit for the future” 
(Безыменский 1972, 93). 
Several departments of the “Third Reich” were engaged in the 
development of the plan of “East campaign” and use of east territories at the 
same time. One of developers of plans on eastern occupied territories – 
A. Rosenberg. Since 1933 he had been the chief of the NSDAP. Within the 
authority of this body the special center for problems of “east territories” – 
“the Central Political Bureau” was created in April, 1941. On Rosenberg’s 
memoirs, on April 2, 1941 Hitler announced the decision to appoint him the 
Minister of Affairs of the Occupied East Territories. On the same day 
A. Rosenberg prepared the memorandum of the purposes and methods of the 
German occupational policy for territories of the Soviet Union “Armed 
struggle with the Soviet Russia, – it was said in it, – will lead to the fast 
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occupation of the most parts of the territory of the Soviet Union, are 
important. It is very obvious that military operations from our party will lead 
to a fast crash of the USSR” (Безыменский 1972, 253). 
In the memorandum Rosenberg emphasized that the relation to separate 
parts of the territory has to be initially directed to the achievement of the set 
political goals both in management, and in the economic and ideological 
relation. In the memorandum he drew up plans, according to different parts of 
the Soviet Union. The kindling of hostility between various nationalities of 
the USSR for the purpose of implementation of German policy. It became a 
cornerstone in the offered concept. The Baltics – Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania – had to become area of the German colonization. It was put also 
forward the plan of creation of the Black Sea union as a part of Ukraine, Don 
and the Caucasus in order that constantly to keep Moscow under the blow and 
to provide “German living floor space from the East”. Along with it’s creation 
of the state formations subordinated the “Reich” were headed by the German 
leaders – commissar was offered. In economic sense these states had to turn 
into an agrarian appendage of future fascist empire (Германский 
империализм и вторая мировая война 1963, 117). 
The Ministry of East Occupied Territories under the leadership of 
A. Rosenberg developed structure of the occupational device for the Soviet 
territories. In the annex to the memorandum of April 7, 1941 (No. 2) it is told 
about the persons appointed to the major positions in administrative facilities 
in the east. So, to a position of the imperial commissioner of the Baltic 
countries and Belarus Rosenberg recommended the gauleiter Heinrich Loze, 
for a position of a reichskommissar of Ukraine – Shikedantsa,. Within 
20 years he was busy with the development of “the Russian question”. For the 
management of the Caucasus it was offered Bakke, who is considered to be of 
the Caucasus’s origin. Reichkommissar it was offered to the area Don-Volga 
D. Klagess, the minister of Braunschweig. In case of occupation of Moscow 
Rosenberg planned for a position of a reichskommissar of the gauleiter of East 
Prussia Erich Koch (Германский империализм и вторая мировая война 
1963, 118). 
Proceeding from political reasons, on April 20, 1941 A. Rosenberg was 
appointed the representative of the “East European regions”. To the chief of 
staff of OKV W. Keitel, it was sent the order on Rosenberg’s appointment and 
it is recommended to render it any help (Нюрнбергский процесс. Сборник 
материалов. 1955, 548–549). Soon W. Keitel issued the order on a business 
trip of the corresponding persons in department on the development of 
occupational policy in the East. All negotiations on questions of “East space” 
were held further by public officials of OKV (Нюрнбергский процесс. 
Сборник материалов. 1955, 551). 
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Establishing cooperation with the Ministry of National Education and 
promotion of Germany was the following step in the activity of the Ministry 
of East Occupied Territories. A number of negotiations as a result of which 
the agreement of rather a historical and political understanding of “East 
problem” was reached. All political and other articles, texts, speeches and 
addresses were carried out had to be carried out in Rosenberg’s department. 
The content of propaganda work had to be coordinated with the instructions of 
the Ministry of National Education and Promotion. 
As Rosenberg sought to use the population of the occupied territories of 
the USSR against Soviet leadership. Much attention had to be paid to a 
question of preparation of propaganda activity among locals. Responsibilities 
of the Ministry of National Education and Promotion and other departments 
were accepted by Rosenberg and “are instructed concerning positions which 
they will have to occupy with a request to coordinate terminology of the press, 
whenever possible avoiding any publicity”. 
Expecting a close victory over the USSR, at a meeting of the Nazi 
leadershipon July 16, 1941 on “a new order” in occupied territories Hitler 
said: The creation of military states to the west of the Urals never has become 
on the agenda... All followers of the Fuhrer have to know: “the empire only 
then will be in safety when to the west of the Urals there is no foreign army. 
Protection of this space against any possible dangers undertakes Germany...” 
(“Преступные цели – преступные средства” Документы об 
оккупационной политике фашистской Германии на территории СССР. 
1968, 50–51]. 
At this meeting the question of punishment over peace the population was 
also considered, resisted the occupational mode. Most of the present heads of 
the “Third Reich” came to a conclusion that most likely this problem could be 
solved only by execution of participants of resistance. In the performance 
W..Keitel noted that it was necessary to make local population responsible for 
the acts because it was impossible to put protection on each shard, at each 
station. “Locals have to know that they will be shot everyone who shows 
inaction, and they will be made responsible for any offense. At the same 
meeting it was approved imperial commissioners for Ukraine and other 
occupied territories (“Преступные цели – преступные средства” 
Документы об оккупационной политике фашистской Германии на 
территории СССР 1968, 53–54]. 
Thus the policy of the authorities of occupied territories of Ukraine, the 
Baltics and the Caucasus, according to A. Rosenberg, had to be more loyal, 
than to the Russian population. Thanks to it the occupying command would 
find support in the fight against the Soviet Union. But Hitler’s plans were not 
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“flirting” with the population of occupied territories, fast colonization of the 
occupied “east areas” as it was planned. According to the leading Nazi heads 
G. Goering, G. Himmler and M. Borman, Germany could carry out the 
colonization of “east space” absolutely independently without assistance of 
local nationalists. 
After the invasion of fascist Germany on the territory of the USSR Hitler 
and his government did not hide the present plans on east the people 
inhabiting the Soviet Union anymore. The main goal, among these plans was 
to deprive east people “any form of the state organization and compliance 
with it to hold them at perhaps a lower level of culture”. Existence of east 
people, according to him, came true the fact that they can be useful only in an 
economic sense (Hitler’s Table Talk 1941–1944. Trevor-Roper. 1953. 424). 
Real plans of Nazi Germany are opened also by the letter of Martin 
Borman This letter was directed at the request of Hitler to Rosenberg. In the 
letter Borman stated Hitler’s wish about the principles which need to be 
observed, according to him, in the occupied east territories. 
In the letter the opinion that the leadership of the Reich is not interested to 
increase the population of these territories, therefore it offers the whole 
program of reduction of birth rates among Slavs is accurately expressed. Also 
the fact that it is not necessary to give to local population the higher education 
at all is noted: “If we make this mistake, we will generate in the future 
resistance against us. Therefore, according to the Fuhrer, it is quite enough to 
train local population, in particular so-called Ukrainian, only in reading and 
the letter” (Дашичев 2005, 39). 
Hitler suggested that the leadership should pay a special attention to the 
events held by the occupying authorities. They should not contribute to the 
development in a local population of pride and advantage. It is necessary to 
take care of that Germans contacted to local population a little, did not live in 
the Ukrainian cities. For them the new cities and settlements supposed to be 
built, strictly isolated from the Russian (Ukrainian) population. Therefore 
houses should have been designed not like constructed for Germans in 
comparison with Russian (Ukrainian). Design. Mud huts, straw roofs and 
other for Germans were excluded. 
In total in the radical territory of the empire a considerable part of “living 
floor space” supposed be regulated by the law. But it was offered to be 
avoided in the occupied east areas. According to Hitler’s conception, for the 
local population, it was not necessary to issue many laws. “The German 
administration has to be small here. Regional the commissioner should work 
with local heads. It is not necessary to create a uniform Ukrainian board at the 
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level of a general commissariat or even the Reichskommissariat” (Дашичев 
1967, 122–123). 
The Nazi leadership planned to minimize the population of Poland, 
Ukraine and Belarus and on their lands to lodge in 10 million. German 
colonists. Those Poles, Ukrainians and Belarusians who had to survive to be 
used as free labor man power for the German owners. The occupying 
authorities had the instruction to keep the population in obedience by extreme 
cruelty, to constantly apply mass executions and other types of destruction 
(Нюрнбергский процесс: Сборник материалов 1988, 89). 
From the beginning of occupation in the occupied territories the accurate 
control system to A. Rosenberg was created commissariats submitted four 
imperial: Ostlandian, Ukrainian, Moscow and Caucasian. Each of them was 
divided into general commissariats. According to Reykhskomissariat Ukraine was 
divided into Volynsk and Podolsk, Nikolaev, Zhytomyr, Kiev, the Dnipropetrovsk 
and Taurian general commissariats. Regional commissariats were the lowest link 
on the German occupation administration. In the occupied Soviet territory it was 
planned to create 1050 such commissariats. Since their completion 144 officers of 
the assault groups (SA), 711 officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Labor Front organization (Дашичев 2005, 10). 
Ostlandian Ukraine in the administrative-territorial relation also consisted 
of general districts, local areas (“gebit”), districts, areas, counties, ballasts 
which headed general, “debit” and regional commissioners. The western areas 
of the Soviet Union that were occupied had no uniform civil authorities and 
the unified power bodiest. In the cities justices, in rural districts – 
commandant’s office was created. Actually, all local authorities, in areas, 
belonged to the corresponding military commandants. From among the local 
population, local administration foremen or burgomasters, in villages – heads 
intended. The Soviet system of the administrative device was destroyed, and 
public organizations were banned (Дашичев 2005, 11). 
According to the principles of implementation of rural and city colonization 
occupied territories of the Soviet Union were divided into two groups: also so-
called borders are included in the Reich. Actions for mass German colonization 
were supposed to be carried out at the expense of the population of occupied 
territories. There were fulfilled actions on “Germanisation” of the population of 
the border Regions of Crimea and the Kherson region. By forcing the local 
population on colonized territories it was planned to carry out road, industrial, 
city and rural housing construction for the account, besides local population.  
All plans of colonization were provided to be carried out within 25 years. It was 
also planned to spend considerable funds for development of agricultural 
industry, which has become a raw appendage to the German empire  
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(Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.). 1965, 139). 
In case of implementation of the plan of “Ost” destruction large the material 
resources in the east and the pursued policy of a full agrarization of the occupied 
territories will be destroyed to occur. 
The Nazi government, pursuing occupational policies in the East, created 
conditions, worsened the situation of the local population. So people perished 
from hunger, it even facilitated, according to Himmler, colonization process. 
During the meeting of the top management of SS in Vezelsburzi he openly 
said that one of the problems of East campaign was the destruction of 
30 million. Slavs (Германская экспансия в Центральной и Восточной 
Европе 1965, 273). 
The information and ideological concept which had to become the 
conductor of interests of Hitler’s Germany not only in Western and Central 
Europe but also in the East figured prominently. 
To keep in obedience such the large territory, avoiding resistance from local 
population, it was also necessary to adjust on places police functions. In this 
regard on July 17, 1941 Hitler signed the order for police protection of the 
occupied east areas. The leadership in protection was assigned to the 
Reichsfuhrer-SS and the chief of police of Germany G. Himmler, who was 
granted the right to make orders Reichkommissar on this matter. For effective 
implementation of police protection to everyone the senior chief of SS both police 
directly and personally subordinated Reichkommissar was sent. Two general 
commissioners, the chief and regional commissioners chiefs of the SS and  
police, to full submission (Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим  
(1941–1944 гг.). 1965, 125). This accurate system of protection very much 
reminded the Bolshevist system of supervision of activity of officers during the 
civil war in Bolshevist Russia and the Great Patriotic War, The political worker 
known as the commissioner who represented law-enforcement bodies and 
watched was attached to each of them, the military authorities in the activity 
adhere to the political line of the party and the Soviet government. 
The order in rural districts was provided by police officers. In large 
settlements there were divisions SS and security parts. It was planned to enter 
accurate accounting of the local population, which is subject to registration 
with the police. To Reichskommissariat’s inhabitants Ukraine it was 
forbidden to leave without the permission of public agents places of a 
permanent residence (Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим  
(1941–1944 гг.). 1965, 126–127). 
Within July, 1941 Hitler published still a number of directives which gave 
instructions in methods to deprive of the population of occupied territories 
desire to resist. 
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According to A. Rosenberg, in each commissariat it was necessary to treat 
to the population differently: “In Ukraine we should begin with cultural 
affairs; there we have to wake historical consciousness Ukrainian, found the 
university in Kiev and other educational institutions”. Goering rejected this 
offer: “In Ukraine Germans, first of all have to think of how to receive from it 
a food maximum”. What Rosenberg answered: “In Ukraine it is also 
necessary to encourage certain aspirations to independence” (Немецко-
фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.) 1965, 127). 
In spite of the fact that Rosenberg planned to pursue a more moderate 
policy in occupied territories, he was devoted to the business of the 
“Third Reich”, and its real policy completely corresponded to the principles of 
fascist Germany. The order demonstrating it was signed by Rosenberg on 
August 23, 1941. He content was about removal of death penalties by special 
courts to persons who do not want to submit to the occupying authorities. 
It was noted that the local population had to behave according to laws, given 
out by the German authorities. As locals were not the German citizens or 
persons of the German nationality, they were in special situation and were 
subject punishment for capital punishment or to the conclusion in convict 
prison (Преступные цели – преступные средства. 1968, 61–63). This order 
was the eloquent certificate of the real policy of the German occupying 
authority and reflected a sample of a legislative system of fascist Germany in 
occupied territories. 
An important place occupied by the ethnic question in the policy of the 
“Third Reich” on occupied territories. The red line there passed the idea of the 
termination of further biological development of the Slavic people as the 
nations. This idea took roots into life in the course of positive succession of 
events for Hitler more and more actively at the front. On “Nurnberg” process 
there was presented a secret report prepared by the Academy of the German 
right in January, 1940 in which it was directly said that to exempt “living floor 
space” from Poles in the Governorate-General and in the western Polish areas 
attached to the Reich it was necessary to take out from Poland to Germany for 
the long term of one hundred thousand Poles and thus to prevent their 
biological development (Нюрнбергский процесс. Сборник материалов в 
семи томах 1959, 561). 
The similar idea was stated also by Himmler in the relation not only the 
Polish families, but Ukrainian too. In the note “Some Reasons about the 
Address with the Population of East Areas which was coordinated and 
accepted by Hitler as directives Himmler suggested to divide the people of 
“east areas” into smaller branches and groups that would have to lead, 
according to the author, to elimination of the Polish and Ukrainian nation. 
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According to Himmler, in denationalization elimination of the intellectuals 
and education of the local population had great value, only this way it is 
possible to turn it into the mass of labor (Хёне 2003, 87). 
In the above-mentioned memorandum E. Vettsel “Remarks and offers to 
the master plan of “Ost” of a Reysfyurer of SS” were accurately checked 
plans of the Hitler’s leadership concerning the population of east regions 
including the Ukrainian lands. It was stressed that after the victory over the 
Soviet Union its territory should be planned to move to the remote Areas of 
Siberia of a significant amount of the Slavic population numbering  
46–51 million People, but not 31 million People as it is offered in the plan of 
“Ost”. Eviction had to take place from the territory of Poland, the Baltic 
republics, Belarus, Ukraine and the European part of the USSR. In this 
territory, it was planned to leave for use as labor about 14 million People, 
including 35 percent Ukrainian (Немецко-фашистский оккупационный 
режим (1941–1944 гг.). 1965, 137). 
Plans of resettlement and extermination of the Slavic population were 
grand. The documents found in archive of security police and Nazi secret 
service of safety (SD) of Poznan demonstrate to it. These archival materials 
seemed to be notes of a Gauptshturmfyurer of the CC Herman Krumey being 
written after the meetings in Berlin in February and in June, 1943 Krum 
headed so-called “the resettlement center “Vostok” in Poznan and carried out 
plans of CC in the occupied Poland. A part of documents coves the Hitler’s 
concept of “resettlement2 of the Slavic people from the territory of the Soviet 
Union. It was so telling about the population of the USSR: People... These are 
not people in the European understanding, slaves... To form the big empire, to 
move in parallel with colonization (according to L.O. Bezimensky “to move” 
in these documents means “to destroy”). Duration – two or three generations... 
Further Krum provides the data confirming what number of the population of 
occupied territories is planned to be moved and destroyed within 30 years: 
Jews – 100%, Poles – 80–85%, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians – 50%, 
галичан, western Ukrainian – 65%, Belarusians – 75%. These numbers were 
given also in respect of Head department of imperial safety of Germany by 
RSHA (German of Reichssicherheitshauptamt, abbr. RSHA) (Безыменский 
Л.А. 1981, 271). 
A special attention was paid to so-called “ethnic plans” of Hitler’s 
Germany concerning the ethnic minorities living in the territory of Ukraine. 
Prosecutions and total destruction of the Jewish and Gipsy population of the 
USSR held a specific place in the policy and the practice of the Nazi 
occupation regime It was not only “racial question” but because there were 
the ideological reasons. At the beginning of war Nazi leaders sought to hide a 
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little the ominous background of plans of colonization of the Soviet Union. 
It is visible from the record of the sentence made by a Reykhslyayter 
M. Norman at Hitler’s meeting with the heads of the “Third Reich” about the 
war purposes against the USSR on July 16, 1941. In legal records there were 
quoted the words of the Fuhrer: “All necessary Actions: executions, forced 
relocation and another – we do, despite everything, and we have to it the right. 
But we do not want to turn needlessly and prematurely any people on 
enemies.... It is necessary to subordinate whenever possible, rather huge 
space, it is the best of all to reach it by execution of everyone who will cause 
any suspicions” (Кенрик, Паксон 2001, 151). 
Mass extermination of the Gipsy population in the occupied territory of 
the Soviet Union was one of aspects of the global racial concept of Nazis and 
their agents. However the racial criterion was not the basic. Nazis called 
Roma “dropouts”. “The Gipsy question” was considered to be a problem of “a 
social and ethical order”. 
In a policy of Hitle’s Germany mass extermination of Roma was not such 
relevant. This ethnic group did not make any global threat. For this reason 
data about rums were not selected in summary reports on the situation in the 
occupied territory in a separate point as it became in relation to Jews. Political 
crimes like sabotage or instigation were never attributed to them. Practically 
did not remember them also Nazi printing promotion. 
However, since spring of 1942 in some cities of a military zone of 
occupation announcements of registration of rum and their resettlement in 
special quarters appeared. On June 10, 1942 the chief of security police in 
Chernihiv published the order about the place of residence of rums which 
obliged them to get registered under the threat of “severe penalty” in the next 
policy station for the purpose of resettlement “to precisely certain places 
which they without the permission of the powerful have no right to leave”. 
This order led soon to mass extermination of the Gipsy population  
(Бариев 2002, 33). 
Historians D. Kenrik, G. Parkinson considered that Nazis pursued first of all 
nomadic Roma who destroyed not only SS-men, but also troops of the 
Wehrmacht and therefore they did not get in reports of retaliatory bodies. 
Destruction of rums of Europe had no system character. Scales of their destruction 
and prosecution were others, than Jews. According to the order of Himmler dated 
November, 1942 in Germany it was supposed to leave 5000–8000 Gipsies.  
It is enough to say that in March, 1943 from 28627 rums, more than 4/5 (20000) 
lived in the native land (Кенрик, Паксон 2001, 152). 
The German historian Margalit considers that not less than 15,000 of them 
it was succeeded to avoid deportation. By special order of a Reykhskomisar of 
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Ostland to the Rod of January 27 and on April 3, 1942 it was explained, 
occupied on production of rum if do not constitute “social danger”, are not 
liable to destruction (Gilad Margalit: 2001, 43). 
In the Slavic and Baltic countries gypsies began to eliminate long before 
the decision on physical destruction of actually German Gipsy diaspora was 
made. Even in the Spring 1941 special retaliatory groups which task included 
the murder of Roma were created. Except professional chastens, SS-men and 
police persons from among the local population were accomplices of 
massacre. 
Foreign researchers V. Vipperman and M. Zimmerman consider that in the 
territory of the USSR not less than thirty thousand Gipsies were shot and 
tortured. As it seems to us, the German documentation does not reflect reality. 
So, according to reports of retaliatory group the number of the killed rums 
made 78 people, whereas only near Smolensk several thousands were shot of 
group of Centre armies. Perhaps, it is the result of the cleaning of archives on 
the eve of defeat. However, even if documentation of concentration camps 
and retaliatory groups remained completely, it would not bring final clarity. 
There is a set of certificates (in particular those who escaped from the German 
prisoner-of-war camp) that Gipsy the camp, even ordinary soldiers shot on 
own initiative: each of them knew about full impunity and therefore enjoyed 
the power over defenseless Roma (Wippermann.; Zimmermann 1996, 374). 
It is very important to note that for the extermination of the Soviet Roma 
in a number of the cities the same methods were used, as at “final decision” of 
a Jewish problem. For example, in Chernihiv, Kherson, the Crimea genocide 
was committed according to such scenario: to Roma suggested to be for 
resettlement in certain points. All who appeared were shot, and then 
chasteners looked for the separate families which escaped in the rural zone. 
Also executions according to lists were applied, and the national identity was 
the only criterion. Well, knowing the fate of the Jews of the occupied USSR, 
it is possible to draw certain parallels (Бессонов М. 2006, 4–28). 
It should be noted racist motivation also. Though in reports of 
Einzatsgruppen there are national columns “Jews” and “Roma”, the Historian 
M. Bessonov focuses attention on the fact that the last were often included in 
the category of “dropouts”. As Nazis sometimes used social criteria, it gave a 
reason to deny the genocide of the Gipsy people. On it there are two serious 
objections (Бессонов М. 2007, 74). 
It is impossible to forget that in Nazi ideology the concept “dropout” is 
treated. Paul Goebbels claimed that the train to the commission of antisocial 
conducts had been given “from blood”. In this way also the theory of “born 
offenders” (as whom ranked also rum) was treated. Thus, use of the term 
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“dropouts”, in this case only other verbal packing for the same racial approach 
(Ржешевская Е. 2004, 34). 
It is necessary to draw close attention to practice of the Nazis. On the 
territory of the USSR Gipsy people as collective farmers and also workers and 
employees were executed. Also in Germany before “Osventsem” gipsy 
employees of public institutions, workers, children from shelters and also the 
men mobilized by the Wehrmacht. were deported. Special methods were 
developed for the destruction of “defective” races in Germany. There was an 
Institute of Racial Hygiene. It existed the task connecting with a creation of a 
full card file on all Gipsy people living in Germany. To solve this problem, 
the police and the scammers from among the neighbors were involved. 
Later on the basis of this database mass arrests were carried out. There was 
also an ideological justification of genocide. Together with Jews, Romans was 
proclaimed in additions to the Nuremberg laws by the low race disabled 
people. Further the decree “About Fight against the Gipsy Threat” was 
adopted. Of course, the intensity of gipsy elimination does not come within 
miles of the state anti-Semitism. However, it is impossible to deny that 
preparation for the destruction of Roma was effective. When the time of “final 
decision” came, performers have been already morally ready to kill 
representatives of ethnic minority. 
An important place in the plans of the Nazis was given to the Turkic peoples 
inhabiting the South of Ukraine and the Crimea. Consequences of the first fighting 
between Germany and the Soviet Union let the Hitler’s leadership caused 
Germany to promote the ideas to unite Turkic peoples on the base of anti-Soviet 
and the anti-Russian ideology. Nazis leadership used these elements both on the 
occupied “east” lands and on the territory of the Reich. It became possible a in the 
countries of Europe and the Middle East too. 
At the beginning of 1941 in Berlin plans of use of a Pan-Turkism ideology 
for association of the “turkish-tatar” people of the USSR under the German 
flags in the possible military conflict with the USSR were considered. 
Representatives of national organizations in Germany (the Caucasus, the 
Volga region, Central Asia) were involved in the MFA in development of 
practical measures in this direction. However, two heads of the Crimean Tatar 
emigration which was in Turkey and Poland the relation at first was alerted 
that had a talk their rather close contacts with structures of the Polish General 
Staff in the past (Преступные цели – преступные средства. 1968, 21–27). 
It is necessary to note the ambiguity in the solution of the “Eastern 
question” in the Nazi propaganda. On the one hand the invasion of the USSR 
under the slogan “Destruction of the Bolshevist and Asian knave”. In this 
direction promotion was also formed. Among the military personnel leaflets 
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and brochures with photos of the Soviet soldiers of various Asian nationalities 
with such texts were distributed to a huge number: “There are what Tatar-
Mongolian creatures! From them you are protected by the Fuhrer’s slider!”. 
Bodies of promotion of CC issued for the German troops as the handbook the 
brochure “Superman”. The people of the East were called on it “dirty, 
Mongoloids, bestial as bastards” (Преступные цели – преступные средства. 
1968, 27). 
On the other hand the Hitler’s military command sought to use the Tatar 
population to fight against the Soviet Union. In this regard, the relation to so-
called “east” people changed, respectively. An army command demanded that 
they should show a maximum of respect for them on places. So in the Crimea 
the commander of the 11th army E. Von Manstein issued two orders in 
November, 1941. he demanded respect for religious customs of Muslim 
Tatars and urged not to allow any unjustified actions against civilians. Since 
October-November, 1941 the Germans began to attract the Crimean Tatars to 
fight against guerrillas and to form on them self-defense companies 
(Дробязко 2004, 265). 
Creation of representative office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the 
headquarters of the 11th army in the Crimea became an important element in 
coordination of work of the Supreme command of the Wehrmacht, the MFA 
and repressive structures on the involvement of the Crimean Tatars in anti-
Soviet fight, the duties of his representative were carried out by the leading 
expert of the MFA major Verner Otto von Hentig (Рекотов 1997, 93). 
A great value, according to the German leaders, a little spiritual education 
of the Tatar population and an explanation for it an essence and the purpose of 
service in the German army. Wehrmacht manual considered the movement of 
Tatars as the first push to the general movement of the Turkic people living in 
the territory of the USSR. A total number of which made up 20.000.000 
people. The potential force of these people was highly appreciated not too, but 
was powerful in the fight against the Bolshevist mode (Органы 
государственной безопасности СССР в Великой Отечественной войне. 
2003, 71). 
In the Supreme leadership of Germany the lack of a uniform approach to 
the fate of the Crimean peninsula supposed to be observed in the future. If a 
part of employees of the MFA held the opinion in need of providing a certain 
similarity of autonomy to the Crimean Tatars the guide of CC would demand 
radical measures for cleaning of the territory of the peninsula from the 
“disabled” population and its further Germanisation. 
In July, 1942. the German leaders finally refused the plan of providing 
self-government to the Crimean Tatars. On July 27 in a rate Vervolf during a 
47 
dinner with the permanent representative of the MFA of a brigadenfyurer 
Walter Hewel A. Hitler declared the desire “to clean” the Crimea (Мюллер 
1974, 44–46). 
The unwillingness of the Turkish leaders to enter the war on the side of 
Germany became a reason for the termination of discussion of questions about 
the future status of the Turkic people living in the occupied territories of the 
Soviet Union. On the Crimean Tatars ceased to look as at a link in the 
German-Turkish relations. 
Thus the German policy for the Crimean Tatars was formed on 
understanding of need of attracting them to anti-Soviet fight on the one hand 
and attempts to talk over Turkey in an introductory question in war on the side 
of the countries of “Axis”. However, after the final refusal of Turkey to open 
fighting the Crimean Tatars ceased to be considered in Berlin as an important 
element of foreign policy of Germany. Despite substantial assistance of Tatars 
in defeat of the Soviet guerrilla movement on the peninsula, the top leadership 
of Nazi Germany developed plans of eviction of these people from the 
territory of the Crimean peninsula. The peninsula was considered as part of 
the future Germany at the beginning of the 30th. The German occupying 
authority under the pretext of the solution of an “ethnic question” of the 
Crimean Tatars tried to use them as it is possible more effective in the fight 
against the USSR. 
Support of the ethnic Germans living in the occupied countries, especially 
in the territory of the Soviet Union was one more important aspect of the 
political concept of the “Third Reich”. To this question much attention was 
paid also by Hitler. 
After the meeting with Stalin in Lviv in 1939. he signed the decree about 
“Strengthening of the German Nation”. This decree provided to return the 
German citizens and a folksdoyche from abroad, to create new German 
colonies and the new German peasantry. This decree laid the foundation for 
cruel directives and orders which implementation became fundamentals of the 
German policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine and other republics of 
the USSR. According to the decree and other orders conditions for 
“opposition2 of the different people in the occupied territory (Koehl, Robert 
Lewis. 1957, 247). 
A. Hitler and his government saw the strengthening of the German nation 
first of all because of an increase in the German rural population but not only 
in Germany and in the territories occupied by the German army. In these plans 
Ukraine was considered to be as the most suitable region for maintaining the 
German agricultural industry. It assumed a number of the rights and privileges 
for ethnic Germans of Ukraine, but was also an obvious threat for all 
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Ukrainian and other people of Ukraine. To wake in ethnic Germans desire to 
be citizens of the Third Reich, by the Ministry of national education and 
promotion of Germany it was developed the whole concept of promotion and 
information impact on this part of the population of Ukraine. 
In this way from first months of the occupation the Hitler’s leadership paid 
much attention to policy to attract to cooperation of ethnic Germans of 
Ukraine. The Ministry of East Occupied Territories created special 
department “The Head Political Department” – department of policy for 
ethnic Germans, special groups for studying of the German settlements in 
Northern Black Sea Coast. It was created administrative bodies of 
Reykhkomisariat of Ukraine which introduced policy of the German 
occupying authority on settlements to a folksdoyche. Special divisions CC – 
K. Stamps sonderkommand, a sonderkommand of “R”, the special 
headquarters of a standard of Genshel directly were engaged in involvement 
of ethnic Germans of Ukraine in cooperation. Along with administrative 
instances from a folksdoyche also public organizations – “The union of 
foreign Germans” worked, – with assistance of which it was created in 
occupied territories more than 8000 schools for Germans and 24,000 local 
offices: “The German society on resettlement”, “The German academy”, 
“Immigration center”, “The organization for strengthening of the German 
nationality”, etc. (Де Йонг Л. 1958, 55). 
All public organizations coordinated the activity with official Nazi 
structures. As a separate link in the structure of the Nazi organizations 
aynzattskomand worked. One of the main objectives was a protection of the 
German colonies. As far as ethnic Germans of Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine 
according to the estimates of P. Reactive quantity to a folksdoyche the course 
of the Hitler’s occupation in administrative education reached from 160 to 200 
thousands people. Generally, ethnic Germans of Reykhskomissariat made up 
about 1% of all local population (Рекотов 1997, 92). 
The position of ethnic Germans-folksdoyche in the occupied territories of 
Ukraine was defined by the directives of the Reich Minister of East occupied 
territories A. Rosenberg on February 19, 1942 and the Reichsführer-SS and 
imperial commissioner on consolidation and strengthening of the German 
nation and race G. Himmler of September 8, 1942 According to these 
directives the ethnic Germans living in the territory of Reykhskomissariat 
Ukraine have to be included in corresponding the national list “Deutsche 
Volksliste Ukraine”. All Germans who were entered in this list were allocated 
with the corresponding duties, the rights and privileges unlike the Ukrainian 
population. The rights and privileges received as well members of families of 
ethnic Germans, especially if they had general children. Depending on purity 
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of race, a folksdoyche were divided into several categories: which of family, 
where all members, ethnic Germans; others from the mixed families; those at 
whom far ancestors were Germans (Рекотов, 1997, 12). 
In this way the policy of the German occupying authority was directed to 
attraction to cooperation of ethnic Germans of Ukraine. Folksdoyche after the 
end of war could have become owners in the territories released from the local 
population. 
Summing up the results, it should be noted that the political concept is 
developed by the leadership of the “Third Reich” represented a complex of 
views of implementation of policy by the state, public organizations, certain 
citizens. In Germany conceptual foundations of public policy actually became 
the doctrine that had been mapped in order to conduct a political struggle and 
turned into ideology. 
The political leadership of the “Third Reich” developed conceptual 
foundations concerning policy in the occupied territories, in particular the 
territory of the USSR. Among them: uses of the territory and the available 
natural resources for strengthening of defense capability of the German army 
and realization of colonial policy; transformations of the local Slavic 
population to slaves and their use in the industry and agricultural industry of 
future German empire with stage-by-stage destruction of bulk of inhabitants 
of the occupied territory; creating favorable conditions for development of 
ethnic Germans – “folksdoycha” in the colonized territories. 
Information and propaganda activity of the Ministry of National Education 
and Promotion and the Ministry of East Occupied Territories of Germany and 
creation of effective information space was directed for realization of the 
above-stated tasks. 
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SECTION 2.2. 
INFORMATION POLICY OF THE SOVIET REGIME  
ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF NAZI GERMANY 
 
The Soviet Union was formed as a state in which information and 
advocacy has become the basis of social and political life of the Soviet 
people. In 1910–1930 s the definition of an information space concept has 
not yet become significant in European countries, and the leaders of the 
Bolshevik Party, without having the means of information warfare, clearly 
understood the importance of the information for the conquest of public 
opinion to their interests. Therefore, after the October Revolution in 1917, 
especially with the formation of the USSR, the country started to construct 
powerful information space. 
In 1920–1930s an extensive system of various institutions and 
mechanisms to influence the social mass was developed in the Soviet Union, 
whose main goal was to maintain proper world outlook in citizens minds, 
which partly reflected the reality, was partly mythologized, but what is more 
important – met specific goals of Bolshevik authorities. Active spiritual, 
ideological and defense-mass work focused on the formation of the 
representatives of all nations and nationalities, social groups patriotism within 
a single country – the Soviet Union and internationalism, all these could not 
give significant results. Moreover, this is the daily educational activities 
carried out along with the repressive practices and daily informing the public 
about the “labor achievements of the Soviet people in building socialism”, set 
peoples patriotic spirit to defend the gains of socialism in the event of military 
threat or enemy attack. 
Ideological education of the masses in the USSR was put on a high level, 
but the German-Soviet War forced to reformulate and summarize the contents, 
directions, forms and means of military-patriotic education. Already in 
June 1941 government speakers in theirs first pubic statements and speeches 
characterized the German attack on the Soviet Union as treacherous. It was 
necessary to convince people that the war against foreign invaders was fair. 
The realization of this idea concluded in people’s contribution to increase its 
forces and raise mass heroism. 
It was obvious, that the Soviet state more than any other state in history, 
paid attention to information and psychological impact of its own citizens. 
According to P. Kenez, the American researcher, this field was fuccessful due 
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to the pre-revolutionary experience of the Bolshevik propaganda, their 
organizational capabilities and the ability of the political system to isolate the 
population from alternative ideas and unwanted information. However, 
P. Kenez noted, that Bolshevik propaganda system was no longer unique: the 
very ideology has formed the basic guidelines, which covered all areas of life 
and formed the unfied outlook. 
Thus, the advocacy of the Bolsheviks, which was started in pre-
revolutionary period among the workers and peasants, was their advantage. 
Later it has become a strong base for the deployment of an extensive system 
of propaganda including constant attention to the masses and their social life. 
The Bolsheviks were always close to the people and demonstrated the strength 
of their ideological beliefs in practice. 
Today we can hardly name the country, which power in the first half of the 
20th century was carried out in relation to its own population large-scale 
propaganda activities aimed at imposing ideas that were not perceived by 
society. Information space that was created in the Soviet Union, was aimed 
the spread socialism. Very much attention was paid to the creation  
and dissemination of newspapers as a tool of effective influence on  
public opinion. This what V.I. Lenis stressed on during is ruling times  
(Ленин 1967, с. 10). It should be noted that during the raise of Bolsheviks 
power, the publishings have become a real ideological weapon. The total 
Bolshevik control included all periodicals, radio, literature, education and 
science, in fact, – daily life of every citizen of the USSR. 
According to the numerous documents of those times, the pro-government 
forces in both countries – in Germany, and the Soviet Union – sought to create 
a totalitarian system with continuous control of public opinion. Management 
mechanisms were similar in the two countries, just as mechanisms of 
mobilization in defense of each country. 
The hard struggle with the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in 1941–1945 
led to information confrontation between these countries and the 
implementation of modern means and methods of ideological confrontation. 
The Soviet society was taught to hate fascism more and more and to identified 
it with cruelty, evil, violence and cynicism. The USSR was a powerful 
political propaganda industry. The word “German” was identified with the 
word “enemy” thanks to I.Erenburg who made great efforts to this. At a time 
when Hitler’s propaganda showing Stalin and the Soviet leaders as stupid and 
criminal people, Hitler was depicted on the Soviet posters as a pathetic, cruel 
dog or snake, killed by a Soviet warrior. 
DuringGerman-Soviet war the Soviet propaganda has performed a lot of 
functions and broadcasted many ideological installations. It is clearly shown 
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on the example of the term “Great Patriotic War”. No doubt, it was a 
propaganda instalation that had become the basis of the concept of 
information and propaganda war of the USSR. Right this phrase had to hide 
the complicity of the Soviet Union to Hitler’s aggressive campaign, which 
lasted until June 1941. Since the beginning of hostilities in the USSR, its 
leaders tried to convince the public that the war waged by the Soviet Union 
with Nazi Germany, is national, liberating and fair. In particular, the decree of 
People’s Commissar of Defense, published in May 1942, included the 
following: “We have no such purpose, to seize foreign countries, to conquer 
alien peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet land 
from the German fascist scoundrels. We want to free our fellows – Ukrainian, 
Moldovans, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Karelians from 
that disgrace and humiliation to which they subjected the German fascist 
scoundrels. For this purpose we have to destroy the Nazi army and 
exterminate all the German invaders...” (Сталін, 1952). 
The same order stated that the Soviet leadership had no such purposes as 
the Nazis had, that it does not seek to impose it will and regime to Slavonic 
and other enslaved nations of Europe. There is no intend to interfere the 
internal affairs of other nations (Сталин 1952). 
The method of fasteninf systems was often used in military reasons, based 
on the fact that the perception of people is very limited due to their small 
amount of operational memory. That person did not have time to process a 
large mass of data and the excessive amount of information perceived as 
chaos. That’s why, during ideological impacts, simple expressions plan an 
important role such as: “Everything for the front! Everything for 
victory!”,”Ukraine has been and will be Soviet”, “Glory to the great Stalin – 
the leader and friend to Ukrainian people!” and many other bright slogans 
(Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. Фонд 1). 
The concept of “Patriotic War” is well-known in world history and appeals to 
the senses of man to an innocent victim, who traditionally and in new 
conditions has the right to take part in “Great Patriotic defensive War”. 
Although it’s hardly possible to call the war between Germany and the USSR 
the “Patriotic” one for all Ukrainians, even knowing how many million people 
were in concentration camps, in captivity as political prisoners and built 
fortifications under the muzzles of machine guns. 
The leaders attitude to the Red Army worriors, who fell into captivity, was 
really impressive. This clearly demonstrates the decree of the Supreme 
Command of August 16
th
 1941 № 270. This document stated, that the Red 
Army, surrendered by the enemy, must be “destroyed by all means, both by 
land and air, and Red Army family, who surrendered, must be deprived of 
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state aid”. The order of People’s Commissar of Defence of the USSR  
of July 28
th
 1942 № 227 included the importance of the formation of “armed 
enclosures” (up to 200 people in each) emphasizes the need to develop 
“armed zahorodzahoniv (up to 200 people in each)”. The decree also 
contained the information to place them “in the immediate rear of unstable 
divisions and oblige them in case of panic and disorderly retreat of division 
parts to shoot on the spot all cowards...” (Король 2002, 51). 
This situation shows that, on the one hand, not all soldiers understoond 
what was happening, why the Red Army retreated. They were not ready to 
defend the regime that has brought so much grief to most of their families. 
On the other hand – the order pointed out that the Bolshevik government and 
the leaders of the Red Army did not trust its own soldiers and commanders, 
the defense of “Homeland” has become a compulsion to many of them. 
Since June 1941, when the fascist German army started to occupy the 
territory of the Ukrainian SSR, its advocacy activity was quite effective and 
therefore could withstand the advocacy work of Soviet propaganda activists. 
But since December 1941 the effectiveness of information-psychological 
influence of the invaders started being less intensive, as a result of the 
confrontation methods ofs Soviet leaders. 
The Soviet Union reacted on Hitler’s information attack already in early 
days of the USSR western regions occupation. On June 23
rd
, 1941 GHQ was 
established and on July 17
th
 1941 the Main Political Directorate of the 
Red Army was founded. In accordance with the directives issued by this 
Department, the main task of military press was to train heroism, courage, 
martial arts, discipline. The press used specially formulated slogans, such as: 
“Fascism – is the enslavement of peoples. Fascism – a hunger, poverty, 
bankrupt. All forces should be aimed at the fight against fascism!”, “We are 
for the right actions. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!”. 
In the first months of the war such slogans determined the contents of leading 
military and civilian newspapers. (Панарин 2006, 18) 
The next step in Stalin information policy was to create an information 
mechanism to ensure the GHQ. The mechanism of managing information was 
created. On June 24
th
, 1941 the joint decree of the Communist Party and the 
government of the USSR “On the establishment and tasks of the Soviet 
Information Bureau” was legislated. The same resolution defined the main 
tasks of the newly created outreach departments, namely: 
– Guidance to coverage of international events and domestic life of the 
Soviet Union on radio and in the press; 
– Organizing counter-propaganda against the German and other hostile 
propaganda; 
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– Coverage and hostilities at the front, preparation and publication of 
reports on the materials of military Command. 
Throughout the period of the war, information agencies were the main 
sources of information of the situation at the front both in Germany and in the 
Soviet Union. Sovinformburo messages were the most valuable for the 
citizens of the USSR, which came up directly from the Supreme Command, as 
well as major newspapers, which hired correspondents of Sovinformburo. 
An important mechanism for the formation of the Soviet information space 
among the soldiers of the Red Army and the population of temporarily 
occupied areas were linguistic and stylistic means, which undoubtedly 
influenced the minds of people like emotive words and linguistic expressions, 
epithets, comparesons etc. which had the status of permanent. They were 
often used as headlines in newspapers and leaflets, which were dropped from 
aircrafts to the occupied territories. In particular, these are some words and 
expressions, which characterized Soviet soldiers: “fighting brotherhood”, 
“ingenuity and courage”, “initiative commander”, “courage”, “their” and so 
on. In contrast, the image of a brave Soviet soldier had an image of the 
enemy, which was wittingly negatevily described with the help of stained 
words and phrases: “terrible atrocities”, “atrocities of the Nazi monsters”, 
“massacre of the Nazis”, “Crimes of Nazi thugs” and others. In proverbs and 
sayings which appeared during the war, invaders were compared with evil 
invaders, exotic animals, representatives of evil spirits, creatures from the 
other world. The newspapers and leaflets often published even swear words 
“cheater”, “bandit”, “proydoha”, “Scarecrow” and others (Советская 
пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: “коммуникация 
убеждения” и мобилизационные механизмы 2007, 19). 
A good example of propaganda texts of those times, which combines 
positively and negatively stained words and linguistic expressions can be 
allocution of the Commander of the South-West direction and the CCCP (B) 
to the population of the occupied territories with a call to fight against the 
Nazis: “The Nazis have seized part of our native Ukraine. They captured and 
your neighborhood also, and now German boots trample native land. Intrigue, 
betrayal and cunning helped the enemy to manage it in the first months of the 
war. In the occupied towns and villages the invaders celebrate bloody feast: 
they rob, kill, rape women and even teenage girls, take out everything 
valuable. German fascists want Ukrainian people to become the German one. 
They want to turn Ukraine into a colony, and you – to become slaves”. 
(Русский архив: Великая Отечественная) As we see, polititians of 1940s 
well understood that any war is impossible without appropriate information 
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actions. In their opinion, the wars “should be fair, an enemy – cruel, own 
soldiers – real heroes “ (Почепцов 1998, 34). 
The powerful information campaigns took place already from the 
beginning of the deployment of hostilities on both sides, whose purpose was 
primarily to discredit the enemy, the creation of an enemy. The main objective 
of informational war was to demonstrate the advantages of country’s armed 
forces, concealing their own loss, exaggerating the losses caused by hostile 
armies, military and industrial facilities and means of communication, 
including enemy’s radio stations. Thes the information distributed through 
military-controlled press and radio. 
The next important step in strengthening the information policy of the 
Soviet Union was the propaganda of extreme vigilance. On June 29
th
, 1941 
the SNK and CC of the CPSU (b) derective was issued by party and 
government organizations of frontline areas. Its contens was brought to the 
public on July 3
rd
, 1941 through the speech of Stalin. The document stated the 
need to organize a relentless struggle with various disorganizers, like deserters 
and alarmist, and those spread rumors. Spreading rumors was often defined as 
a crime and fell under the appropriate criminal penalties. At the same time 
distributed pamphlets and other propaganda materials, which explained that 
the spread of false rumors was a “moral sabotage”, which could be primarily 
interested by enemy (Коммунистическая партия в Великой Отечественной 
войне 1970, 42). 
To coordinate and manage the information streams, which sprang in the 
rear and on the occupied regions of the USSR, the Office of propaganda and 
agitation of the CPSU (b) has created five new departments: radio and radio 
information, advocacy groups, literature, cinema, arts (Коммунистическая 
партия в Великой Отечественной войне 1970, 42). Each department was 
self-sufficient entity, and industry was completely controlled and subjected to 
total censorship. 
According to the plan “About the work behind the enemy lines, approved 
by main political administration of the Red Army plan, there were defined 
following tasks from November 1942 to September 1943”: (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України. Фонд 1, 68) 
1) distract the Germans and attract the Soviet citizens who were under the 
influence of German propaganda and for various reasons appeared in enemy 
camp, at the police service, the gendarmerie, the so-called Cossack 
detachments of “Russian Liberation Army”, etc.; 
2) to mobilize the population to prepare for a national uprising against the 
occupiers, to extend the armed struggle of the occupied areas against the 
Nazis; 
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3) to organize a mass boycott of all activities of the Germans during the 
seizure of areas; 
4) to strongly promote the success of the Red Army, the soviet front and 
thereby give hope to close the liberation from Nazi rule. 
The Soviet Information Bureau has become an accumulation and 
dissemination center of important information. But to conrol the information 
flows and to prevent unauthorized listening and hostile foreign radio 
broadcasts, on August 23
rd
, 1941 I. Peresypkin, the Deputy Commissar of 
Defense, issued the decree about the verification of the implementation of 
Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR dated June 25th, 1941 № 1750, 
according to which all citizens, living in the Soviet Union, were obliged to 
hand over personal radios to local connection authorities (Русский архив: 
Великая Отечественная 1997, 72). 
Soviet Informbureau, in accordance to the basic activities, constantly 
managed coverage of international events and domestic life of the Soviet 
Union on the radio and in press, organizing counter-propaganda against the 
Nazi media, publishings of military reports by materials of the Command of 
the Red Army. Sovinformburo also guided activities of anti-fascist and Slavic 
committees created at the beginning of the war: Soviet women, youth, 
scholars, Jewish Committee (КПСС в резолюциях и решениях съездов, 
конференций и пленумов ЦК 1985, 213). Since 1942 vector of the Soviet 
Information Bureau was radically changed and focused mainly on 
communication with foreign media, public and political organizations. For 
this purpose, 11 departments were created in the structure of the information 
and propaganda agency (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы 
Великой Отечественной войны 1999, 59). 
The most difficult task was to inform the world community about events 
which took place on the Soviet-German fronts and on the work of the home 
front. The Soviet Information Bureau had no connections with the 
international information space. It was necessary to form new ones. 
Opponents of the Soviet Union, including Germany, had a powerful 
propaganda apparatus, had a large number of radio stations, newspapers in 
major European countries. The Soviet Union allies quickly created a powerful 
information and propaganda organ. The Soviet Information Bureau faced 
tough task: to develop and maintain relationships around the world, to use all 
available methods – newspapers, magazines, radio stations, agencies, etc., to 
transmit official information about the Soviet Union and the events which 
took place in the country. 
Sovinformburo let the readers and listeners from abroad know to fight for 
the Soviet army and people against Hitler’s army through 1171 newspapers, 
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523 magazines and 18 radio stations in 23 countries (Советское 
информационное бюро 1944–1945). 
Radio programs Sovinformburo such as “In the last hour”, “The 
construction of the Soviet Information Bureau”, “Letters from the front and 
the front” and others were available for listening to almost every citizen of the 
USSR, although the radio points worked with major interruptions. Operational 
summary of Sovinformburo was published daily from June 25, 1941. News 
from the front was gatherd from 5am to 6am. Sovinformburo reports were 
always published on the front pages of Soviet newspapers. They were the 
main sourse of spreading information in almost every town. 
At the beginning of July1941 the Informbureau Soviet Berau together with 
All-Union Radio Committee, conducted a new form announcing information, 
which has not been used in practice before. It was regular radio transmission 
of political reviews. At first they were broadcasted only on the territory of the 
USSR, and later for listeners abroad. The reviews were broadcasted once a 
week (later – twice) at a specific date and time named “Averin”. In fact, their 
authors were a few dozen of people: Yaroslavsky, Pik, Omelchenko, Varga, 
Zvavych and others- 30 people on total. The certain Comintern officials were 
hired to work as commentators. Even more, thanks to the People’s 
Commissariat of Defense there were involved officers to prepare articles, who 
were treated in hospitals, as well as those who were sent from the front. These 
materials were sent abroad after Informbureau Soviet literary group 
processings. Commentators work seemed impossible without the efforts of the 
authors and compilers of the texts. All of them were united in the Literary 
Sovinformburo Department. During July – October 1941 the department’s 
staff prepared and sent abroad around 140 articles. Soinformberau has 
prepared more than 400 articles during this period together with specially 
ordered materials for newsletters of England, the USA, China and Sweden 
(Салата 2009, 117). 
The management of Sovinformbureau in conjunction with the All-Union 
Radio Committee was worked out clear requirements for the contents of all 
materials which were broadcasted on the radio. The messages of Soviet 
Informbureau were based on some clear pattern. First, there were summed up 
the battles for different directions, then – figures of destroyed equipment and 
manpower of the enemy, then – losses of Soviet troops (sometimes this order 
was violated). The morning digest contained the last night events, and the 
evening issue expressed analyzed results of hostilities during the day. From 
the first day of the war correspondents provided descriptions of battle scenes 
and exploits of Soviet soldiers. During the German-Soviet war, 14470 names 
of the soldiers were announced, who distinguished themselves at the front 
61 
(Советская военная энциклопедия 1979, 415). Together with this, in shoul 
be noted that sometimes daily and summary reports from the fronts were false 
and biased, that even Stalin did not believe in them (Сообщения Советского 
Информбюро 1944–1945, 3). 
The information, provided by Sovinformburo, was immediately published 
in newspapers and leaflets, which were later distributed on the fronts and on 
the occupied territories by the German army. 
The information materials, submitted in messages, were subjected to strict 
censorship. Despite the specific requirements regarding the Informbureau 
materials which were allowed/probihited for publishing, the editors had to 
make adjustments in messages, or to publish it in the way which absolutely 
did not meet basic line of Soviet information and political propaganda. 
For example, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” newspaper contained 
“The Spring”, essay by Iyulsky, in which the author, following the requirements 
of propaganda, showed the situation in the besieged Leningrad as if life on the 
streets and boulevards of the city was in rush, kids played in the gardens etc. 
Despite shells and bombs bursted nearby, noone paid attention on them. This 
information was designed for soldiers of the Red Army and the population of the 
occupied territories, who had to believe that the German army could not break the 
spirit of the Soviet people that their whole life has changed and keep on moving 
forward. But if this essay was read by Leningrad residents, who were starving and 
dying from cold in the besieged city, they would be very indignant, and who 
knows how it all could be finished (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны 2007, 156). 
The “Izvestia” newspaper stopped publishings of “Fuel is delivered on 
time” by A.Kuznetsov, correspondent. To show the courage and heroism of 
Soviet railroad workers, the autoher mentioned in the article the amount of 
destroyed railway stations, broken trains, damaged tracks etc. One part of this 
correspondence should have had positive influence on the population and the 
soldiers of the Red Army, but the rest would support the creation of German 
Informbureau, but it could bot be allowed to happen. 
Due to different reasons, 65 articles and essays have been canceled in such 
newspapers as “Pravda”, “Izvestia”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, “Red Star”, 
which covered the main events of war (Русский архив: Великая 
Отечественная 1997, 157). 
To make Soviet broadcasting more accessible to all social groups of 
different nationalities, on November 17
th
, 1941 according to the Decree 
№ 904 by the State Defense Committee, there was approved the mandatory 
radio broadcast in Ukrainian and in Polish. To this end, it was ordered to use 
one radio in October broadcasting center in Moscow for 12 hours a day to 
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perform Ukrainian radio and oblige Broadcasting Committee to finish the 
installation in Engels one of the radio tools, taken from evacuated Kharkv, till 
December 3, 1941.It was specifically intended for radio broadcasts in 
Ukrainian and Polish (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 25). 
Based on the above, we can state that Sovinformburo leaders faced great 
difficulties with recruitment: they were required language skills, experience in 
advocacy and peronl information. The particular attention was paid to the 
selection of correspondents who worked with foreign newspapers and agencies. 
The military propaganda held abroad, played an important role in work of 
the Soviet Information Bureau. Thus, the report of the Soviet Informbureau of 
1941–1943 showed that this department daily controlled and supervised 
22 central newspapers, all military correspondence Tass and Radio 
Committee, TASS pictures, publishing products. This correspondence was 
sent to England, USA, Sweden, Turkey and Iran, which helped to adjust direct 
relationships with the US military magazines (Сообщения Советского 
Информбюро, 1944–1945, 258–259). 
The government and the main political administration of the Red Army 
understood that to announce the information to the public in such a way was 
very dangerous. Therefore, the daily combat Sovinformburo construction took 
a long way from the General Staff to the speaker of Radio Committee and its 
text was significantly changes. Sovinformburo management adhered the rules 
under which the loss ratio had always been in favor of the Red Army. 
According to these claims, the messages dated June 22–24th 1941 about the 
downed aircraft, mentioned that the Soviet Air Forces lost 374 aircrafts, and 
the Germans – 381 (Сообщения Советского Информбюро, 1944–1945, 4). 
On June 25
th
 1941 it was reported that the Soviets lost 17 aircrafts, and 
Germans – 76. June 30th – 21 lost Soviet aircraft and 102 German airplanes 
(Сообщения Советского Информбюро 1944–1945, 5). To check this data in 
the offices was wery difficult, that’s why the worriors could not understand 
why such large army losses were presented as a victory. 
Another eloquent example proves, that the information, supplied through 
Sovinformburo, did not always reflect the true events that took place at the 
front. So, we know that during the defense of Sevastopol, compounds remains 
(109th Infantry Division, 142nd Infantry Brigade, 4 consolidated battalion – 
in total about 5.5 thousand people) under the command of Major General  
P.G. Novikov kept on fightings. They were not mentioned in vaults at all. 
In such circumstances, soldiers and officers completely lost morale. And it 
effected the situation on the front. Such cases were not rare. The control over 
events at the front was lost quite often, and whole units dropped out of sight 
of command, resulting their commanders to operate on their own. 
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The Sovinformberau message shows the relation of the command to 
combat groups of the the Red Army, as the Soviet troops left the Sevastopol 
on July 3
rd
, 1942, which (the message) also contained the following: 
“The Soviet troops losses during June 7th – July 3rd: 11385 people killed, 
21099 people – wounded, 8300 – missing, 30 tanks, 300 guns, 77 airplanes. 
Soldiers, commanders and wounded people were evacuated from Sevastopol” 
(Сообщения Советского Информбюро, 1944–1945, 284). However, we 
know that these data was not true. In fact, according to the reports declared by 
P.Oktyabrsky, the Chief of the Defence of Sevastopol district, the commander 
of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral, to the General Headquaters on July 9
th
 
1942, the total number of Soviet troops amounted to 130125 persons, the 
losses – 31068 people, injured – 17894 people, those who died in field 
hospitals – 1207 people. Knowing these numbers, it is easy to count the 
number of defenders of Sevastopol, the remained – 79956 people. Almost 80 
thousand soldiers and sailors who heroically defended Sevastopol were 
forgotten and doomed to death (Меленберг, 200). 
When Hitler’s troops almost captured Kyiv and Soviet troops retreated, 
there were no reports from Soviet Informbureau neither on 19
th
 nor on 20
th
 of 
September 1941 about it. All that we know about Kyiv of these days is: 
“During the night of September 20th 1941, our troops were fighting the enemy 
on all fronts”. As a result, major Kyiv residents and people from the suburbs 
had no time to evacuate (Меленберг, 200, 74). And later, those, who did not 
evacuate from the area of German occupation, were called “traitors at the 
national level”. 
Instead, we read in the same statement about Soviet soldiers freed villages 
in Smolensk region from the Nazis, about Bosnia and Herzegovina that keeps 
on fighting between Yugoslav rebels and Italian troops, about good harvest in 
the Omsk region and Altai Territory and other regions of the Soviet Union 
(Сообщения Советского Информбюро, В 8 т. 1944–1945, 74). 
Despite the messages in the government newspapers, they published 
articles with authors, summing up weekly news or other hostile period. They 
wrote about about a significant advantage of the Red Army over Nazi troops, 
urging the population and the soldiers of undeniable victory of the Soviet 
troops. As an example, an article written by A.S. Shcherbakov “Hitler 
deceives his people”, which was published in the newspaper “Pravda” on 
October 5
th, 1941 and broadcasted by Sovinformburo on air (Великая 
Отечественная война 1941–1945: Энциклопедия, 640). The draft of the 
article stated: “... the loss of the Germans near Leningrad – 105 thousand”; but 
after revision of A.S. Shcherbakov the figure was 140 thousand. In the draft 
we can see: “... it was documentaly proved that during three months of war the 
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Germans had lost 11,100 tanks, about 13 200 guns, 10 000 aircrafts, the Red 
Army inflicted 3–4 times more damage to the enemy”. The final “3–4 times” 
were corrected to “2–3” and deleted the phrase “documentaly proved” 
(Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной 
войны 1999, 37). There were also removed outright expressions and some 
German losses were understated for 3 months of the war the Germans lost 
more than 11 thousand tanks, 13 thousand guns, 9 thousand aircraft and more 
than 3 million soldiers (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны, 1999, 39). It should be noted that in service in the 
Wehrmacht did not have so many tanks. Comparing Soviet losses to German 
ones, the first ones looked more optimistict: “1,128 thousand in manpower, 
about 7 thousand tanks, 8,9 thousand Guns, 5,316 aircrafts” (Советское 
Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1999, 41) 
Comparing Informbureau messages to the figures of the Soviet military 
losses in A.S. Scherbakov records, we can conclude that digital material 
reports did not meet reality but consisted of propaganda purposes. All these 
events created the image of the invincible Soviet Army for the Soviet 
population, who worked behinf the enemy lines or was in the zone of Germa 
occupation; the Army, which could not be defeated. 
The last issue of “The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945” encyclopedias 
edited by M.M. Kozlov, contains the information that the German Arm lost in 
November 1941 only 750 thousand people (Великая Отечественная война 
1941–1945: Энциклопедия 1985, 13.). The studies of M.I. Meltyuhov shows 
that the Germans before the war with the Soviet Union had only 3899 tanks 
and 4841 aircraft (Мельтюхов 1991, 18). Thus, it appears that the article of 
the Soviet Information Bureau and propaganda leaders, of A.S. Scherbkov in 
particular, showed that German military units were destroyed almost two 
times more than it was in reality. 
Similar technologies were also used by Nazi propaganda. Wehrmacht 
Supreme Command spread the information on the occupied territories about 
the huge losses of the Red Army and downplayed self losses at the front. This 
information was distorted to maintain the morale of soldiers and to hide the 
true figures of Wehrmacht losses on the Eastern Front. Propaganda 
departments made stories about “the Red Army defeat”, about the number of 
captured Soviet soldiers. With the help of misinformation, the enemy tried to 
influence the Soviet soldiers, on the population of temporarily occupied areas 
of the Soviet Union and the global public opinion. 
To somehow counteract Nazi propaganda, the Soviet leaders launched 
counter-Informbureau: only during the first six months of the war there were 
published over 15 major materials (1941–1945. Публицистика и очерки 
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военных лет, 1982, 74). In its publications the Informbureau disclosed 
methods of counting enemy losses of Soviet tanks, planes, guns and more. 
The collection contains many other data that make an undeniable interest to 
historians. 
The influence of the ideological concept of the party on the activities of 
the Soviet Informbureau leaders was deliberately determined. The situation of 
that time forced the editors and reporters to carefully follow certain rules, such 
as: the Soviet system – the fairest system in the world, all the Soviet – the best 
in the world, the Soviet people – the freest, the proletariat of other countries 
certainly oppressed etc. Deviation from established ideological postulates led 
the person, accused in it, to the rank of enemies, and then – to the repression. 
It happened with a group of employees of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. 
When its influence on the international community increased, the committee 
was dissolved at the end of 1948, and many employees were arrested. They 
spread the blame of anti-Soviet information. Military Collegium condemned 
13 people to death (В комиссии Политбюро ЦК КПСС, 1989, 38). 
Studying Sovinformburo work during the Great Patriotic War, we can 
conclude, that: 
1) Soviet Informbureau had become a powerful tool of counter-
propaganda of the Red Army and the population of the occupied territories; 
2) the formation of an information space on the occutpied territories took 
an important role in the activity of the Soviet Information Bureau, where all 
the messages were delivered in newspapers or leaflets; 
3) Foreign political propaganda and dissemination of information “from 
the first hands” to the United States, Britain, Turkey and other countries was 
an important aspect of its activity; 
4) the materials of Sovinformburo during hostilities served as an 
information and advocacy function, so that all materials tested and contolled 
by main political administration of the Red Army to follow the ideological 
and propaganda requirements. 
In general, it should be noted that the materials, that indicate the activity of 
the main body of Soviet propaganda – the Soviet Informbureau, make it 
possible to expand scientific research on the World and the Great Patriotic 
War and answer important questions. They help to explore the methods and 
mechanisms of Soviet information space on the occupied territories of the 
German army. 
Messages to the areas, temporarily occupied by German fascist invaders, 
were broadcasted through Ukrainian radio stations. Thus, the most popular 
among them was the station of Taras Shevchenko. It should be noted that the 
broadcast was intended mainly to working-age population of temporarily 
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occupied areas of the Soviet Ukraine, in particular its most active 
representatives – guerrillas. Broadcasting was based mainly themed, namely: 
‒ Systematic coverage of the heroic struggle of the multinational Red 
Army, including sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people, who fougt in its 
ranks for the liberation of all temporarily occupied Soviet lands from the 
German yoke; 
‒ Show selfless labor on the home front, inspired by high noble aim to 
defeat the German invaders; 
‒ A wide and systematic show of Stakhanov work on evacuated 
enterprises and collective farms, further development of Ukrainian science, 
culture and art in the Soviet rear; 
‒ Show courageous struggle of Ukrainian people’s avengers – partisans 
behind enemy lines, unfolded under the slogan “Ukraine has always been and 
always will be the Soviet state”; 
‒ Systematic coverage of the terrible Nazi hordes on the occupied 
Ukrainian lands, exposing their man-hating program extermination, 
enslavement and Ukrainian people’s transformation into German ones, the 
destruction of national culture and science with its historical and cultural 
relics (В комиссии Политбюро ЦК КПСС, 1989, 1). 
Particular attention was paid to radio message created already during the 
war: “Soviet Ukraine”, “partisan” radio station by Shevchenko and others. 
These stations were used by the Soviet government as mechanisms of 
propaganda-agitation direction. Their activity on the occupied territories of 
the Nazi army was especially active (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 23). 
The overall volume of Ukrainian Radio Committee was 19 hours 
35 minutes daily, which included: 6 hours 25 minutes of Moscow relaying 
transmissions, 12 hours 35 min of personal broadcast. The prodaganda and 
agitation department was given 2 hours and 28 minutes per day (the rest of the 
time was used to create the desired mood of the population) (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, Фонд 1, 2). 
Radio broadcast of propaganda and agitation departments was based on 
appearances, speeches and orders of Stalin and others. Promotion of these 
documents, the impact on the Soviet people on the occupied regions of 
Ukraine and directing them to fight against the German invaders – all these 
issues covered all leading positions in broadcasting. 
During 1942 the department of propaganda and agitation has announced 
about 2 thousand papers, correspondence, individual notes, out of thi 
amount – more than 1,500 original articles and correspondence. 
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The majority of radio programs were dedicated to the famous Red Army 
heroism, wisdom and courage of the Soviet people. In order to fulfill this task, 
special articles were ordered and organized the systematic performances on 
the radio to the people on the front. The articles were about some combat 
operations of units, departments, military units of the Red Army, the heroism 
in the fight against the German invaders. Among them there were such 
programs: “The power of Stalin’s prediction”, “noble, lofty goals Patriotic 
War”, “Infinite heroism of Sevastopol people calling on the exploits”, “In the 
name of the motherland”, “For you, Ukraine” and others (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 3–4). 
A large number of transfers was devoted to the Communist Party and its 
leaders – Lenin and Stalin. The Party was hown as the only power that 
organized the Soviet people in the struggle against the Nazi invaders. Such 
programs constantly emphasized that the Soviet people always win just 
because of its great leader Stalin. 
On November 23
rd, 1941 “Latest news” radio station resumed its activities 
which continued to broadcast radio programs in Ukrainian cites from Saratov. 
During 1942 this radio station daily broadcasted six editions of the latest 
news, two issues of “News from the fronts of World War II”, two issues of 
“guerrilla news”, two issues “the newspaper” (Центральний державний 
архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 8). 
The “Ostanni Visti” newspaper was focused on such issues: 
– Official reports; 
– Soviet Informbureau messages; 
– TASS correspondents’ and central newspapers’ messages; 
– the information from abroad about struggle of oppressed peoples against 
Nazism, about mighty coalition of great powers – the USSR, the Great 
Britain, the USA; 
– Message from the World War II fronts; 
– News from the Soviet motherland (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 11). 
Printed and visual materials were not as operative as radio programs, and 
therefore could not fully perform its functions. 
To defeat the enemy in the information confrontation, Chief Political 
Department of the Red Army also stepped up its activities in countering 
German advocacy attacks. On August 19
th
, 1941 all military councils and 
fronts’ chiefs were sent the directive “About the work among with the 
population of the occupied areas and the party-political leaders of the guerrilla 
movement” (Бурцев, 1981, 104). This step of the Soviet government testified 
that the outreach military policy factor was of great importance to defeat the 
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enemy. According to this directive, in the Main Political Department of the 
Red Army and in front political directorates there were established relevant 
departments, and in the political department of the army – similar 
departments. Their main task was to conduct information flows and 
propaganda among the population of the occupied areas and the guerrillas, to 
improve the experience of information warfare. These departments existed in 
the structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army till September 
1942, and then refered to created headquarters of the guerrilla movement. 
According to the directives instructions, the departments of party-political 
work among the people and the Red Army, which worked on Soviet territory 
occupied by the enemy, assigned certain responsibilities: 
– to send their representatives to the enemy lines to guide the work of the 
occupied areas of the Soviet political management and guerrilla movement; 
– to publish special literature (monuments, cards, addresses, etc.) and 
distribute them among the population of the occupied areas, among guerrilla 
groups formed by local people distribute “News from the Soviet Motherland” 
issued by the Chief; 
– to organize daily radio broadcast for the population of the occupied 
areas; 
– to provide central and local periodicals to the occupied areas through its 
daily delivery to nearby areas with specially selected people and drop it from 
the aircrafts to remote locations (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 
1997, 24). 
The issue of leaflets and bulletins started on August 18
th
, 1941 in Russian, 
Ukrainian and Belarusian. During the war 681 different newspapers were 
published with a total circulation of about 510 million copies, including in 
Ukrainian – 112 newspapers (about 35 million copies). These types of printed 
campaign expressed the situation on the Soviet-German and other fronts in the 
Soviet rear and on the occupied territories etc. Thus, one of the bulletins dated 
January 22
nd
 1942 stated: “Dear brothers and sisters from Soviet areas, 
temporarily occupied by German troops! Hitler’s soldiers hide from you the 
fact of the defeat of German troops and spread false messages about our 
country. Do not believe fascist dogs!” Postcards call all learn the truth about 
the Red Army and the real events occurring at the front, from Soviet 
newspapers and leaflets (Чайковський, 1990, 301). 
The bulletins contained the events, which took place in the front and in the 
rear of the Soviet army at this time. There was the review of foreign press 
about the defeat of German forces at Moscow, reports on the status of military 
production in the countries – allies of the USSR, the activities of the guerrillas 
and their subversive activities and so on (Чайковський 1990, 302). 
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To increase the informational confrontation and reduce the pressure of 
Nazi propaganda on the population in the rear and on the occupied territories, 
the Soviet management started the rapprochement with the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Stalin, realizing tremendous unifying and spiritual, ideological role of 
the Russian Church (and it was the outlet for the entire territory of the USSR), 
initiated the restoration of the patriarchate. Before this, the huge funds 
collected to help the church in front of armored columns, aviation equipment 
etc. were a motivative factor. On the first day of the war, Metropolitan Sergiy 
blessed the Soviet people in his message to “defense of the sacred borders of 
the motherland.” The next step in this policy was the closure of anti-religious 
periodicals. The “Union of the Godless” was also dissolved. Its editor was 
Yemelyan Yaroslavsky (Hubelman). In 1943 Stalin agreed to elect the 
patriarch. It was the Metropolitan Sergiy. Since then the church has began to 
actively use “moral justification for war” conducted by the Soviet Union 
against fascism (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной 
войны, 2007, 20). 
By strengthening its position in the information space, the State 
Defense Committee formed Command Headquaters of the partisan 
movement at Central Headquaters on May 30
th
, 1942. P.K. Ponomarenko 
was a head of the CPSU (b) Belarus. In accordance with the directives of 
the Main Political Directorate on September 28
th
, 1942 the Political 
Department was founded and connected to the Central Staff of the partisan 
movement, headed by B.I. Malin, the secretary of the CPSU (b). The main 
task of this administration was to widespread deployment of agitation and 
propaganda work among the population of lands temporarily occupied by 
the Nazis. At the same time the Political management gave orders to all its 
structural subdivisions to organize oral propaganda and counter-
propaganda, and also publications and distribution of printed leaflets etc 
(Волковский, 2003, 392). 
The protocols № 6–10 of the subterranean meetings of Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks) dated 29
th
 January – 30th April 1943 we can see that the leaders 
of Bolshevik subterranean organizations performed a strong agitation and 
propaganda work among the population on temporarily occupied regions of 
Ukraine. They carried out not only the dissemination of information about the 
plight of the population and its slave labor, but also to ensured by the 
collection of materials from the occupied areas for processing and using 
information as a weapon against themselves as occupiers. The members of the 
subterranean studied, systematized these materials in order to use them for 
counter-propaganda (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, фонд 1, 117–124) 
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Not remained aloof and Komsomol governing bodies did not remian 
asside. The Decree of the Central Committee of Komsomol about measures of 
Komsomol organizations on the temporarily occupied areas we can see which 
activities they performed among the local population: they widelyspread 
printed and oral propaganda aimed to strengthen the faith of young people in 
the victory of the Soviet Union, they increased production of leaflets on 
practical issues of guerrilla warfare, they popularized folk heroes, destroying 
traitors etc (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 1997, 112). 
The political management of the Central Headquaters of the partisan 
movement performed the party-political work in guerrilla groups, constantly 
stuffed propaganda materials, hardware behind enemy lines, sent 
propagandists, journalists, typists and printers, while the supply of arms was 
very limited. 
In June 1942 to explore the experience of advocacy of all units in the 
structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, military-political 
propaganda Council was created, whose task was to scientifically generalize 
study of scientific political propaganda and on this basis identify ways and 
means to increase its efficiency. 
On July 4
th
, 1942 the Council of the military-political propaganda 
legislated directive, which contained instructions for managing work on a 
specific materials and its application differentiation related to the specific 
characteristics of the existence of enemy units and formations. To firmly root 
the idea of inevitable military defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies in soldiers 
minds, advocates emphasized the growing strength of the Soviet Army, the 
intensity of the anti-Hitler coalition and boundless faith in the victory of the 
people of the Red Army (Волковский, 2003, 393). 
The Soviet leaders made a big bet on partisan advocacy. It was due to 
some reasons: firstly, the partisans were more affordable to settlements that 
were already contoled by the Nazis; secondly, part of the guerrillas could 
move relatively freely along the occupied territories, introducing themselves 
as residents of this or that settlement. It was almost the only opportunity for 
the Soviet leaders to influence the local people. 
For the German command guerrilla movement and the movement of 
resistance to Soviet territory was completely unexpected. German leaders 
have had to study forms of guerrilla struggle, its character already during 
the war. 
The information space played a significant role in the activities of guerrilla 
units on the occupied territories, which was formed directly by the USSR 
government, the was aimed to influence the minds of the population on the 
occupied areas by German fascists. 
71 
Partisan movement for the Soviet Union, especially for the Russian 
people, was not a new phenomenon. It is known that in the USSR in 1920–30s 
a lot of work was carried out to prepare guerrilla warfare in case of a possible 
attack of the enemy. Hundreds of partisans of civil war were specially trained, 
sabotage agents developed special emphasis in case the guerrillas could make 
them on their own from scrap materials behind the enemy lines. But before 
the beginning of World War II major trained guerrillas were repressed. 
No one else was involved in the development of subversive technology, even 
the establishment of such technology was not ever raised (Салата, 2007, 71). 
The formation of the guerrilla movement in this war was not provided in 
advance. The issue before the war was not studied at all. Soviet doctrine, as 
mentioned above, claimed that in case of aggression of the enemy the Soviet 
army could strike crushing retaliation and the enemy would be defeated yet on 
its territory. In 1939 this doctrine was focused not only by all the combat 
strength of the Red Army, but by the population of the USSR. 
Only the Soviet-Finnish War, which ended in shame for the Soviet Union 
and significant losses proved that the use of subterranean subversive and 
intelligence activities and the creation of special units that would use guerrilla 
warfare tactics were necessary. 
In fact, not only the leaders, but also the Soviet people were not prepared 
to conduct guerrilla warfare. Timothy Strokach words prove this fact (who 
was appointed a head of the Ukrainian Partisan Movement Headquarters in 
June 1942): “Our people morally was not prepared for possible defeat at the 
front, for a possible hard war, for a possible hard clandestine subversive 
activities in the enemy lines, which require special training” (Безсмертя. 
Книга Пам’яті України. 1941–1945, 2000, 222). 
But despite the lack of specific experience, before November 1941 the 
guerrilla movement spread almost along the entire territory of Ukraine, which 
was occupied by German fascist invaders. The government faced the task 
tocontrol the activities of guerrilla units and vector it to the support of the Red 
Army. 
With the assistance of the Information Office, headed by Lavrentiy Beria, 
the occupied territories, with guerrilla groups, particularly in Ukraine, in July 
1941 the information space started its formation. Its main objective was to 
inform the partisans with the news from the front and carry out propaganda 
campaign aimed at “unconscious” citizens who fell into guerrilla groups in 
different conditions. 
With the assistance of the agency, there were developed a number of 
measures and mechanisms that ensure the creation of the necessary 
information field. 
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One of the most powerful tools were newspapers and radio. Thus, to provide 
the necessary information, the locations with the partisans were dumped a large 
number of newspapers from the aircraft which were published in the rear. Among 
them: “Partizan”, “Red Partisans”, “Bolshevik” and others (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 40). 
Ukraine party management developed measures that helped to spread the 
necessary information among the guerrillas and the people, who remained on 
the occupied lands. They included: 
1) “For Soviet Ukraine” newspaper was planned to be published and 
droped behind enemy lines in circulation of 100 thousand copies. In addition, 
till 10.11.2014 such newspapers as “Communist” and “Bloshevik” had to be 
published behind the enemy lines; 
2) extra 28 mobile printers (“F” – 2; comrade. “K” – 2, comrade. “C2 – 2, 
comrade. “P” – 1, comrade. “L” – 2; comrade. “B” – 1, comrade. “B” – 1) 
were delivered for pulications of newspapers, postcards and leaflets by 
Sovinformbureau till December 1
st
 1942. Plus extra 22 printers till January 1
st
 
1943; 
3) to deliver 30 radio starions till the end of the year; 
4) to drop off the aircrafts 100 libraries to the guerrilla groups; 
5) Increase the publication of leaflets, in appeal to the Ukrainian 
population. In November-December, it was planned to publish least 45 titles, 
including 10 illustrated. Most of the cards were spread among partisan groups, 
having created a network of agents to the distribution of newspapers and 
leaflets among the population. Use maximum capabilities to supply printed 
materials to the Right Bank regions of Ukraine; 
6) to organize day-time radio broadcastings subterratean and partisan 
newspapers published behind enemy lines, and also fo guerrilla groups; 
7) to publish a series of pamphlets about the struggle of the Red Army 
and the guerrillas and distribute them among guerrilla groups; 
8) to issue a series of small essays about life and work of the Soviet 
people in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Saratov 
and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань 
України, фонд 1, 47–48). 
Chief Political Department of the Red Army paid particular attention to 
leaflets distribution: during June 1941 – November 1942 the Department of 
Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U Komsomol Central 
Committee and the Political Administration of South and South-Western 
Fronts have printed such publications for the population of Ukraine on the 
occupied territories: 
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– “Communist” newspaper – 155 issues of total circulation 1340 thousand 
copies; 
– “Communist” leaflet-newspaper – 535 thousand copies; 
– “Soviet Ukraine” newspaper – 185 issues of 435 thousand copies; 
– “Soviet Ukraine” leaflet-newspaper – 120 thousand copies; 
– “For Soviet Ukraine” newspaper for guerilas – 141 issues of circulation of 
23 thousand copies. Totaly delivered around 25 thousand copies (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 41). 
The management was worried about leaflets supply to the occupied areas 
of Ukraine, as they made it clear about what was really happening on the 
fronts and disclosed the policy of German occupation government on 
Ukrainian lands. The articles revealed the true plans of the enemy, its cunning 
plans and the criminal actions of the German administration. Most of the 
leaflets were left by the Red Army soldiers while retrograding. There were 
25 issues in total of total circulation of more than 26100 thousand copies. 
Among them – 10 issues of illustrated leaflets, they were more attractive  
to the population of the occupied territories. Their circulation was 
10 000 thousand copies. A considerable number of leaflets were dropped from 
airplanes – 140 issues of total circulation of 251616500 copies (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 42). 
The main Political Directorate of the Red Armym the leaders of guerrilla 
groups organized systematic permanent notification of the population on the 
occupied regions of Ukraine about the domestic and international position of 
the USSR; spoke about active and productive work of Soviet citizens in the 
rear, spread the Nazi propaganda, printed articles, wrote correspondence and 
other materials which later spread in the rear of the German invaders 
(Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 
фонд 1, 26). There were various leaflets’ headlines: the situation at the front, 
Nazi atrocities, appeal to different segments of the population, exposing 
traitors etc. 
Thus, the Soviet government has made every effort to control mood and 
behavior of the population, especially on the occupied territories. Newspapers 
and leaflets had become a necessary means of maintaining information space, 
which was formed in those regions with the help of the developed countries 
and the leaders of the Communist Party of methods and technologies. 
The proof of such policy of the Government is the memories of 
O. Saburov, the “Hercules” partisan unit Commissioner: “In the first weeks of 
the war partisans had only small homemade receivers. With the help of them, 
partisans listened to “Latest news from Moscow”, then copied by hand and 
distributed among the population”. 
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The proof if the management and contents of radio programs, which were 
in air for guerrillas and the population on the occupied territories, was radio 
inquiry about managing radio programs for partisan newspapers, 
propagandists and agitators of guerrilla groups of Ukraine. The document 
stated that radio programs contained: 
– Materials, which described the situation at the front. Special messages of 
Soviet Informbureau, data about losses of Nazi forces; the morale state of the 
German army and armies of German allies; 
– Materials, which characterized the situation in the Soviet rear: increase 
the production of weapons, ammunition, food (factories, farms); Soviet 
people’s patriotic movement; unity of the Soviet front and rear; 
– Information about Ukrainian guerrillas military actions and other 
occupied territories; 
– A commented information from abroad. Chronicles of the anti-Nazi 
struggle of the peoples of the occupied European countries by Nazi Germany; 
– Articles which reveal the lies of Nazi propaganda, leaflets for 
publication in partisan detachments (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 11). 
There was also founded “Guerrilla truth” newspaper, which included printed 
materials, broadcasted by the Soviet Informbureau which were later distributed 
among the partisan units and people on the occupied territories (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 7–9). 
For example, S. Kovpak union raided from the Bryansk forests to the Right-
Bank of Ukraine. Going in the raid, the guerrillas preparing a huge number of 
leaflets with pictures, which were in their possession (Центральний державний 
архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 13). 
Commissioners of guerrilla groups and political instructors often 
conducted interviewsby their own with local people. Sometimes partisans 
hung leaflets in villages conquered by the Nazis directly on their windows for 
ads. The invaders did quickly notice that it was not their newspapers 
(Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 
15–16). These “tricks” of the guerrillas made it possible to disseminate the 
information in the most remote parts of the occupied territory. 
One of the commissioners of guerrilla group proved that they often spread 
information that refuted the provocative materials in response to a provocation 
of German newspaperd. 
A special theme was developed in all newspapers which were published 
for the guerrillas. For example, front-line journalist Georgy Rzhanov said: 
“Guerrillas listened to Moscow. They have known about news of intensified 
guerrilla movement throughout Ukraine from messages of the Soviet 
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Informbureau, about the establishment of the Central Headquaters of the 
partisan movement at the Supreme Command, which would conduct this 
movement. Almost every night guerrillas listened to special programs created 
for them and the population of the occupied territories” (Салата, 2007, 74). 
In the first place the Soviet Informbureau issued latest messages. 
Anchormen announced morning and evening live arches to partisans. Then, 
there were messages “The last time”. Sometimes it was possible to broadcast 
the material which could wind up the Nazi propaganda. 
Along with the official reports of the Soviet Informbureau they tried to 
give the best information about the guerrillas, which appeared in the national 
press and in which their activities were positively characterized by population 
on temporarily occupied territories. 
Broadcasting all necessary information to partisan newspapers fully 
justified itself (Радио в дни войны, 1975, 52). 
At the beginning of the war, with the assistance of guerrilla groups there 
were published 270 subterranean books! The usual place of publishing office: 
house, vehicle or just a shelter in forest, turning into a kind of club – cell of 
concentration and distribution of information. Farmers and the youth from the 
surrounded villages came with the guerrillas to read the latest reports from the 
war fronts (Радио в дни войны, 1975, 53). 
In addition, leaflets were replicated in many partisan groups. For example, 
according to incomplete data, in S. Kovpak group during the second half of 
1942 ther were published 900 thousand copies, and in groups A.Saburov and 
A. Fedorov – 800 thousand and 400 thousand copies (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 28–29). 
Thus, we see that one of the priorities in the activities of the guerrillas was 
campaigning and advocacy on temporarily occupied territories. It included: 
preparation of wall newspaper, leaflets; dissemination of information 
broadcast by the Soviet Information Bureau; hanging leaflets, slogans, appeals 
on the trees in the forest. They criticized the false reports of Nazi propaganda, 
and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань 
України, фонд 1, 36). 
Political control was given instructions for the organization of “Soviet 
Ukraine” radio station to the population of the occupied territories of Ukraine and 
the guerrillas who operated deep behind enemy lines. In June 1941 the Political 
Berau of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine legislated resolution about 
the format and frequency of issued “Communist” and “Soviet Ukraine” papers. 
Subsequently there was legislated about the format and frequency of such 
publications as “Komsomolets Ukraine”, “Stalin tribe” and others (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 28). 
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In order to strengthen the activities of Soviet agitators and propagandists, the 
circulation of “People’s agitators” magazine was increased from 120 thousand 
copies to 150 thousands. In this magazine soviet propagandists could find detailed 
instructions of the methods and techniques of propaganda and informational 
influence on masses in general and on individual in particular (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 2). 
There were systematically organized special programs which had the task to 
convey the experience of guerrilla warfare to some other units (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 17). 
A powerful tool for partisan political education and increase of their 
responsibility to the people was military oath regarding hard work on 
strengthening discipline and organization in groups and education of hatred 
for the invaders (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань 
України, фонд 4620, 179). 
Various forms of verbal propaganda were widely used. According to 
numerous memoirs of participants of guerrilla warfare, the forms of work 
were sufficiently well-known: there were mass meetings in the liberated 
villages, conversations of partisan agitators, intermittent rallies and meetings 
during combat conversion unit. 
In these cases guerilla units used forms of political work, customary for 
Soviet people, such as rallies, demonstrations and even military parades in the 
days of revolutionary holidays. For example, the resonant response took place 
in Dubovichy village during parade on February 23
rd
 1942 by Putivly 
combined detachment (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, фонд 4620, 180–181). A large number of local residents 
took part in parade. This action demonstrated support to the Soviet regime. 
According to the decree of Defense Commissar of the USSR dared 
September 5
th
 1942 “About the tasks of the guerrilla movement”, to the decree 
of CPSU (b) dated October 2
nd
 1942 and to the decree of the State Defense 
Committee of the USSR dated November 11
th
 1942, Partisan groups of 
A.F. Fedorov, A. Saburov, S.A. Kovpak, K.S. Melnik etc. were spread 
published newspapers and leaflets, which were distributed among local 
people. O. Saburova squad had published more than 102 titles of newspapers, 
leaflets, newsletters by total circulation of 156,183 copies (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 4620, 18–23). 
During 1942 CC CP (B) U and political department of the Southern and 
Southwestern Fronts have delivered 222 million copies of different 
publishings behind the enemy lines in total. Most of the printed materials had 
little impact (Ивлев, 1988, 58). 
Only in January 1943 they have sent 13 kinds of leaflets to the occupied 
territories of Ukraine. 
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During the whole war the were distributed about 400 million newspapers, 
leaflets, appeals and other printed materials on the territory of Ukraine. 
Equally active was publishing in Crimea, where the information space was 
in quite tough conditions. Here, since May 1942 to February 1943 there were 
published 35 issues of the newspaper “Red Crimea” total circulation of 
735 copies. They were sent to the rear of the enemy (Ивлев, 1988, 61). 
For the manufacture and distribution of printed propaganda directly into 
the units there were delivered 56 portable printers (including 21 body 
printers). During short-term typing courses there were taught 37 people  
(later 8 people were sent in to the front). 350 libraries, mobile cinema unit 
(which could serve more than 10 thousand people) were packaged and 
shipped to guerrilla. 
Since November 1942 till April 1943 103 issues of leaflets have been 
published in Ukrainian. Total circulation was about 8100 thousand copies. 
1980 thousand copies of magazines and 300 thousand of brochures 
(“Communist”, “Soviet Ukraine”, “Sovetskaya Ukraina”, “For Soviet 
Ukraine”) were also published (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, фонд 4620, 24). 
To distribute the necessary information, the Central Committee of the 
CPSU (b) outlined such tusks tp the leaders of guerrilla groups: 
1) to deliver 50 portable printers to guerrilla groups; 
2) to organize broadcasting the information for the newspapers, flyers and 
other printed publications on the temporarily occupied Soviet lands through 
“Soviet Ukraine” and “T. Shevchenko” radio stations; 
3) to increase the publication of leaflets for different social groups with a 
call to go to and strengthen the guerrilla fighting against the German invaders; 
4) periodically to dispatch active guerilla groups for meetings, lectures 
and reports to partisan detachments. 
To fulfill task list on the activities of Ukraine guerrilla groups, CPSU (b) 
requests to allocate Ukrainian Partisan Movement Headquarters: 
– Weapons, ammunition, clothing, equipment, medicines and food; 
– Radio of the following types: “RAO” – 1 pc. “RAF” – 2 pcs., “Jack” – 
30 pcs., “Sever” – 100 pcs., “CA-I” – 100 pcs., “RPM” – 25; 
– The receiving equipment such as: “Seagull” – 5 pcs., “Hamer-Lund” –  
3 pcs., “A-5” – 5 pcs.; 
– 50 pieces of portable printers (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, фонд 4620, 53–54). 
As noted above, lectures, conversations and other forms of communication 
with the people who carried out the guerrillas played an equally important role in 
the information space created on the occupied territories. So, judging by reports, 
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in Sumy, there were held 698 meetings, attended by 73 thousand people, 
organized by members of guerrilla groups. In July-August 1943 there were held 
392 meetings in 104 towns, under command of A. Saburov in 104 towns, which 
attended more than 40 thousand people (Богатырь, 1963, 263). 
In 1944 the activists of the 1st Ukrainian partisan division had more than 
1600 meetings in political topics witht the residents of Rivne, Volyn and Lviv 
regions. Activists unions under the command of M.V. Taratuto in September 
1943 – February 1944 have organized 1100 interviews. The guerrillas under 
command of S.O. Olesiyenko covered more than 900 settlements in  
36 regions of Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Rivne, Ternopil and Volyn 
regions (Григорович, 1983, 89). 
The propaganda activities of guerrilla groups was directed not only against 
the Nazi army. The Ukrainian national movement was also its ideological 
opponent on the occupied territories. According to the famous historian J. 
Amstrong, Soviet partisans opposed the Ukrainian national movement, 
searched for information about the Ukrainian conscious, preparing various 
provocations, eliminated a number of Ukrainian patriots. Since 1942 each 
squad of Soviet partisans had a special department of the NKVD, later called 
“SMERSH”. One of the major tasks of partisan movement in Ukraine was the 
disruption of life of local civilians struggle with nationalist forces that 
spontaneously arise during people’s resistance to invaders and operated 
without the control of the Soviet government (Armstrong, 1964, 29–32). 
Wehrmacht management faced extremely difficult tasks on the occupied 
territories. Its main reasin was constant counteractions of Soviet information 
flows. Forming the information space on the occupied territories of the USSR, 
the Nazi management leadership, on the one hand, had to justify and disguise 
the colonial policy, which was based on exploitation, hunger and mass 
murders, and on the other – had to stimulate the occupied areas for 
cooperation. German propaganda was based on anti-Semitism, and 
Bolshevism and on the opposition of individual nations and nationalities of 
the Russian people. As the Wehrmacht management paid great attention to the 
information during the war, enemy propaganda was well organized and the 
number of the invaders increased. Even despite the fact that the Soviet 
government also used the various campaign activities, the number of defectors 
during the 1943–1944 still remained high. Thus, according to the historian 
L. Naumov, the number of prisoners amounted to 994 thousand people, and 
those, who was considered deserters – 376 thousand people. Overall, he 
estimated, 1.8 million people returned from captivity (among them wounded 
and injured) (Наумов, 1996, 429–435). As to the population of the temporary 
occupied territories, the German information space had almost no support. 
79 
Hunger, exploitation, deportation, persecution and mass extermination of Jews 
and representatives of other nations left no illusions about the future structure 
of social life. People were increasingly convinced that to survive in combat 
was more real than to serve for the Wehrmacht 
Wermacht leaders believed that people’s emotional state played and 
important role in the dissemination of any information, which finally let to the 
formation of commitment to the new government. 
According to psychologists, an emotional injection was necessary to 
maintain a permanent human interest to propaganda, and to make information 
more easy to remember, to penetrate into very consciousness. The het-up 
person carries out rash act much easier. This is what mainly pushed for the 
leaders of the Third Reich. In addition, very emotional excitement alters 
human behavior, even daily one. As a rule, a person can feel the body 
mobilizing, the surge of power. These forces were successfully used by 
politicians of both totalitarian states, skillfully guiding them to the proper 
direction (Гогун, 2004, 25). 
The Soviet government stuggled to create powerful information space on 
the occupied territories. Although official propaganda was not fully trusted by 
the population, true-to-life stories seemed to be told by farmers from the 
occupied areas. They were sent to the villages, not yet occupied by Hitler, to 
tell stories about their life during the Nazi occupation, so they could call on 
farmers to greater diligence during harvesting. 
The German army, as already noted, measured its success or failure by the 
number of defectors. Reports of many agencies were filled with figures 
showing the growth of production, an increase in personnel, materials, 
vehicles, media etc. At the same time, Soviet propaganda industry did not 
provide a sufficient number of equipment, materials and personnel. For 
example, only reporters from “Red Star” newspaper and “News” 
governmental newspaper possessed aircrafts. The Central Committee did not 
inform TASS about editors’ mistakes. TASS device was extremely 
ineffective. Sometimes it took months for the device to make decisions, but 
not minutes as it had to be (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны, 2007, 32). 
In total, in November 1943 – January 1944 in Donbas, there were 
published 34 newspapers, which attracted best propaganda promoters to work 
on the publishing office. Particular attention was paid to the materials that 
reflected the political topicality. Local departments of the Communist Party 
carried out an active mobilization of party organizations, communists and 
Komsomol members at the elimination of Nazi propaganda (Державний 
архів Вінницької області, фонд Р-6022. 28). 
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Thus, in terms of World War II, there was formed information space on 
the whole territory occupied by the German army – Reich Commissariat 
“Ukraine” and in the area of military administration and throughout the Soviet 
Union, by the Communist party leadres and the government with the help of 
specially developed methods. Its main task was to keep the faith of the 
population in communist ideas, by any plea unite the people to fight against 
the Nazi invaders, destroy-insurrectional subterranean formation, which, 
although opposed the invaders, but constituted a great danger to the Soviet 
regime. 
A considerable information flow was aimed at guerrillas and people on the 
occupied territories. Soviet government are the Communist Party managed to 
develop strong mechanisms and means of information dissemination and its 
transformation into information space. Guerrilla groups were mainly used 
more as a means to spread necessary information to the population of the 
occupied territories and as a tool to combat enemy forces and the regime and 
all entities whose ideas contradicted the current communist regime. Despite a 
great amount of losses, the results of the war shows, that these methods were 
very effective. 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Ленин В.И. 1967. С чего начать? Полн. собр. соч. Т. 5. Москва : 
Издательство политической литературы. 
2. Сталін Й. 1952. Про Велику Вітчизняну війну Радянського Союзу. 
Москва : Издательство политической литературы. 
3. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 – Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 32. 
4. Король В.Ю. 2002. Трагедія військовополонених на окупованій 
території України в 1941–1944 роках. Киъв: Видавничий центр 
«Академія». 
5. Панарин И. Н. 2006. Информационная война и геополитика. 
Москва : Издательство “Поколение”, 
6. Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: 
“коммуникация убеждения” и мобилизационные механизмы 2007. 
Авторы-составители А.Я. Лившин, И.Б. Орлов. Москва : Российская 
политическая энциклопедия. 
7. Русский архив: Великая Отечественная 1997, за редакцией 
Золотарева В.А. Т. 20 (9): Партизанское движение в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг.: документы и материалы. Москва : 
Терра. 
81 
8. Почепцов Г.Г. 1998. Информацтонные войны – основы военно-
коммуникативных исследований. Киев: «Славянский университет». 
9. Коммунистическая партия в Великой Отечественной войне (июнь 
1941–1945 гг.): Документы и материалы. 1970. Москва : Политиздат. 
10. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 – Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 989. 
11. Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, за редакцией Золота- 
рева В.А. 1997. Т. 13 (2–2): Приказы Народного комиссара обороны 
СССР. 22 июня 1941 г. 1942 г. Москва : Терра. 
12. КПСС в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и 
пленумов ЦК (1898–1986). 1985. Издание 9-е. дополненое Москва : 
Политиздат, Т. 7. 
13. Никулина Н.Ю., Сорока З.Н. 1999. Советское Информационное 
Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Проблемы 
источниковедения и историографии. Калининград: Калининградский 
государственный университет. 
14. Советское информационное бюро (Совинформбюро). Риановости: 
Доступ 2 мая 2014 http://ria.ru/spravka/20140624/1012873157.html. 
15. Салата О.О. 2009. Радянське Інформаційне бюро як механізм 
управління інформаційними потоками в умовах Великої Вітчизняної 
війни. Наукові записки Вінницького державного педагогічного 
університету ім. Коцюбинського. Вінниця. Видавництво Вінницького 
державного педагогічного університету ім. Коцюбинського. № ХІV. 
16. Советская военная энциклопедия 1979. Под ред. Гречко А.А. 
Москва : Воениздат. 
17. Сообщения Советского Информбюро. 1944–1945. В 8 т. Москва : 
Совинформбюро. Т. 1. 
18. Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. 1997. Под редакцией В. 
А. Золотарева. Т. 20 (9): Партизанское движение в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг.: документы и материалы. Москва : 
Терра. 
19. Меленберг А. 2005. Взорваны и забыты. По материалам сайта 
“Новая газета” Доступ 11 июня 2015: http://2005.novayagazeta.ru/ 
nomer/2005/16n/n16n-s23.shtml. 
20. Великая Отечественная война 1941–1945: Энциклопедия 1985. 
Под редакцией М.М. Козлова. Москва : Советская энциклопедия, 
21. Мельтюхов М.И. 1991. 22 июня 1941 г.: цифры свидетельствуют. 
История СССР. № 3. 
22. 1941–1945. Публицистика и очерки военных лет. 1982. Т. 1–2. 
Москва : АПН. Т. 1. 
82 
23. В комиссии Политбюро ЦК КПСС. 1989. Известия ЦК КПСС. 
№ 12. 
24. Ржанов Г. 1975. Партизаны слушали Москву. Радио в дни войны. 
Москва : Политиздат. 
25. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 57. 
26. Бурцев М.И. 1981. Прозрение. Москва : Воениздат. 
27. Чайковський А.С. 1990. За нами Большая земля: Помощь 
советского тыла в организации народной борьби против фашистских 
захватчиков на временно оккупированных территориях Украины,  
1941–1944 гг. Київ : Вища школа. 
28. Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: 
«коммуникация убеждения» и мобилизационные механизмы. 2007. 
Автори и составители Лившин А.Я., Орлов И.Б. Москва : Российская 
политическая энциклопедия. 
29. Волковский Н.Л. 2003. История информационных войн. В 2 ч. 
Ч. 2. Санкт-Петербург: ООО Издательство «Полигон». 
30. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 – Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 19. Спр. 5. 
31. Салата О.О. 2007. Роль партизанських з’єднань у створенні інфор- 
маційного простору на окупованих землях України у 1941–1944 роках. 
«Університет». Київ : Видавництво Київського Славістичного 
університету. № 2. 
32. Безсмертя. Книга Пам’яті України. 1941–1945 2000. За редакцією 
І.О. Герасимова, І.Т. Муковського, П.П. Панченка. Київ : Пошуково-
видавниче агенство «Книга Пам’яті України». 
33. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 12. 
34. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1. Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 19. Спр. 2. 
35. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1. Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 19. 
36. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1. Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 199. 
83 
37. Радио в дни войны 1975. По редакции М.С. Глейзер и  
Н.М. Потапов. Москва : Искусство. 
38. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 – Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 989. 
39. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 70. Спр. 5. 
40. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 6. Спр. 649. 
41. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд 1 Центральний Комітет Комуністичної партії (більшовиків) 
України. Оп. 6. Спр. 678. 
42. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд. 4620 Колекція документів з історії Великої Вітчизняної війни.  
Оп. 3. Спр. 128. 
43. Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. 
Фонд. 4620 Колекція документів з історії Великої Вітчизняної війни.  
Оп. 3. Спр. 100. 
44. Ивлев И.А. 1988. Оружие контрпропаганды, Советская 
пропаганда среди населения оккупированной территории СССР. 
Сборник материалов. Москва : Мысль. 
45. Богатырь З.А. 1963. В тылу врага (Боевая деятельность 
соединения партизанских отрядов под командованием Героя Советского 
Союза А.Н. Сабурова). Москва : Соцэкгиз, 
46. Григорович Д.Ф. 1983. Идейно-политическая деятельность 
Компартии Украины в годы Великой Отечественной войны. Киев: 
Политиздат Украины. 
47. Armstrong J. A. 1964. (Ed.) Soviet Partisans in World War II. 
Мадісон. 
48. Наумов Л. 1996. Советский Союз во Второй мировой войне: 
Критический очерк советской историографии войны. Русское издание 
Александра Прегер. Los Angeles, 
49. Гогун А. Черный PR Адольфа Гитлера: Документы и материалы. 
Москва : Эксмо, Яуза, 2004. 
50. Державний архів Вінницької області. Фонд Р-6022. Колекція 
свідчень, спогадів та інших документів колишніх в’язнів гетто, 
концентраційних та робочих таборів, а також громадян, примусово 
вигнаних до Німеччини. Оп. 2. Спр. 17. 
  
84 
 
 
 
SECTION 2.3. 
TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING 
THE INFORMATION POLICY OF BOTH COUNTRIES  
IN THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE 
 
The 20-th century was the period when informational propaganda was 
actively used in political, economic and military spheres. During this period 
the totalitarian states sought to create a single common information space 
controlled by the country’s leadership. 
Concepts such as “information war”, “information aggression”, 
“information security” as it was known originated during World War II and 
the Great Patriotic War. There was a close connection of mass media with 
conflict situations. It should be noted that in armed conflicts a fight on an 
information field seemed not to be less important than directly military 
operations. 
In our opinion the change in the information and military sphere took 
place just on the eve of World War II. The German military command has 
repeatedly stated that the cause of the defeat was not only the courage of the 
Soviet soldiers and the population but also influence on the consciousness of 
the mass media of both states as the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Then the 
existence of “information and psychological ensuring fighting” was 
recognized necessary to form through media public opinion that any military 
operations found support among its population. Methods practically do not 
differ from usual signs “public relations”. It is known to be the creation of 
quantitative and qualitative own point of view of advantage in media and the 
introduction of steady associations, schemes, myths that meet the interests of 
information campaign organizer. It was also applied by the Nazi government 
of Germany already during World War II and in occupied territories. 
In the U.S.S.R. and Germany there were qualified personnel in the field of 
propaganda. It should be noted also, as that increased the experience far 
before coming to power. For example, political circles of the USA noted that 
Bolsheviks of 1918 carried out a great influence on the population of the 
Russian Empire. So, the Ukrainian army which totaled one million people 
under the influence of Bolshevist propaganda was demobilized within two 
months (Камінський, Дашкевич, 1998, 121). The Russian political scientist 
Mr. Pocheptsov explains the fact that “the slogans of Bolsheviks reflected the 
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interests of fighters of the Ukrainian army which consisted of vast majority of 
ordinary peasants. They wanted to work on earth in peaceful conditions” 
(Почепцов, 2001, 66). 
In the military-political concept of Hitler’s Germany attention was paid the 
creation of information space not only in their own country but also in Europe 
and the territories of other countries occupied by the German army that 
Thus, so that political concept, military strategy and tactics developed by 
the Hitler’s leadership of Germany would be realized it was necessary to exert 
a powerful information pressure on the German population space, first of all, 
and then the population of the territories occupied by German fascist army. 
How the Nazi leadership of Germany understood the role of information 
and information space? It is possible to say with confidence. that they 
understood. Experience of flippant attitude information and propaganda led 
Germany to defeat in World War I. Therefore on the eve of World War II 
Hitler and his entourage paid much attention to the formation of propaganda 
bodies and information influence across the vertical of military and political 
leadership. It is proved by documents that the financial oligarchy of Germany 
financed the propaganda campaigns of Nazis. 
In the 20–30s of the 20-th century the international community, in 
particular, Great Britain and the USA, already owned methods and 
technologies of impact on the consciousness of the population and its 
behavior. They created own information space using advanced 
communication technologies of that time. 
Today, as well as seventy-five years ago, information space is, first of all, 
the sum of difficult information technologies which are a basis and the 
defining component of an industrial and economic complex of transnational 
communities which influence formation of world outlook processes in society 
(Shreyder, “the theory of communications”) (Шрейдер, Шаров, 1982, 71). 
There are general models of influence within propaganda and counter-
propaganda. They represent a modification to an information field to obtain 
results of their change in real living floor space. Such information field is used 
for the solution of social, political, economic, military tasks. Information 
space has particular importance during the war. For example, the fascist 
leadership of Germany during 1941–1944 understood the role of information 
which impacted on the consciousness of the population and and their 
willingness to fight. 
From the very beginning of the political activities A., Hitler and the leadership 
of fascist Germany paid much attention to information impact on the mentality of 
the person. Having analyzed consequences of World War I they concluded that 
information, propaganda weighs not a less powerful in comparison with  
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well-armed army. Having come to power for the first time Nazis applied 
information impact on the population of other countries. At first, it influenced the 
population of Germany, then the European countries. A powerful information, and 
psychological influence laid down on the population of occupied territories of the 
USSR. Information influence was carried out by various methods. Information 
extended through news agencies, radio, including also that were located abroad 
through the German correspondents working in the different countries through 
foreign newspapers; by holding exhibitions in Germany and abroad; in the course 
of implementation of cultural exchange with the friendly countries in science, art, 
sport. (Панарин, 2006, 156). 
A. Hitler noted that in the researches concerning political events he was 
always interested in propaganda activity more. “... To what extreme results 
propaganda can bring, it is correctly used, it was necessary to wish 
passionately only during the war of it. Unfortunately, everything needed to be 
studied in other directions as results of the activity of politicians were very 
“modest”. It is necessary to refuse completely an old education system for the 
German soldiers and to deal more persistently with propaganda issues” 
(Hitler, 1953, 141). These words of Hitler demonstrate that he understood the 
need to use a propaganda, moreover. He sought to change an education 
system and education of Germany including military education to create such 
information space which would direct the activity of all the population of 
Germany and army to a victory. 
Hitler considered that propaganda had to be the best means to influence 
people. “Propaganda – the fight tool, and in hands of the person who well 
knows this business, – the most terrible weapon. The propaganda has to be 
turned to masses. The art of propaganda is in forcing people to believe that 
this or that fact exists. The art of propaganda is to understand the feelings of 
broad masses. National feeling simple and monotonous. The people speak yes 
or no. Truth or lie! The people argue rectilinearly. The susceptibility of 
masses is very limited, the circle of her understanding is narrow, but the 
forgetfulness is very high” (Макаревич, 1993, 63). 
For that time technologies of information space being formed on the 
ideological principles not only used by the Hitler’s government. The Soviet 
Union where the ideology and mechanisms of its introduction were extremely 
developed was the most powerful in this regard. The methods and 
mechanisms were developed by the government of the Communist Party 
which controlled information flow both in the USSR and beyond its limits 
made society undoubtedly closed. 
In considering an arsenal of means and mechanisms of information space 
and concrete methods of impact on public consciousness we could analyze the 
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basis of method’s transition from simple and primitive forms to more difficult 
and graceful ones. 
The method of psychological impact on the population of occupied 
territories, guerrillas, fighters and officers of the Red Army was one of the 
mechanisms which played an extremely important role in the formation of 
information space. 
As a famous Russian political scientist V. Krysko thinks “the social 
systems of government are carried out through providing information and 
psychological impact on the object” (Крысько, 1999, 121). 
Psychological influence is a way to influence on people (on certain 
individuals and groups). It is directed to change of ideological and 
psychological structures of their consciousness and subconsciousness, the 
transformation of emotional states, stimulation of certain types of behavior 
with the use of various ways of the obvious and hidden psychological 
coercion. Complex using of various ways of the hidden psychological 
compulsion of people in the form of the system of psychological operations, 
various propaganda campaigns is considered to be widespread means of 
political struggle, in particular, during the war (Прокофьев, 1999, 97–99). 
During active fights and occupation of a part of the territory of the USSR 
psychological influence seemed to be existed by various methods and the 
main means wholly. They affected consciousness and subconsciousness of the 
population. Firstly, there were actually psychological methods as belief, 
suggestion, informing, encouragement, coercion, punishment, example 
method. Secondly, psychological impact was carried out with attraction of 
military means. Thirdly, the adverse psychological climate among the 
population of occupied territories which undermined the credibility of the 
enemy. Such as special forms of psychological influence were used: verbal, 
publishing, graphic, broadcasting forms. 
So, at once from the beginning of the war against the USSR the Supreme 
Command of Wehrmacht issued “The Directive for Front Propagandists”. In it 
it was emphasized that “in planning propaganda actions on the enemy it is 
necessary to define accurately what purpose of propaganda campaigns will be; 
a circle of people to perform these actions; place and area of the forthcoming 
actions; main methods of influence and main theses; technical means of 
distribution of information materials; optimum time of holding propaganda 
campaigns. In the Directive the basic principles of propaganda impact on the 
enemy were represented: 
1. “It is not necessary to use difficult, tangled, artificially constructed 
designs. The more simply, more clearly, contents, higher its efficiency. 
2. The person naturally is an emotional subject, therefore, it is much more 
effective to address her feelings. 
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3. Propaganda’s texts have to be logically thought over but they are not 
necessarily logically stated. 
4. Repetition is an important mechanism of propaganda. Successful 
propaganda is necessary to adhere to a thesis until conditions of a 
psychological situation change. 
5. It is very important to make use of already existing experience for an 
increase in efficiency of front propaganda” (Крысько, 1999, 125–126). 
As far as the principles of information propaganda in the USSR there were 
ideological and political restrictions to use information space. 
It was the prerogative of the Soviet government. It was brightly shown in 
information processes that took place in the Soviet society. That’s no doubt 
that there was the characteristic phenomenon for any totalitarian political 
regime of the 20-th century. 
Without seeking to absolutize the value of information control in the 
formation of totalitarianism we will note that the great influence on its 
formation was made by various factors Including direct state violence, 
traditions of the Russian statehood, etc. However, information monopoly 
attempts to establish control over processes that proceeded in society. 
And this fact happened to have played a significant role in the tragic period of 
1941–1944 in the history of the U.S.S.A. 
According to plans of A. Rosenberg who sought to use the population of 
occupied territories of the USSR, in particular of Ukraine in fight against 
Bolshevist Russia, there was put a question to create the information space 
before the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda, the Ministry of 
East Occupied Territories and Head Department of Imperial Safety of 
Germany. 
It’s important to study the main directions defining the information space 
of Hitler’s Germany in occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR and 
mechanisms and methods applied the government of the Reich to the 
distribution of the power. 
On occupied territories the Department of Military Propaganda of 
Wehrmacht which coordinated the main propaganda strategy with Goebbels 
dealt with problems of military propaganda. The ministry of national 
education and propaganda became the largest and most influential authority 
authorized to control all other ministries. 
At the headquarters of the Supreme main command of Wehrmacht in April 
1939, the Department of Propaganda was created. In its structure there were 
special military units as propaganda companies. According to Instruction 
No. 51/39 to their competence, the solution of the following tasks entered: 
conducting propaganda among the German population and the military 
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personnel, conducting propaganda in a front-line zone and among troops of 
the opponent. By the beginning of World War II, the Wehrmacht already had 
at the order 14 companies of propaganda (Панарин, 2006, 157). 
Propaganda companies were staffed with persons who had to own equally 
well as journalistic (literary, radio – photo or cinema) skills, and any military 
weapon. The last circumstance was an especially a great value when 
publicizing actions of pilots, tankmen, seamen of torpedo boats, etc. As, for 
example, the crew of the warplane was not able to afford the luxury to take 
aboard any superfluous the person who would be only the observer of events 
which took place. But at the same time, it was not necessary to imagine a 
business in such a way that companies of propaganda worked only in shooting 
and other divisions. Each company of propaganda was applied to the whole 
army. The military personnel of these companies acted individually or as a 
part of compact groups. They were located far from other direct employees on 
service. 
Companies of propaganda were designed to serve not only mass media of 
the Reich but also “to carry on propaganda directly in parts and connections of 
Wehrmacht, to provide psychological processing of troops and the population 
of the opponent...” (Орлов, 1985, 31). 
“Till June 22, in general, there were 19 companies of propaganda 
(the twelfth ground forces, the fourth the Air Force, 3 companies in the fleet 
and 6 platoons of war correspondents in Troops of CC). Besides, each of the 
three groups of armies (“North”, “Center”, “South”) had besides also on a 
battalion of propaganda. They were engaged in the edition of newspapers, 
conducting radio-propaganda, display of movies...” (Жуков, 2000, 7). 
After an attack of the German army on the Soviet Union also the 
population of occupied territories of the USSR fell within the scope of their 
propaganda. Such changes in the activity of companies of propaganda are 
explained by the fact that their divisions had amplified and became an almost 
independent type of military force since 1943. This authority was under the 
observation of the Ministry of national education and propaganda. Propaganda 
companies used leaflets, newspapers as a form of propaganda 
(Панарин, 2006, 283). 
Instructions were developed by Department of the Ministry of East 
Occupied Territories. They determined the content of information and 
propaganda activity of structures of Wehrmacht in the territories of the 
Ukrainian SSR occupied with fascist army. they pursued the next aims: 
ensuring moral and psychological impact on local population by political and 
cultural propaganda by means of the press, broadcasting and cinema; 
implementation of propaganda campaigns which had to influence moods of 
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the population for the benefit of the Reich and the German administration on 
places; information and cultural support of the troops which are in a zone of 
activity of propaganda structures (Дашичев, 1973, 196). 
In the occupied territories of the USSR in the structure of the Ministry of 
the Press and Propaganda headed by the major Kranz there was created so-
called “Russian committee” under the direction of the imperial Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ribentrope in the summer of 1942. 
Thus, in the East propaganda and the press in which there were the main 
mechanisms of formation of information space, organizationally were under 
supervision at once of several structures which were on hand directly 
Wehrmacht and to Rosenberg’s ministry, and indirectly – to the Ministry of 
National Education and Propaganda and a number of other Nazi departments. 
In different territories the level of propaganda activity i was not identical. 
It, of course, could not but affect its efficiency. The propaganda of 
Wehrmacht differed in the greatest “irrelevance” and illegibility. The crucial 
importance as its products fell into hands of the population and enemy quicker 
than any other was attached to it. Cards and posters for distribution among the 
population of occupied territories were made rather skillfully and quickly.  
At the same time, not all soldiers of Wehrmacht supported methods that were 
applied by their government against civilians and it complicated a propaganda 
campaign. (Жуков, 2000, 8). 
A total number of these troops of propaganda during the period from June 
1941 to April 1942 was about 15 thousand People whereas the average contingent 
of “a propaganda company” made – 115 people (Орлов, 1985, 132). 
Distribution of the German press, leaflets, holding small conversations 
among the population of occupied territories was the main objective of 
companies of propaganda: “The power of the Third Reich”, “Only Germany 
will help Ukraine to get rid of Bolshevist slavery”, “Work in Germany makes 
the Soviet person cultural” and many others. 
It will be interesting to consider examples of propaganda leaflets which 
were distributed by members of propaganda companies in the occupied 
territory of Ukraine of 1941: 
“Peasants and workers! 
Who Adolf Hitler? 
Ask about it the German soldier who exempted your homeland from 
Bolshevist animals! 
Ask about it the German worker to whom he gave work, bread, and 
wellbeing again, that is all that it was deprived earlier... 
Ask about it the German peasant who can leave the earth in inheritance to 
the son and the grandson now... And all of them will answer you: 
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Adolf Hitler is the embodiment of force, power, kindness, justice...” 
(Гогун, 2004, 345). 
Analyzing such pathos cards and appeals it should be noted that very few 
people from inhabitants of occupied territories trusted them. But a difficult 
life, especially the Ukrainians, and belief that other best living conditions 
could have been created a good basis for fascist propaganda. 
In preparation for a propaganda campaign, special attention was paid into 
the training of the German agents and the foreign organizations of the 
National Socialist Party. So, for example, for propaganda in the Soviet Union 
agents from among the former Russian citizens who were for one reason or 
another forced to leave before the war the USSR prepared. Under the 
leadership of national socialists they prepared analytical materials for bodies 
of propaganda, defined weaknesses of the Soviet society, developed 
recommendations on information and psychological impacts on the staff of 
the Soviet Army and the population of the areas occupied by fascist army 
taking into account national psychological peculiarities, traditions and culture 
(История ВКП(б), 1938, 317). 
The use of the former Soviet citizens was caused by the realization of the 
purpose of Wehrmacht to demoralize the Soviet Army and to give the 
population of occupied territories to full disappointment in the Bolshevist mode. 
Not only cards but also periodic material prepared for this purpose and used: 
books, photos, movies, put on the Soviet political figures). At the same time 
information of the Soviet newspapers issued in a borderland, large-circulation 
editions of the enterprises and the departmental periodical press appearing big 
circulations, broadcasts, etc. was exposed to processing. Since the end of 1940, 
the leadership of Hitlerite Germany begins to show great attention to the internal 
life of the Soviet Union, trains agents already from among the German experts 
for obtaining important information on the economic and political situation of 
the USSR (История ВКП(б) 1938, 317 – 318). 
Carrying out the task, bodies of propaganda were guided developed by 
department of propaganda of Wehrmacht and given out in the first half of 
June, 1941 “By instructions on implementation of propaganda during 
implementation of the plan Barbarossa”. “Instructions...” defined 
organizational, political, psychological bases of activity of bodies of 
propaganda and contained ideological and political installations. Among them 
were also such: an enemy of Germany is not the people of the Soviet Union 
but only “yids-Bolshevist” with the functionaries and the Communist Party; 
the German Wehrmacht came not as the enemy of civilians, it, on the 
contrary, seeks to exempt them from tyranny of Councils; each attempt of 
resistance will be ruthlessly suppressed; it is not allowed to propaganda to 
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nominate the idea of creation of the national states (disintegration of the 
Soviet Union to the certain states) for the economic reasons dissolution of 
collective farms it is not planned yet (История ВКП(б), 1938, 317). 
Information and psychological impact on the population of occupied 
territories from the Hitler’s government were periodically weakened because 
the Soviet power also applied not less effective propaganda, military, police 
and psychological remedies. 
From the very first days of the war Soviet leadership created 
organizational and information mechanisms that complicated the activity of 
the occupational guide to the introduction of own ideological and political 
theories and strengthened the information and ideological field which already 
worked at the territory of Ukraine. The information and ideological field 
which was created in Ukraine by Soviet leadership was used for impact on the 
consciousness of the population, introducing the socialist ideas and 
propagandizing hatred to everything the capitalist world. 
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the ideological sphere of the 
USSR had already became a core of the Soviet information space being formed 
in the country. Methods that were applied by the government of the All-Union 
and Communist Party (bolshevik’s) were considered by Party’s leadership on 
places the most effective. Although many ideological campaigns looked absurd 
and compromised the existing way of life in public consciousness. It is 
interesting that such methods suppressed a considerable part of the Soviet 
people, estimated operations of ideologists of the Communist Party, 
characterized them as absolute nonsense (Цыбмал, 1995, 35). 
Despite the activity and importance of the Soviet propaganda, 
nevertheless, a considerable part of the population understood what happened 
in the state and could analyze consciously events and realities of the  
Soviet life. 
Despite of it, the traditional direct way of psychological impact on 
consciousness which relied on the belief of people was one of the methods 
used by Hitler’s administration in occupied territories of Ukraine and it was 
turned to their mind. Rational arguments, logic were applied. This method 
was used by both the Hitler’s administration, and the Soviets. 
Let’s take an example of this method in the USSR. The application of 
rational arguments of logic was characteristic of Marxism where the thesis 
“life was the starting point of an explanation defines consciousness”. At the 
beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the country appeared before a terrible 
accident: danger of loss of statehood and transformation of the population into 
slaves. At the same time the society was driven to extreme despair by own 
government and its policy of collectivization, repressions against “enemies of 
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the people” and Famine-Genocide. Despite of it, the leadership of the USSR 
and Soviet Ukraine, in particular, understood that it was necessary to fight 
back the enemy and not to allow occupation of the country by the fascist 
army. And as the major task in this context was the idea to build such 
information space in which everyone realized need to save the socialist 
homeland and its gains. 
A necessary component of carrying out such explanatory work turned to 
the reason for people and consciousnesses was an accounting of real 
conditions. At the same time, it is important to understand the distribution of 
forces, the real interests of people to carry out the analysis. At the same time it 
was necessary to consider a condition of public consciousness, that was to 
give accurate, noticeable, clear slogans: “Our right cause! The enemy will be 
broken! The victory will be for us” and “All for the front, all for a victory!” 
and others. A characteristic example – events of civil war, we will remember 
Furmanov’s “Mutiny”: “How to take it in hand, this rebellious crowd? it is 
necessary to act firmly, surely as strong and without the slightest concessions, 
fluctuations. This the first: firmly and without being given generally. And the 
second not to release for one moment from under an inquisitive look all 
crowd, together with observing it from all directions and in all 
manifestations... thirdly, here that: know, then there lives the crowd: the most 
essential knowledge in its interests. and in them speak... Then, fourthly look 
on faces, all in eyes, catches at proper words, guess on movements... If did not 
strike the right note, business was gone... in – the last, so to speak, on 
separation олько two words: when no measures and means help... – I will 
descend from a tribune, from a barrel, from a box, all the same from what, 
I will descend as safely as ascended there... perishes under fists and butts, the 
agitation. So did that and from your death, there was an advantage” 
(Фурманов, 1985). 
The principles of accounting of a real situation were widely used also by 
leaders of Nazi Germany. The characteristic example is given in the book by 
M.I. Burtsev “Enlightenment” devoted to propaganda fight against the fascist 
army in 1941–1945 Hitler then told: “We brought up youth against which the 
whole world, youth rough, exacting, cruel” (Бурцев, 1981, 24). 
But in that time the cruelty generated another feeling. The German soldier 
was sentimental. He thought about the future of his family and he did not 
understand for what future he would have to die. The Soviet card with the 
image of the snow-covered field, corpses of the German soldiers became the 
proof of it for them, already froze, and on this background close up the child, 
cries; and under the drawing only three words: “Fater ist tod” (“The father is 
killed”). Most of the German soldiers held in hand this card as the admission 
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in captivity (Кочергин, Коган, 1980, 20). As we see, this method was a very 
effective tool in the belief of soldiers of Wehrmacht. 
In the period of the Great Patriotic War both sides paid a lot of attention to 
the distribution of leaflets in the back of own army and temporarily occupied 
territory. The Soviet leadership understood that at the front soldiers did not 
less need for cartridges, clothes, food, resting. They waited for information 
and moral support. This fact seemed to define moral of soldiers. 
The maintenance of such cards and posters caused the Ukrainians to dump 
Bolshevist domination and to support the German army in the release of their 
territory. The posters and the cards, told about what merciful German soldiers 
to children, etc. (Немецкая пропаганда на территории СССР, 2013). 
Placing differently semantic accents in several leaflets devoted to the same 
question both the German and Soviet propaganda managements considered 
psychological features of various groups of the military personnel and the 
civilian population of the opponent. Printing registration of a card promoted 
strengthening its emotional actions. Reproduction in leaflets of photos, copies 
of official documents increased their persuasiveness. Contents of the leaflet 
consisted most concisely so that it was easily perceived even at forcedly fast 
reading. Thanks to a small format, it was easy to be hidden, transferred, kept 
as the admission in captivity. 
For drawing up cards and other types of propaganda by the German 
propaganda structures various methods and receptions were used. Rational 
arguments when for explanatory work the real interests of people and public 
consciousness, in this case, this population of occupied territories was used and his 
desire to live and to manage freely in the independent country was applied. 
Granting selective information was the following important method which 
was applied by the Nazis. It was formulated by simple phrases and repeated many 
times. Thus, the person subconsciously absorbed this information. The card which 
was released in April 1943 agitated for a transition to the party of Germans and 
the introduction in the Russian liberation army. It was used such method when its 
name repeated in the leaflet of 12 times (Лисичкин, 2005, 41–43). 
A large number of propaganda materials for strengthening of ideas of  
“a liberating mission” of the German army was given by the Ministry of 
National Education and Propaganda together with the Ministry of East 
Occupied Territories. The whole series of cards were directed to discredit the 
leaders of the Soviet state and the command structure of the Red Army. Among 
them, there were cards about Stalin and his government (Гогун, 2004, 64–65). 
In the first months of the war in Kyiv, the Ukrainskoye Slovo newspaper, 
(later “A new Ukrainian word”) which editor was K. Shteppa was issued.  
The newspaper had to cover all events which positively reflected the activity 
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of the German occupying authority and “to expose” Bolshevist policy. Along 
with political messages and publications articles about the cultural life of Kyiv 
and the policy of the German authorities were published in the newspaper 
(Верба, 1999, 27–29). 
To strengthen a negative impression about the activity of the Soviet 
government, the Nazis government distributed comical images. They were 
also in local newspapers, and on cards. So in the “Volyn magazine” there was 
the caricature where Bolsheviks was shown as a hungry wolf who looked up 
at a basket (Ukraine which lifts the German cross) (Волинь. Часопис для 
Волині, 1943. 2). 
The caricature became one of the most widespread levers on the 
population of occupied territories even if at first sight the person was not 
engaged to see and read on the picture, over time this picture had been already 
renewed in the memory at the level of subconsciousness. Caricatures were in 
the majority of issues of any newspaper published in the occupied territory of 
Ukraine. The issues of the Vinnitskiye Vesti newspaper published on 
Vinnichchin from April to July 1941 (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 3; Вінницькі 
вісті, 1942, 3; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 4, Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 2; 4; 
Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 2; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 4). 
In the first months of the war of Hitler’s Germany with the USSR a 
considerable part of the population of occupied territories of Ukraine believed 
that now having exempted from the Bolshevist mode they would be able to 
create the independent state where they would be owners on the earth. The 
German propagandists tried to maintain an exact balance between the absolute 
truth, half-truth and a lie (you should not forget that there is also “white lie”) 
on this problem. And this balance depended on the present provision and 
events at the front because the population of occupied territories recognized 
the real policy of the fascist leadership very quickly. 
In such and similar situations the German government sought to influence 
the local population to form his morale in the necessary direction. 
Knowing how the population of Ukraine treated the process of 
collectivization and sought to have its plots the Hitler’s leadership convinced 
the population of occupied territories that the fascist army had fought for a 
new order to change an old system, a communistic arbitrariness. There was 
the next slogan: bread, instead of hunger and poverty. 
As an example we offer the text of one of the most popular German 
leaflets – as addresses to citizens of the Soviet Union, fighters and 
commanders of the Soviet Army, especially peasants: 
“Citizens of the Soviet Union, fighters and commanders of the Red 
Army!” 
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The German army fights for a new order, instead of an old system, a 
communistic arbitrariness; bread, instead of hunger and poverty. 
Return of landowners-capitalists it will not be allowed. Though the war 
continues. 
The country yards and personal plots which were still in private use of 
collective farmers are transferred to the full possession to peasants and will 
not be assessed with taxes and requisitions... (Окороков, 2007, 96). 
Thus, having considered the desire of peasants, their serious condition 
owing to the “managing” of the Bolshevist power, the German occupational 
administration tried to turn the population of occupied territories on the allies 
in the fight against the Soviet Union. 
Totally in the German leaflets, unlike the Soviet, the main focus is 
concentrated on the personality which is on the fact that for each person it 
“I” am the most important in life that she does not care about grandiose losses 
of the country, failures at the front. Generally the German propaganda hoped 
for the natural law of self-preservation, aspiration of the person to survive at 
any cost, to settle safely in any conditions. The Soviet power, addressing the 
population, fighters, and officers of the Red Army, focused on the rescue of 
the socialist Homeland and its gains. 
Other principles of information space formation gave the chance to get 
much more deeply into the consciousness of the person. Together with 
rational ways of impact on consciousness there were ways to call irrational 
actions. They carried out destructive action, suppressed a rationale and to 
force people to serve the purposes of those who established them. In this 
direction, in due time big practices were made by Goebbels’s Department. 
During the almost entire period of occupation Hitler’s ideologists and the 
occupying authorities applied a direct way of impact on the consciousness of 
the Ukrainian population. From the protocol of a meeting of Hitler with 
Rosenberg, Lyammers, Keitel, and Goering of July 16, 1941, about further 
plans concerning Ukraine and its territory we see that there were to develop 
concrete principles concerning policy in the occupied areas. Here Hitler 
agreed with Rosenberg that a victory would be received quicker if the German 
army had the support of the local population. He also agreed with the opinion 
that in each commissariat it was necessary to develop the attitude towards the 
population. In Reykhskomissariat Ukraine, according to Rosenberg, it was 
necessary to put in action “cultural guardianship”, it is necessary to wake 
historical consciousness Ukrainian, to create in Kyiv favorable conditions for 
education... (Косик, 1998, 172). 
Implementing the program of influence on the local population the 
German administration addressed to historical consciousness of Ukraine 
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Almost in each journal number “Vinnytsia Messages”, articles about the 
famous Ukrainian figures and national avengers who fought for the freedom 
of the Ukrainian people were published. In the same articles the fascist army 
was compared to fighters for its freedom. In many articles, Mikhail 
Grushevsky’s activity (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Ivan Gonta Philip Orlik 
(Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Nikolay Hvylevy (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Ivan 
Kotlyarevsky (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3), Lesya Ukrainsky (Вінницькі вісті, 
1941, 3), Boris Grinchenko, etc. (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3). 
Continuing the political line the Minister of East Occupied Territories 
A. Rosenberg during the stay in Kyiv addressed consciousness Ukrainian. 
He delivered a speech in which he explained a place and tasks for the 
Ukrainian in new Europe and said that the Ukrainian culture would be revived 
be with the assistance of the Germans. It was noted that traditions, customs, 
native language, dances, freedom of religion should be renewed. The German 
power took responsibility for a cultural revival of Ukraine. Respectively and 
Ukrainians had to become consciously and readily on service of the future 
destiny (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 1). 
To influence on consciousness of the population of occupied territories 
more effectively the occupational administration used the most modern levers 
and well- known communication technologies: opened movie theaters, 
adjusted and supported work of theaters where performances of the famous 
Ukrainian directors with the heroic past of the Ukrainian people – the 
performance “The Zaporozhets Beyond Danube”, “Taras Bulba”, etc. were 
put (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 4). 
From the chronicle of the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper, we see the work 
of the “Vinnytsia radio station” which program was made so that works by the 
Ukrainian poets and composers as often as possible were distributed. During 
the day, for example, on October 3, 1941, works by the Ukrainian composers 
performed by symphonic and wind orchestras sounded, sang the Ukrainian 
theatrical chorus, read the best samples of the Ukrainian poetry and prose 
(Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 4). Such reception made an impression at the local 
population that the Ukrainian culture revives, so behind it would revive also 
economic life. 
The method of a big lie was a favorite method of Goebbels. It was applied 
among troops of Wehrmacht and the military of the Red Army and in 
occupied territories, it is successfully applied and reasonable A. Hitler in due 
time. Studying Goebbels’s activity in the context of propaganda the historian 
V. Lisichkin concluded that the propaganda machine of Nazi Germany staked 
on what in the USSR the population got used to trust politicians and therefore, 
dissemination of any false information will be perceived by people positively, 
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with trust (Лисичкин, Шелепин, 1999, 24). To open true plans concerning 
the fate of the population of occupied territories the Hitler’s government had 
no intentions, therefore, the outright lie became the main instrument of Nazi 
propaganda. 
This principle of creation of information society became one of the most 
important in the policy of the Hitler’s government in the occupied territory. 
A large number of the examples recorded in magazines and newspapers of the 
period of occupation demonstrates to it. So, in the “Volyn magazine” of 
September 21, 1941, we learn how the German leaders resorted to bald open 
lies and misinformation of the population. In the diary “Soldatenzeitung der 
Ukraine” the positive characteristic Ukrainian allegedly was given. The 
author, the famous expert on the Ukrainian traditions, Gekel, reported about 
the Ukrainian and state traditions, big Ukrainian princely the state, eternal 
fight of the Ukrainian people against the Moscow and Polish aggressors which 
repeatedly encroached on independence of Ukraine. “That the Ukrainian 
people, certainly, cost to fight for freedom of Europe per the present on side 
of Germany” (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3). So, the German 
soldiers were given it seems manuals, to be respectful to the Ukrainian 
population, to help to fight for the rights and freedoms. 
One more graphic evidence of occupational lie was the campaign of 
children school training. At the beginning of August 1942 in all occupied 
areas of Ukraine entering Reykhskomissariat Ukraine it was proclaimed a set 
of children of seven-year age for training at high comprehensive school. Lists 
of children were made and it was noted them compulsory education 
(Державний архів Сумської області, фонд 1955, оп. 1. спр. 12. l. 1, 2, 19, 
26, 61). It would seem, here it, the real educational policy, at last children had 
an opportunity to study in the native language. But we see the real policy 
which was pursued by Hitler already on Erich Koch’s reaction that in Ukraine 
not only 4-great national schools but also a set of other schools and 
gymnasiums for which he did not grant permission work. He noted that when 
in Germany the growth of education stood still and even the vital professions 
such as a doctor, could not have necessary development. It was not important 
at all whether in Ukraine education which could plan the German authorities 
only in 10 years will increase (Чайковський 1990, 168). 
As a result of such a policy which testified to the present plans of fascist 
Germany the order of a Reykhskomisar of Ukraine Koch about closing in 
Ukraine schools and institutes and about sending teachers and pupils for 
forced labor to Germany was published on October 24, 1942. At the same 
time, he demanded that, except 4-great national schools, there was no school 
to which it did not allow. Paid attention to that, as 4-great schools could work 
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only when he was convinced of their need (Немецко-фашистский 
оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.), 1965, 169). 
How the Ukrainian children studied, we can judge by memoirs of 
V. Kachanov, the pupil of Akimovsky elementary school of the Zaporizhzhia 
region. He remembers that during occupation neither he, nor other Ukrainian 
children could study. Only the German children studied. He remembers only 
as the occupying authority concerned his mother in commandant’s office to 
beat her. And on February 1943 they were expelled from a home (Державний 
архів Запорізької області, фонд 1676, Оп. 2, Спр. 3, 3). 
At the same time about not to lose arrangement and to create illusion free 
public life the occupying authority promoted formation of regional centers of 
Land committees which had to be engaged in agricultural works and train 
experts for work in large-scale enterprises. So, in. The first was exactly 
created by the Regional Land Department of District Administration. At once 
after creation the Department started to found the circles of “Rural Owner” in 
each community on all areas. For this purpose, the Regional Land Department 
gave out and distributed in all regional land departments of an area the 
document of such contents that allegedly once, in far times. Ukraine was a 
granary of Europe. The people of Ukraine became unfortunate. They were 
removed into place and brought together to ethnographic vegetation, the slave. 
Bolshevist collective farms finally destroyed the Ukrainian peasantry. 
Modern times have come. It is created by our independent lives... There is a 
wide field for the device of various courses. The main purpose is to teach 
farming to develop it. On those courses, farmers learn about new in 
agriculture, livestock production, engineering science, gardening, truck 
farming, poultry farming, and other industries (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 
1941, 3). 
Information which is contained in sense of this document was partially 
truthful and therefore drew attention of the local peasantry, but further and 
there was an outright lie which purpose was a formation of opinion about “the 
big future”, about obtaining qualification, about creation of appropriate 
working conditions – all that the Ukrainian peasants aspired for a long time to. 
Departments of Propaganda which were not only in each area but also in 
each area, the city made a maximum of efforts for strengthening information 
and psychological impact on the population. What only they did not resort to. 
In one of newspapers “Volyn” of December 18, 1941 article was written 
where the Ukrainian students continuing the general historical way with the 
German youth studied at the universities of Germany long ago. In the German 
higher education institutions such famous Ukrainian figures as, 
I. Khmelnytsky, I. Paletika, V. Stefanovich, S. Todorovsky and many others 
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studied. G. Skovoroda aws known to respect the Germans more. 
For confirmation of these words there was the small statistics submitted such: 
in a summer semester, 1941–1942 academic years 464 students from other 
countries, among them 319 Ukrainian studied at the German universities. This 
number increased at the expense of students from Volhynia and Galichina 
(Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3). 
Demonstrating to the Ukrainian population aspiration of the German 
administration to bring it out of darkness and to give the chance to reach in the 
cultural and educational level of what the German people already had and the 
best way was the purpose of such publications to prove it, showed results of 
cooperation of the Ukrainian and German people throughout several centuries. 
It should be noted that such information completely contradicted that 
educational policy which was pursued in occupied territories by Erich Koch. 
That’s no doubt that both sides were not frank. The soviet leadership tried 
to show the Germans as the real monsters and confirm the above-stated 
indications. The German leaders constantly reminded about negative sides and 
the Soviet collective-farm system, and they not bad managed it as for this 
purpose there were serious reasons. It would be desirable to note the 
consequences of the occupational policy of 1941–1944. 
In the periodical press and cards constantly compared former life 
Ukrainian to what it would be in the future, noted how badly they lived of 
Bolsheviks and which bright future could be for them in future with the 
assistance of the Germans. The thought that Bolsheviks according to plan 
organized hunger in Ukraine was in large quantities imposed, their policy was 
directed to extermination of the Ukrainian nation. To the Ukrainian people the 
feeling of uncertainty imparted. “It deprived of any human dignity. Had all 
aspirations of the personality to be limited to such an extent only to calm the 
physical hunger” (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941 379, 2). 
The population of occupied territories convinced that the Soviet Union 
prepared for the approach for the whole world. Having built powerful army, 
made various weapons all possible forces for a campaign were mobilized for 
the West. (Сумський вісник, 1941, 3). Streams of misinformation were 
directed to the population of occupied territories, still doubted, to support the 
occupational mode and to create the appearance that in the future Ukraine 
would become an independent state. 
In the conditions of war it was necessary for any psychological influence 
the truth and its certain volume. In this background also necessary portions of 
false data were allowed. But the method of “the partial truth” became the most 
effective, it consisted of the differentiation of described events, allocation of 
true, but isolated facts and their identification with an event. In more general 
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formulation of the question – creation based on the facts of false information 
structure. Such difficult educations received the name of political myths 
(Бурцев, 1981, 27). 
Such an obvious example is the message of the Kharkiv Regional 
Commissariat about the strategy of the Red Army at retreat from the territory 
of the Ukrainian SSR. Propagandists noted that the Soviet troops, receding, 
destroyed everything on the way that nothing remained to the population 
which could not leave the territories occupied by the German army 
(Державний архів Харківської області, фонд 2984, Оп. 1. Спр. 7, 41). It is 
necessary to recognize that partially this information was truthful. Many 
miscalculations and mistakes which were made by Soviet leadership and the 
Red Army at retreat became a reason for the German propaganda and 
propaganda. People who witnessed such retreat of the Red Army were already 
easy to be convinced of anything. 
From articles that contain in the “New Ukraine” newspaper issued with the 
assistance of the occupying authority we see that with the arrival of Hitler’s 
army Kharkiv prospers happened to restore a spiritual life. Authors of articles 
claimed that people should watch a performance moving daily gather to watch 
a performance With the assistance of the German command which cared for 
the spiritual life of residents there were put 18 elementary schools where 
about 3 thousand were studied to work. There were opened 6 regional libraries 
(Державний архів Харківської області, фонд 2984, оп. 1, спр. 7, 59). 
A famous Ukrainian historian A.V. Skorobagatov wrote about a true life 
realities in the Kharkiv region. He noted that the occupational policy on the 
Kharkiv region differed from the policy in Rekhskomisariat of Ukraine 
radically. It took place when the government of this territory was transferred 
to the commander-general field marshal Walter von Reichenau 
(Скоробагатов, 2004, 66–68). Before the occupation of the Kharkiv region 
the German troops were already strongly exhausted in the fight against the 
Soviet Army, broken the plan of “lightning war” and to that Rejchenau 
demanded further draconian measures in the fight against the Soviet guerrillas 
and underground workers (Державний архів Харківської області, 60–61). 
The Wehrmacht established a new order in Kharkiv with extreme cruelty. 
In the first days of occupation on balconies of houses and cable columns of 
the city 116 people were hung up. It was terrible to go outside, everyone was 
suspected of cooperation with Bolsheviks (Харьковщина в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны, 1941–1945 гг. 1965, 552). 
So, from the first days of occupation against civilians the Nazis it made 
cruel repressions. So intimidated the population and showed what waits for 
those who would not carry out the order of military authorities. 
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Life in the occupied Kharkiv was very heavy. Lack of food, an opportunity 
to earn a living, or to somewhere exchange something edible, a curfew – all 
this affected opinion of Kharkiv citizens of rather new power. And even 
opening and work of theater or attempt of the occupying authorities to begin 
academic year did not make people more favorable to military authorities in 
the city (Скоробагатов, 2004, 279–280). 
Throughout all war, the Hitler’s government tried to create information 
space not only in occupied territories. During war it was important for the 
fascist leadership of Germany to support the trust among the German 
population that was an inexhaustible source of military forces, illusions of 
constant victories and big achievements of invincible German army. People 
manipulation through information influence was possible because there was 
feedback. All schemes of information influence worked in German society on 
the eve of and during World War II because grew consciousness of many 
people. Here, certainly, a role was played not only by the principle of 
submission of information, and, first of all, a difficult economic situation of 
the country and each German citizen in particular. 
German society existed also a powerful tool of realization of receptions 
and methods of creation of artificial information space – the mass media 
(MM). Rather figuratively the founder of the Society of Krishna told about the 
action of media: 
“Now for anybody, not a secret that using mass media it is possible with 
unprecedented to create skill a veil of deception and illusion so nobody will be 
able to distinguish the truth from a lie, reality from fiction” (Лисичкин, 
Шелепин, Боев, 1997, 37). 
Support of the German population was also necessary also because of 
most of the printing products, transfers of broadcasting and movies for the 
occupied areas created in Germany. 
Fixed assets of dissemination of information were as it was already noted, 
radio, the German information bureau, and the press. Therefore the first task 
which faces the Hitler’s government in occupied territories of Ukraine, in the 
shortest possible time to restore broadcastings and printing houses of the 
regional, regional press as most effective remedies of formation of 
information space (Панарин, 2006, 154). The population of Ukraine was in 
the specified information space, daily scooped information from the press, 
broadcasts, from screens of TVs. Being often in the world of the symbols 
which are torn off from reality, they went even against own interests. The 
reality faded into the background. In this sense of people became dependent. 
Several ways of effective information actions were fulfilled. Occurred so-
called “brainwashing”. Mind zombies of people was carried out. It was 
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created obedient to the person, the people turned into manageable weight 
(Дичев, Бийчанинова, Берестенко, 1993, 68). 
A very interesting and productive method was also the method of a 
declaration of ideals in using appeals. According to the political scientist 
Mr. Pocheptsov a considerable part of people especially in the rural zone 
almost did not read books. It gave the chance to impose to people thought in 
the form of slogans. A slogan had to be short, attractive and expressive one 
(Почепцов, 1998, 62–63). 
It should be noted that the majority of headings of articles in the 
occupational press had the character of slogans, for example, in the 
Vinnitskiye Vesti newspaper – “The peasantry – the vital force of Europe” 
(Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 1), “Germany wins on all fronts” (Вінницькі вісті 
1941, 1), “Awakening to new life” (Вінницькі вісті, 194, 3). Such slogans 
aimed to show to the population of occupied territories what aims are pursued 
by Hitlerite Germany according to the solution of the Ukrainian question. 
Also the method of a denial of information influence of the opponent was 
actively used. This method was rather often used by all Departments of 
Propaganda of the Ministry of East Occupied Territories and Wehrmacht. 
It consisted of content that the German propaganda tried to deny that 
information which got to the population of occupied territories through the 
Soviet channels are banned: newspapers, leaflets, radio, etc. So, for example, 
when the German citizens listened to the “Swiss” radio stations or BBC Frich 
as known for the Germans as the radio commentator discredited completely 
propaganda efforts of allies (Герцштейн, 1996, 241). 
A similar situation developed when the German occupational 
administration disproved the Soviet messages and tried to show information 
from a different angle of sight. For example, we will provide a fragment to the 
political article in the “Wolhynien newspaper”, Nr. 25 (53), vom 29 Maerz 
1942, Rowno. An article can be considered as one of many responses to Stalin 
propaganda in which crimes of the fascist mode are reflected in occupied 
territories and the real aspirations of Hitler. In the article, it is said that all 
efforts of Soviet leadership to break force at the head of which there is a big 
European Adolf Hitler were vain. “Nothing surprising as on flags which unite 
the whole of Europe in the fight against Asian Moscow of the user also the 
family is clear to Europeans appeals” (Центральний державний архів 
вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 2, оп. 1, спр. 103, 29). 
To deny information of the Soviet press that the German government 
broke the nonaggression pact signed by both parties in August 1939 
occupational administration in newspapers, in particular in the “Volyn 
magazine” of December 25, 1941, proved that treason happened from Stalin. 
104 
Proofs that representatives of the Soviet party circles showed to the American 
correspondent V. Kerel that Stalin used were provided the contract is signed 
thoroughly to be prepared for war. In the article it is noted that it is Stalin war 
and its purpose – to destroy the European people (Центральний державний 
архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 2) This strategy of 
Stalin was confirmed in other publications “Moskovia against Europe” in 
which the opinion that the Russian monarchs with HVIII of a century sought 
to take and divide Europe is leading. In confirmation of it the example is 
given: the partition of Poland three states of 1772–1795, the initiator whom 
Russia (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та 
управління України, фонд 2, оп. 1, спр. 103, 2). 
The famous historian A. Necreech considered that the non-aggression pact 
between Germany and the Soviet Union was used by Stalin for strengthening 
of the Soviet Army in war with Finland. According to him, Stalin planned 
participation of the USSR in the large-scale European war, but at the same 
time he was afraid to face the union of the leading capitalist states and first of 
all was afraid of change of front England and its conspiracy with Germany 
against the USSR (Некрич, 1995, 325–327). 
The former officer of GRU V. Suvorov considers that Stalin used Hitler to 
begin the war in Europe. But this thought only confirms the existence of the 
Soviet doctrine which provided warfare in the territory of the opponent. 
Suvorov notes that Stalin prepared for drawing a preventive strike and even 
time was defined (Суворов, 1990, 175). Therefore there was enough 
information which gave a reason to the German leaders to speculate on this 
thought. 
In the “New Zaporizhia newspaper” of August 19, 1942, we read an article 
about how Bolsheviks justify with a lie the real situation at the front. As the 
people do not want to support Soviet in the authorities in, she somehow to 
hold the positions, almost in each construction from fronts tells about the 
achievements and victories over the German army. Actually “received nothing 
for all the time of approaches, and only small huge losses in manpower and 
military equipment (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 3). In the same newspaper, we 
read also about losses of the Red Army and words about losses of the German 
army in northeast loops of the Don arch. 
An active development of propaganda naturally generates counter-
propaganda. It is one of the methods of information and psychological impact 
on people of the occupied Ukrainian territories. According to the same 
G. Pocheptsov, counter-propaganda is a response to communicative actions of 
the opponent, for example, a denial of this or that information that goes from the 
opponent. Opponents, Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union actively studied 
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propaganda and propaganda activity and messages of each other to prevent their 
mass impacts on consciousness Ukrainian (Почепцов, 2001, 68). 
First of all, it should be noted that the leader of Fascist party Adolf Hitler 
and therefore the considerable stream of propaganda of Soviet leadership was 
directed against it was one of the main objects of propaganda. The Hitler’s 
team in the counterpropaganda activity worked on a problem of publicizing of 
activity of Hitler and Stalin in a foreshortening, convenient for them. So in 
one of the brochures “Adolf Hitler and children” who extended on the 
occupied territory in the fall of 1941, it was said: 
“Cut off for long years from the rest of the world by Bolshevist 
executioners, you could not know the naked truth. 
Constantly lied to you and inspired that the German people hate Adolf 
Hitler, across Germany blood flows the river and that the world does not 
know the cruel despot. 
The Jewish propaganda especially sought to blacken the person Fyurer and 
it is clear that Jews also hate him as it is loved by the German people... 
We will try to show you how the people of Germany and especially 
children love Fuhrer and as he loves children and the people... 
Adolf Hitler will destroy the devil system of the Bolshevism and on your 
Homeland and will give to your people the world, happiness and an order” 
(Гогун, 2004, 342). 
All these words were followed by photos with the image of Hitler who 
communicated with children and worked on the solution of global problems. 
In the German policy also using of anti-Semitic moods was not new.  
To receive the favor of the local population the German leaders in occupied 
territories imposed a thought that in all vital difficulties, in the period of the 
Soviet power Jews and Bolsheviks were guilty. In the directive of the Supreme 
Commander of Wehrmacht in September 1941. It was said: “Fight against the 
Bolshevism demands ruthless and vigorous actions first of all against Jews who 
are the main carriers of the Bolshevism” (Коваль, 1999, 164). 
Similar example “Address to the population of occupied territories of 
Reykhkskomisar Erich Koch’s Ukraine: “England is your enemy as there is it 
the enemy of all European people. This war was imposed on Europe by 
England! She is an ally of the Bolshevism! It has to be beaten because the 
world and wellbeing can come only when the victory over England is won. 
Put your gratitude of Germany and your contribution to fight against England 
the work...” (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та 
управління України, фонд 57, оп. 4, спр. 185,1). 
In propaganda also the Soviet power adhered to the same principle. So, the 
address to fighters of the Red Army, the guerrilla and the population of 
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temporarily occupied territories was published in the “Communist newspaper” 
No. 174/6654 of July 23, 1941: “Beat mad fascists! The impudent enemy 
perfidiously attacked our native Homeland, the blood-thirsty fascism wants to 
enslave our freedom-loving people, our home ground... fascists open wide to 
fall to the ground of the blossoming Ukraine, to its forests and the rivers, to 
riches of our people. We will not allow it, we will not assume that the mean 
enemy scoffed at ours of honor and freedom. By fire and sword we will expel 
the Hitler swine from the cities and villages...” (Центральний державний архів 
вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 3206, оп. 2, спр. 72, 10). 
From this, the important principle of military propaganda follows: any 
attacks to the country and her leader, any propaganda, discredits the power, 
only enhances the commitment of those who else not quite identify 
themselves with the state system. This problem cannot be solved even by the 
cleverest and skillful propaganda. It can solve only a military victory. At the 
adverse course of fighting such is propaganda, in general, it is doomed to 
failure. “Extremely low efficiency of propaganda of the Red Army on the 
German troops in the first two years of war of Hitler’s Germany against the 
USSR is explained by these reasons. In this case, information influence faced 
also a rejection of hostile propaganda, and strong nationalist sentiments... 
If the level of a moral and political condition of the opponent is insufficiently 
high, and fighting develops unsuccessfully for it, then psychological influence 
has every chance to be productive” (Крысько, 1999, 90). 
This fact is confirmed after the defeat of the German armies near 
Stalingrad when weakened and is disappointed the German soldiers with the 
whole parts and divisions were given in captivity. 
One more significant fact from the report of guerrilla connection of the 
colonel Melnik in villages of the Rivne region where nationalist groups of 
bulbovets and Banderovites spread provocative rumors about that, as if the 
Soviet guerrillas destroy civilians, the population sometimes fled from the 
village to the forest at our approach. 
All population is hostile against Germans, traitors of the Homeland. 
In many villages which we passed the population addressed guerrillas with 
complaints to criminal acts of police officers, heads and those who served the 
Nazis. 
The moral and political spirit of most of the peasants became sharply 
hostile the “German invaders” (Центральний державний архів вищих 
органів влади та управління України, фонд 4620, оп.3, спр. 112, 74a-75.). 
The concept of Nazi policy in occupied territories of Ukraine provided, 
first of all, the creation of the powerful information space placed at service to 
the “Third Reich” and directed to a clear victory in this war. The main 
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objective of information space is to win the favor of the local population to 
the occupying authority and its support in the fight against the Soviet Union 
during an initial stage of the war. 
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SECTION 3.1. 
MEDIA AS A MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTING  
THE INFORMATION POLICY OF THE WARRING PARTIES 
 
The media play a huge role in shaping and functioning of public 
consciousness. A special impact of the media is known to take place in the 
period of military conflicts when leaderships of warring countries are 
interested in a victory at any price. 
Since the invention of I. Gutendergom printing press in 1450 began to talk 
about the impact of the printed word on the public consciousness. History 
shows that “at first only the ruling clique of society realized the potential 
social influence of the printed word. Many state leaders being afraid of 
consequences of general literacy and availability of printed materials sought 
for control over publications to disfranchise opposition”. The similar fear 
before the influence of media still exists in many societies with totalitarian 
regime where leaders suppress or control activity mass to remain in power. 
The period of 19 – the beginning of the 20th century is marked by the 
distribution of literacy and development of technologies in various areas that 
led to the emergence of new forms of mass communication (the invention of 
the phone, radio). Since then, concern about the consequences of mass media 
exposure has become a sphere of activity aseducated elite and individuals and 
all groups of the society. 
The broadcasting is considered to the second type of the media after the 
print media. The use of radio waves allows an information to be transferred to 
unlimited distances and on the air. A history knows a set of examples of the 
influence of broadcasting on public consciousness. This influence could have 
both positive and negative effects. 
The emergence of television marked a new stage in the development of 
public consciousness technologies. Today television seemed to be the most 
widespread channel of information influence on masses. Due to ample 
communication opportunities “effect of presence” is the most effective 
instrument of management of outlook of the personality at the present stage. 
The television (unlike printed media and radio) influences on two bodies of 
perception at once – hearing and sight, – thanks to what the viewer obtains the 
bigger volume of information when the listener or the reader for the same 
time. In turn, it affects also the impact of television on public consciousness: 
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“Possibilities of telecasting allow to transfer the maximum quantity of 
information in the form in which it is most easily acquired, providing the 
greatest influence”. 
In the last decades the worldwide computer network actively is being 
developed. The media information takes an important place in network. In a 
worldwide web there is a set of electronic versions and digests of printed 
media (change the contents in real-time), Internet radio, network telecasts. 
Thus, in the conditions of the information society people are influenced by 
all kinds of mass media that manipulate their minds. So at the expense of what 
similar manipulation does become possible and who is “manipulator”? 
At the beginning of the 20th century the German philosopher Spengler 
foresaw the role of information in a person’s life. In the “The Decline of 
Europe” he wrote: “In the near future only three or four world newspapers 
will direct the thoughts of the provincial press and control the consciousness 
and will of the people”. According to his statement in the 20th and the next 
centuries “periodicals will play an extremely important role. It will influence 
the political and public relations and also the military conflicts” (Шпенглер, 
1998, 191–193). 
The 20-th century, really, became a time when mass media, in particular 
newspapers, magazines and radio developed and affected public opinion. 
Since World War I, the media, in particular newspapers and leaflets, were 
always active participants of armed conflicts. It is possible to consider the 
attack on the radio station in Gleyvitsa. Radio and newspapers became the 
tool for distribution an information with the high speed and necessary 
comments. Also the leader of the Italian fascists B. Mussolini understood an 
important role of the press. According to his colleagues in planning the 
military operations he paid more attention to headings published in 
newspapers than military operations of Italy. 
Most theorists and researchers define periodicals the place in the life of 
society, especially during politically active periods and at the time of armed 
conflicts. Periodicals are considered to the main source of information, 
discussion and protection. 
Already in the late 20-s of 20
th
 century Hitler and other leaders of the 
German National Socialist Party understood that the periodicals had to 
become one of the most powerful tools in the fight for establishment in 
Germany of the Nazi regime. 
As soon as Hitler came to the power he announced that the press of the 
Third Reich should be an object of (Gleichschaltung known as the Nazi 
political concept of the conquest of all spheres of Germany’s life. It was in the 
interests of the national socialist mode. At once after the formation of the 
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Ministry of National Education and the Promotion of Germany headed by 
I. Goebbels all newspapers and magazines of the Third Reich appeared under 
strict control. All oppositional editions were forbidden by the law on the press 
adopted on October 4, 1933 by the Nazi regime. This law deprived of 
publishers of the right to make independent decisions in the field of editorial 
policy. Such rights were transferred to editors who were, according to the 
management of the Reich, “carriers of public concerns”. The journalism 
appeared profession of the state value. To control the edition of periodicals 
completely it was necessary to put journalists under complete control of the 
national socialist leadership. In 1935 for this reason there was distributed the 
order on obligatory membership of journalists in the National Socialist 
Workers’ Party of Germany (NSDAP). So way a considerable part of the 
qualified journalists lost opportunities to be engaged in the activity 
(Волковский, 2003, 192). 
The ban of the Berlin’s Press Conference which actually was a public 
association of capital journalists became an important step in total control 
over periodicals. The government motivated it with the fact that only the state 
could have rights for the dissemination of information. But it was created 
“Administration Press Conference”. Earlier in 1934 Max Amann 
reconstructed a very influential professional organization called the Union of 
Newspaper Journal Publishers. It became the Department headed by him 
personally. In the structure of this department was a number of various mass 
media departments and the periodical press. That year under the observation 
of NSDAP it was reconstructed known “German News Agency” and united 
these authorities in one big agency which actually became the “German 
Information Bureau and NSDAP” (Вороненкова, 1999, 295). 
Liquidation of newspapers and magazines which belonged to Jewish 
became the following step of Nazi policy. They had to sell the editions to the 
German owners. It should be noted that the majority of newspapers and 
magazines belonged Jewish’s periodicals. There were such editions as the 
Central Fereyns Tsaytung newspaper (Berlin, 1922–38) (Энциклопедия 
третьего рейха, 1996, 379]; also at this time, Zionist newspaper “Yudisha to 
a Rundsha” (1896–1938) gained great popularity. Well new editions, such as 
“Der Schild” established in 1921 by Association of the former Jewish military 
personnel appeared. More than three three dozen public newspapers and 
magazines which appeared during that period in Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, 
and other cities, as a rule, were not political editions. They were addressed to 
various social groups of the Jewish population of Germany: young people, 
teachers, women, employees, etc. “The Der Morgen Magazine” (Darmstadt, 
1925–38) reflected in the editions “German-Jewish Assimilation policy”. 
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Contrary to those editions monthly newspaper of M. Bubera “Year” 
(Berlin, 1916–24) became a tribune for those who preached the Jewish 
spiritual revival in Central Europe. Supporters of “Mizrakhi’s” movement 
issued the monthly journal “Tsion2 (Berlin, 1929) (Периодическа печать, 
1992). 
Later “Crystal night” the Jewish press in Germany almost stopped the 
existence. The majority of editions were crushed. There was a mass 
emigration of Jews from Germany. The Nazi leadership decided to leave only 
the edition of the “Yudisha Nakhrikhtenblatt newspaper” (left since 
November 23, 1938) which limited the publication of official decrees and 
bulletins so-called “Imperial Organization of Jews in Germany” 
(Периодическа печать, 1992). 
As soon as it was finished with the press belonging to representatives of 
the Jewish people, NSDAP established a total control and monopoly on 
Jewish periodicals. The Nazi government founded its own editions and own 
periodicals such as “Felkisherbeobakhter” which became an influential 
official newspaper of the Third Reich. A. Rosenberg headed it. In Berlin 
I. Goebbels established an own newspaper “Angrif” and started publishing it. 
There were some old newspapers which Goebbels personally monitored their 
contents personally (Энциклопедия третьего рейха, 1996, 380). 
Thus if to trust statistics in 1932 year a total number of newspapers was 
4700. In 1939 there were 3500, and in 1944 editions left 977 (Вороненкова, 
1999, 302). This data demonstrates that an enormous work has been done to 
eliminate newspapers and other periodicals by the Ministry of National 
Education and Promotion because this press did not profess to support the 
ideological bases of National Socialist’s Party. 
It is necessary to recognize that in the first year of staying in power of the 
Hitler’s government there were periodicals, conceptually unified, 
subordinated to Nazi policy and economic requirements. The number of Nazi 
newspapers annually increased. The following data demonstrate it. In 1932 at 
the initiative of the National Socialist Workers’ Party 70 printing editions 
turned out to appear. In 1935 the Party already had 140 newspapers. In 1944 
there were 352 newspapers (История Второй Мировой войны, 1974, 303). 
No less important role was played by periodicals and printing materials 
and in the territories occupied by the German army. Except for troops of 
Wehrmacht in invaded territories promotion of propaganda by print press was 
carried out by the Ministry of East Occupied Territories. There were special 
structures and departments which were created for this purpose. 
The structure of the ministry assumed at the disposal of the Reich 
commissioners the special departments of the propaganda. There were also 
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included divisions of occupational administration known as village headman, 
burgomasters and representatives of other office ranks. The structure provided 
institutions of regional governments. The village headmen should have 
provided the population with propaganda materials. If in some villages the 
newspaper and the leaflet were not got the headmen would be able to bring 
newspapers and read its independently. It was made a special order of reading 
reports of the German Supreme command to the population. That necessary 
information constantly was accompanied by each resident of the cities and 
villages. Special boards in the most crowded places were established where 
posters and leaflets had been pasted and hung. 
In the Ministry of National Education and Promotion of Germany it was 
created a special “East” department with “Vineta”. This branch of power 
carried out coordination and the management of propaganda campaigns in the 
occupied territories directed against the USSR. 
The occupational administration applied various forms of promotion 
through the edition of newspapers and magazines Ukrainian. They were as 
demonstration at movie theaters of special movies and an evident propaganda 
in the form of posters and leaflets, documentary exhibitions and also theatrical 
performances. It was broadcasted in Ukrainian, Russian and other languages. 
But influential means of periodicals remained the most important ones. 
As it was stated above in the previous section, at the front and on occupied 
territories special propaganda groups worked with the Hitler’s army. Each of 
them also had separate departments. So the Wehrmacht had high hopes on a 
group of” South” which serviced by the “Propaganda-Abteilung U” battalion. 
Their task included propaganda activities among troops of Wehrmacht and the 
psychological processing of military and the population of the enemy (Орлов, 
1985, 31). 
On the eve of military operations on June 6, 1941, by the chief of staff of 
General headquarters of Wehrmacht it was issued the directive where it was 
instructed in a strengthening of companies of promotion and departments 
which were responsible for this site of work as experts from propaganda 
activities. There were entered the departments of censorship which had to 
monitor the maintenance of the press in the occupied territory in German and 
local languages. Also, “the fact that the main objective of the press is the 
calming impact on the population of occupied territories to keep him from any 
resistance” (Коваль, 1988, 157–158). 
In the middle of July 1941 at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the 
Reich the decision to renew the Ukrainian press for more active influence in 
the occupied territories was made (Косик, 1998, 240–241). As the Soviet 
printing enterprises were destroyed by the Red Army at a retreat, In most 
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cases typographical equipment was delivered from Germany or from other 
occupied countries of Europe. The former head of publishing in 
Reykhskomissariat Ukraine G. Gornauyer wrote that for years of occupation 
(1941–1943) “the most part of the printed materials were made by the civilian 
population and army of Wehrmacht” (Ивлев, Юденков, 1988, 119). 
From the beginning of the creation Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine there 
was formed the political authority operating according to instructions of the 
political department of the Ministry of East Occupied Territories led by 
A. Rosenberg. Its’ task was to unify editions specially those that had been 
planned and had been already given. Political management consisted of 
14 departments among which there was a department of the general 
promotion. Its structure included sections: promotion, the press, radio, 
cinema, foreign communications, economic recruitments, exhibition, service 
of troops, etc. (Черняков, 2006, 8). The Ministry of East Occupied Territories 
named Oettinger carried out the plans Vermwacht as the inspector 
(Державний Російський воєнний архів, фонд 1358, оп. 1спр. 1, 26). 
In the Ministry of East Occupied Territories there was an accurate system 
of the organization to function the German and occupational press both and to 
provide it by necessary materials. The Head of that Department Zimmerman 
and secretary Ludwig Bulish organized the work. This department was 
engaged in providing propagandists with the equipment, film materials, paper 
for newspapers, loudspeakers, etc. (Державний Російський воєнний архів, 
фонд 1358, оп. 1спр. 1, 38). 
In addition for service of the “East Press” in the Ministry of East Occupied 
territories the group being consisted of 18 where the head was Kikhben – 
Schmidt was also in addition created. Serving of the press was the main 
function of this group, as well as an above-mentioned department: plans, card 
files. That Department had to hold information with helping of trips to places 
and control and processing of materials for the “East press”. The newspapers 
and magazines extended in the occupied territory of the Ukrainian SSR 
directly submitted to it (such as “New word”, “Voice..., etc.” (Державний 
Російський воєнний архів, фонд 1358, оп. 1спр. 1, 40). 
The political management of the press was rather influential. It was 
engaged in the development of accurate instructions for censorship for 
publishers of periodicals. The correspondents of the “East Press” served there. 
There was a bright propaganda in this department Germany in which it was 
told about the best in the world and in Germany. Brochures and books printed 
materials about Adolf Hitler and his aspiration to create a new Europe and 
about the German peasants and workers who were well off (Державний 
Російський воєнний архів, фонд 1358, оп. 1спр. 1, 42). 
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The thesis about the dismissal of the people of the USSR from 
“the Bolshevism” was the main objective of the occupational press. Fight 
against the Soviet political and social order was the central point of this 
promotion. In it the major part was assigned to Jews (together with 
communists). 
At the end of 1941 the Directive of the Reich Minister Rosenberg on the 
introduction of fascist orders in the occupied Soviet areas was published.  
It was noted that all questions connected with permission of issue of local 
newspapers had to be solved by the Reich Minister of the occupied East areas 
on the basis of offers Reichkomissar. It was noted that newspapers should 
have been to give out so much information how it would be necessary for the 
population. But at the same time, it was necessary to seek restriction of a 
number of local newspapers in a Reykhskomissariat. Further, it was noted that 
permission to the edition of local newspapers depended further on existence in 
each separate case of politically reliable publishers and editors. A necessary 
condition was the existence of enough German acceptable bodies (Німецько-
фашистський окупаційний режим на Україні, 1963, 65–66). 
The power bodies of the periodical press supervision were created in each 
“Gebitkomissariats”. From the letter of the commissioner of Uman to the 
General Commissioner we see that all articles and publications were published 
in the Umansky’s newspaper “Ukrainsky Golos” and were exposed to captious 
censorship from propaganda departments of occupational administration. 
The letters arriving from citizens also underwent censorship, some of them were 
not included in newspapers (Центральний державний архів вищих органів 
влади та управління України, фонд 3206, оп. 2спр. 74, 4). 
For local residents of the city and village he press was the main source of 
information. It is important to stress that a local radio regularly transferred its 
detailed reviews. Selections of newspapers were also available to readers of 
city libraries. The popularity of the press among the population was caused by 
regular publications of data on the situation on fronts of World War II and 
also orders and orders of local administration. Periodicals were read and 
discussed by millions of people in the occupied territories.It was extremely 
important for the occupational press to cover “Jewish problem”. In the 
occupied territory the periodicals did not only inform the population by means 
of the occupying authority but also directly influenced a change of the attitude 
towards Jews from the local population. And that time it was significant to 
provide necessary help to them (Гитлеровская пропаганда юдофобии в 
прокламациях и карикатурах, 2005. 190, 56–58). 
In the territory of the Ukrainian lands periodicals appeared to be under 
German control in the first weeks of occupation. Since the end of the summer 
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of 1941 newspapers in Ukrainian had begun to appear already in all territory 
occupied by Germans. Since the fall of 1941 periodicals printed in each 
regional or regional center Since the fall of 1941 there were Distributed 
newspapers in city of Volyn.( such as “A free word” in Drogobyche, 
“the Voice of Poltavshchyna” in Poltava, “Sword” in Kryvyi Rih, “Nova 
of Dob” in Berdichev, etc.) (Черняков, 2006, 23–32). 
For the purpose of unification and systematization of periodicals in the 
territory of Reykhskomissariat “Ukraine” the news department of the Ministry 
of East Occupied Territories developed a strong and an accurate system of 
divisions. One of them, in particular, “German Publishing Society in Ukraine 
with Limited liability” that took place in Lutsk. This edition was corresponded 
in German. The main task was to print all German-language periodical press 
and also official bulletins of a Reykhskomisar and general rulers, book-trade. 
There were many correspondents and photographers in their structure 
The societies “Press of Ukraine”, “Ukrainiya”, “Applied Press Ukraine” the 
“Agricultural publishing house of Ukraine” were subordinated to it. 
The society “Press of Ukraine” was formed on December 1, 1941 by the same 
founders as “German Publishing Society”. G. Grornauyer became the director. 
The society coordinated the work of all enterprises and printing houses in the 
“Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine” and in a zone of military authorities which 
controlled their economic activity. Provided with necessary materials, etc. Society 
“Ukrainiya” was also founded in Lutsk (November, 1941) by he National Union 
of the German publishers of newspapers in Berlin. At the beginning of 1943 this 
department of the press had the 32
nd
 own points of distribution. And in August of 
the same year periodicals had already extended in 65 cities. 
In general at the beginning of 1943 society “Press of Ukraine” provided an 
issue of 91 newspapers with a general single circulation of about one million 
pieces. Thus, according to the estimates of the scientists investigating the 
occupational press in the territory of Ukraine there were about 300 issued 
newspapers and magazines (Черняков, 2006, 57–58). Permission to a such a 
number of periodicals can be explained with the aspiration of fascist 
administration to make completely control on information field of occupied 
territories, to distribute necessary propaganda character and thus to affect 
consciousness and behavior of the local population. 
When in the summer of 1942 the Hitler’s leadership understood that war 
would not end as quickly as they wanted. The press was used actively among 
the population and the periodicals became the major front in this case. Despite 
it, special methodical approaches that were used for the purpose of promotion 
among the Ukrainian population were developed for the edition of the 
occupational press. 
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Staffing issue was equally important in the publication of the periodical 
press also. In the first months of occupation in newspapers and magazines the 
German administration employed mainly those Ukrainian journalists who in 
the period of the Soviet power government could not, for one reason or 
another circumstances to realize their professional and creative abilities. 
The newspapers and magazines appearing in the occupied territory were 
issued in many languages. Most of them were given a circulation from 2.5 to 
10,000 copies. The newspapers issued in the territory of Ukraine and zones of 
military authorities were issued mainly in Ukrainian, sometimes in Russian 
and language of the numerous ethnic minorities living during this period in 
Ukraine (Волковский, 2003, 207). 
The majority of the newspapers and magazines issued in the occupied 
territory not too differed from each other according to contents and the nature 
of publications. On the first pages victorious reports from fronts and praise of 
the German soldiers were printed. The articles of the second and third pages 
published an information about the Bolshevist model and its hostile intentions 
on Ukrainian, about the famous Ukrainian figures of the past, about 
achievements of the Ukrainian peasants in the conditions of occupation 
mainly. The majority of reports presented through a prism of views of the 
German journalists or Ukrainian journalists cooperating with the occupying 
authorities. This fact formed a certain ideological and psychological mark of 
the reader. 
Headings of articles in the “Volyn” and “Vinnytsia Messages Magazine” were 
the next: “Kyiv and Poltava are freed” (Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1941, 1), 
“Success on the Donetsk front” (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1942, 1), “The 
German troops successfully constrain an enemy impact”. In these articles it is said 
that the fascist army successfully had resisted to the Soviet troops in the northwest 
of the Kirovohrad region (Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1943, 1). It is interesting 
that those days – on November 23–24, 1941 – in the Soviet reports we can read 
that “the Soviet troops took the regional center of the Kirovohrad region, 
Onufriyevki. Around the lower watercourse Pripyat, continuing approach, they 
also occupied the regional center of the Polesia region with the city of Hoyniki” 
(Жадов 1978). What information was truthful? How did feel the population of 
occupied territories having obtained information from the German reports, at the 
same time and from Soviet? 
Having glanced over occupational newspapers you are convinced that the 
allegedly fascist army really brought to the people of Ukraine peace and 
harmony. Opposite information was given in the Soviet press. 
In the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper on the first page we read “Germany 
wins on all fronts” (Вінницькі вісті 1941, 1), on the second and third pages 
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we see the publications “Awakening to New Life” (Вінницькі вісті 1941, 3), 
“The real face of the Bolshevism” (Вінницькі вісті 1942, 2), etc. 
Most publications focused on differences in public administration in the 
USSR and during the German occupation. It was written in the “Sumskoy 
Vestnik” newspaper No. 6 of November 5, 1941: “The invincible German 
army brought to the city of Sumy the true freedom, having exempted it from a 
communistic yoke. Only recently citizens began to breathe a full breast...” 
(Сумський віник 1941, 2). The article headlined “Elimination of a Bolshevist 
Collective-farm System” there was noted that unlike Bolsheviks German the 
government had issued the order on granting the earth to peasants in 
individual use. It was published in the (New Ukraine, 6, 1942, 54–65). There 
it was told about difficuliest in life of the Ukrainian peasants and how thanks 
to “a New Order” and a “New Land Law”, peasants would be able to become 
prosperous and would be able to provide “Great Germany State”. However, 
it’s known that the “Land Law” remained on paper. The collective-farm 
system continued to exist in another format. It was a very convenient form of 
managing in the conditions of which it was possible to control completely 
work of peasants and to withdraw the most part of the made products. 
The press, first of all, carried out a strategic task of Nazi ideology to 
promote that the population of occupied territories stuck to anti-Semitic and 
anti-Bolshevist moods. So the important place was given to “Jewish question” 
in periodicals. Moreover, the Jewry was identified with the Bolshevism and 
the Soviet power (Вінницькі вісті. 1943, 3). In the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” 
newspaper of August 9, 1942, under the title “Real Face of the Bolshevism” it 
was represented a caricature which demonstrated how the Jew had removed 
the mask of Stalin. It was commented so way that Jews actively led the 
country and Stalin was their mask (Вінницькі вісті 1942, 3). 
“Jewish question” occupied a prominent place in periodicals. In editorial 
articles as propaganda materials which prepared in Berlin the speeches and the 
reports of Nazi’s leaders regularly had been published. The thought was 
accurately carried out that Jews as the support of the Bolshevist mode was the 
main enemy not only Germany but also other people of the USSR. 
In addition to professional journalists, the authors of anti-Semitic and anti-
Soviet publications were historians, art critics, doctors, musicologists, etc. 
Practically all newspapers issued in the territory of Ukraine published special 
orders of the occupying authorities concerning Jews in a zone of military 
authorities on the last page of the edition. It was published also a huge amount 
of materials about the prosecution of Jews at all times and worldwide. The 
periodicals quoted from anti-Semitic sayings of the famous philosophers and 
politicians. Thus the ideological foundations of anti-Semitism were created on 
the territory of Ukraine. 
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It should be noted that such publications especially appeared to be at the 
end of 1943 after the defeating of the fascist army near Stalingrad. 
The Hitler’s government tried to convince the population of occupied 
territories that the Jewish people and the Bolshevist historically happened to 
become a threat and danger to humanity. 
As soon as the occupied territory was given to German authorities, the 
process of publishing standardization and replacing of their owners began at 
once. In the first months of the Great Patriotic War a part of newspapers 
appeared at the time of the Soviet power continued submitting their 
censorship. This was explained by the fact that the Hitler leadership could not 
cancel periodicals in occupied territories because of disseminating 
information and messages. 
Publishing activities in zones of military authorities was based on 
instructions of the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda. As an 
example we will consider a sample of one political directive concerning the 
press: “The Ukrainian and other newspapers issued in “Reykhskomissariat of 
Ukraine” – an exclusive tool for propaganda and administration policy. 
They do not serve national or cultural needs of the population or religion... 
Every line has to help with the implementation of a great mission of the 
“Fuhrer” in the creation of new Europe” (Косик 1998, 240–241). This 
directive is graphic evidence of functions of the German periodicals in 
Ukraine. There was no aim for any Ukrainian state or cultural aspirations. 
The Germans treated very seriously the creation of a new network of mass 
media on the conquered lands. In particular it belonged to delivery of fresh 
information to Lviv at first by train from Berlin and Vienna then by the telegraph 
and finally across all territory of “Reyskomisariat of Ukraine2. Thereby the 
problem of providing all magazines with monotonous official information 
concerning events in Germany, in the world, on fronts and so forth was solved. 
To run the press business a special “Press Service” was created in the 
Governorate-General territory. The chief of the press disposed to note that a 
state language in the territory of “Reyskomisariatu Ukraine” was to be 
German. There was separate publishing of official press in Ukrainian and 
Russian languages. The Nazi power adopted providing newspapers with 
necessary materials and the paper. The “Press Service” in “Reykhskomissariat 
of Ukraine” and in a zone of military authorities gave permission to the 
acquisition of the paper of each edition separately there. Printing houses could 
publish circulations only with the permission of the authorities too and it was 
possible to distribute only the editions allowed by the authorities. 
So within a short period of time the beginning of the formation of 
information space seemed to become. The occupying authority conducted 
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a policy of reduction of Ukrainian editions. Therefore within the first months 
the majority of publications ceased to leave in general. But already in 1942 
newspapers were issued practically in each Governorate-General territories 
and almost in each area and the large city. 
Periodicals in temporarily occupied territory became an important 
instrument of propaganda. It is possible to claim that the press played the 
leading role in the policy of the Hitler’s government. The majority of 
newspapers in the territory of “Reykhskomissariatof Ukraine” were published 
on behalf of the local community. Local authorities had to resolve 
organizational issues of the press. Despite it all newspapers and magazines 
were under fixed control of censorship which was carried out by 
representatives of Wehrmacht propaganda structures and military authorities. 
At the end of 1943 in the occupied territory of Ukraine, as it was noted 
above, about 300 newspapers and magazines were issued. The structure of 
each of these editions was also typical. So, if we revise several newspapers, 
such as “Ukrainian word”, “New Ukrainian Word”, “Volyn”, “The Vinnytsia 
messages”, “Kostopilsky News”, published during 1941–1943, then we will 
see that the first page of these editions had aimed subject. On the first page the 
reports from fronts which moved in a pathos form on behalf of winners were 
printed. On the same page there was the review about the international events. 
It’s interesting to note that information about allies and opponents was 
divided. For example, an Italy and Japan and the opponents as Great Britain, 
France, the USA and the Soviet Union. If it was talked about Great Britain or 
the USA authors of messages criticized practically all actions of the leaders of 
these states. If it was talked about Italy or Japan it was then said mainly about 
their achievements. Rather seldom on the first-page there was an information 
about the important events in the city or “Reykhskomissariat” or in a zone of 
military authorities. Generally such information was printed on the 3rd, 
4
th
 pages along with usual announcements and orders of local authorities. 
The second page of each printing edition is devoted to the fighting of the 
fascist army against Bolsheviks or military operations of allies of Germany in the 
South or in the Far East against Great Britain, France and the USA. There were 
too articles about the international events. They were often published international 
events in the world and caricatures of Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The fourth 
page is devoted to the everyday’s life of the population of the cities and villages. 
There the messages to a “gebits” and various nature of the announcement took 
place. It was reported about work of theatres, cinemas, the cultural chronicle, 
about the enrollment of children in school and their training. There were the 
articles devoted to sports subject. Considering informational content of the 
4
th
 page, an impression was made that in the occupied Ukraine life rages at full 
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speed and people were happy and joyful. The periodicals avoided giving 
information about all sorts of executions in the occupied territories, confiscation of 
housing and property, compulsory evacuation of youth to Germany, etc. 
As confirmation consider a few several typical newspapers appearing in 
the territory occupied by Hitler’s army, including the 88th issue of the  
“New Zaporizhia” newspaper of October 4, 1942. On the 3rd page we read the 
article titled “Education of Youth” where the author gave manuals as it was 
necessary to bring up and to educate young people of Ukraine on the 
examples of German youth. On the 4th page article titled “Cinema at This 
Time” it was told about with what pleasure the local population had got 
watching the German movies (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 3, 4). 
In the 4th issue of the same newspaper of January 13, 1943 we read the 
message from the main apartment of the Fuhrer of January 9, 1943 about the 
victorious fight of the fascist army between the Caucasus and Don, in 
Stalingrad (Нове Запоріжжя, 1943, 1). Information was given from positions 
of winners. It caused the local population to believe of the hopelessness Red 
Army and its attempts to resist to troops of the Reich. In the message the 
achievements of the German army were shown and actions of the Red Army 
were humiliated. It was made with aim of demonstrating the destruction of the 
Soviet equipment or troops. 
In the13th issue of the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper of September 28, 
1941 on the first page there was a summary data of the fronts for September 
26 and the message about fighting in the East from Kyiv (Вінницькі вісті, 
1941) was given. It was important that the characteristic scheme of 
construction and arrangement of material should be in the periodicals. In the 
14-th issue of the same newspaper of October 1 on the first page there was 
given a military construction till September 28, 1941. On the 2nd page of the 
same issue M. Ilyinsky wrote about the Jewish writers in Ukraine, on the 
3
rd
 page there was the article titled “Awakening to New Life” in which the 
author told that process of revival of the Ukrainian culture would be promoted 
by German occupying authority and with its assistance the Ukrainian public 
organizations in which the Ukrainian population could fully realize the 
creative abilities. The fourth page is devoted to basic provisions of “An Order 
of Administration2 (self-government). The Second section headlined as 
“Spirit of Administration” was the most interesting It was noted that self-
government demanded that discipline, organization and worthy attitude should 
be obligatory and any free-minded position prevented restoration. The 
administration had to be guided by the idea of the Ukrainian people and the 
interests of the German armed forces. It was responsible for depriving of 
Bolshevist dissoluteness to return to national discipline and working rising. 
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Further stated that the administration had had to care for that and to attract 
the people to the voluntary partnership, avoiding at the same time any 
coercion. “It was necessary that honest cooperation should be especially in 
branches of social, sanitary, cultural and sports work” (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 
1, 2, 3, 4). Similar installations to peasants were given by the Soviet 
authorities too. Actually Hitler’s government created a regime of complete 
obedience to the laws and orders of the “Third Reich”. 
In the “Sumskoy Vestnik” newspaper editor clearly adhered to the 
structure of the coverage of events and the presentation of its position. 
So in the first issue of this newspaper of October 19, 1941, on the 1st page, 
we read the address to the Ukrainian people under the heading “Joyful Time 
Came Big” where the author started to say about Ukraine with Taras 
Shevchenko’s words. He told about how Ukraine was destroyed and led to 
death. “Big promises of free trade, of the full development of a private initiative, 
really free work, private ownership and full spiritual liberation promised by 
Bolshevic’s power were not realized” (Сумський вісник, 1941, 1). On the 
2
nd
 page of the 6th issue of the same newspaper there was given the article that 
the invincible German army brought to Sumy the true freedom, having 
exempted it from communistic domination and that “right now citizens began to 
breathe with a full breast and can be given peace” (Сумський віник, 1941, 2). 
The newspaper “Novoye Ukrainskoye Slovo” issued in Kyiv was no an 
exception. The 229th issue of this newspaper of September 30, 1943, also 
completely corresponded to structural accents of creation of an information 
field in the occupational press. On the first page, as well as in the majority of 
newspapers, messages about successful fights of the German army near 
Zaporizhia and about big losses of the Soviet Army were given. There was an 
article titled “Guarantor of a Victory” where the author claimed that the 
Soviet Army had sought to take the whole of Europe and only intervention of 
Germany stopped “a red invasion”. Hitler’s Germany acted in this article as 
the guarantor of the peace in Europe. In September 1943 fascist troops 
receded under the pressure of the Soviet Army. Now the main objective of 
Hazi was to stay in occupied territories and to achieve the trust of the 
population. Therefore on the same page there was sent a message to the 
Ukrainian people that war would be coming closer again and the population 
have to help the German power (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, 1–2). 
Through periodicals the German occupational regime created an illusion 
of a benevolent attitude of the Hitler’s mode towards the Ukrainian 
population. Publications about constant underlining achievements and 
peaceful work for the sake of Great Germany and the publication how the 
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Ukrainian culture blossomed and developed, constant comparison of the 
German regime with the Soviet one, of course, not in favor. A certain part of 
the Ukrainian society at first really trusted the occupying authority and 
cooperated with it. 
From the very first days in all newspapers issued in “Reykhskomissariatof 
of Ukraine”, mainly on 3–4 pages, it was told about work and achievements of 
the Ukrainian peasants. At the same time, it was noted that Ukrainian peasants 
would receive big crops and for this purpose and the German authorities 
would organize special agricultural courses to teach the Ukrainian peasantry 
In the “Volyn magazine” of September 7, 1941, it was reported that with 
the assistance of the German power on the Ukrainian lands would have 
plentiful opportunities for the professional development of agricultural 
workers. In each area peasants should improve the technology of processing 
of the soil, increase in a number of cattle and improve the financial position 
(Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3). 
The old Soviet collective-farm system which the German occupying 
authority did not liquidate and placed to itself at service, even more often 
caused discontent. In this regard at the beginning of 1942 the occupying 
authority proclaimed reforms in the agrarian sector. On February 15, 
1942 was reported the law “About New Agrarian System” was reported by the 
administration of agricultural industry. It was issued practically in all 
occupational periodicals on February 26. On pages of periodicals the broad 
campaign of promotion of the new “Land Law” and its provisions under the 
slogan “The earth to each peasant” was given. (Нестеренко, 2004, 282). 
It seems that reform has begun to act was far from the truth. The German 
occupational administration did everything to delay destructions of a 
collective-farm system. 
Within two-three months in newspapers “The Temporary Charter of 
Work” detailed instructions on the organization of new land economy were lit. 
(Державний архів Сумської області, 1–10). An active discussion of the law 
created the illusion of its introduction. When peasants saw that really nothing 
shifts and they continued to work in collective farms, they began to oppose 
openly, warmed up by the Soviet propaganda. 
In April-May, 1942 the occupational administration began to carry out the 
distribution of land and to issue the special documents certifying land 
ownership rights. But, according to officials of the economic headquarters 
“East” of May 18, 1942, peasants were dissatisfied that they had been forced 
to work in public economy system again. For them, it was the same collective 
farms. Even active propaganda about the advantages of this type of farms did 
not affect the moods of peasants. 
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We find confirmation of these words in information message No. 7 of 
June 17, 1942, of the German retaliatory groups about the political situation in 
the areas which were temporarily occupied by fascist troops and in which the 
occupational administration noted that agrarian reform had been actively 
discussed generally among a rural population. At first, peasants were happy 
with the introduction of the new “Land Law” but interest in this subject fades, 
and the trust to local government had been lost. The author of the message 
concluded that “such situation made propaganda activity weak” 
(Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 27). 
Next important question in periodicals was the culture and education of 
the Ukrainian population. Less often there were publications about scientific 
research.Considering the conceptual principles of the German policy on the 
cultural development of the population in East occupied territories, including 
Ukrainian, it should be noted that the administration of the “Third Reich” did 
not wish to encourage the development of national consciousness and national 
culture there. Himmler noted that education of the population in occupied 
territories could lead to disobedience. He stressed that “it does not correspond 
colonial policy of Nazi Germany” (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, 89). The policy of Hitler’s regime in 
occupied territories came down to suspension of cultural development of 
Ukrainian and other people and to the destruction of their material and 
spiritual treasures. 
But during the war when the German leaders understood that they were 
losing positions at the front, it was necessary to change the plans to gain trust 
and support of the local population and to force them to work for the fascist 
army. From that moment it was reasonable to influence thoughts and activity 
of civilians through culture. 
Glancing over periodicals, almost in each newspaper on the 4th page we can 
see announcements of opening of the theatre, a premiere of this or that 
performance, demonstration of movies. So, in the “Volyn” magazine of January 1, 
1942 we read the message about life in occupied territories: “In organized national 
theatre, of November 9, 1941, performing “Natalka Poltavka”, “Nazar Stodolya”, 
“May night”. Also on the basis of the former theatre of miniatures in Kyiv, it has 
been organized “Cheerful theatre” where the performance “Green Island”, 
Overchenko’s “Torzhik” are given. The Kyiv theatre “Myuzik-hall” developed 
own repertoire which included dances and singing. (Волинь. Часопис для 
Волині 1942, 4). In the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper on which 4th page 
advertises the opera in 3 actions “The Zaporozhets beyond the Danube” was 
performed (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 4). And in the “New Zaporizhia” newspaper 
No. 88 for 1944 the author told about mass watching of German production 
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movies by the Ukrainian audience and about impressions which were received by 
locals and esthetic pleasure, about the discussion which lasted after (Вінницькі 
вісті, 1941, 4). During an initial stage of occupation, the Ukrainian intellectuals 
were not evacuated. Having various reasons and circumstances they continued to 
work and support own people. 
Working in educational institutions, teachers could influence pupils and 
their parents maintaining hope for the temporality of occupation. Others 
convinced the population for the German liberating mission. The most part of 
the intellectuals directed the activity of supporting Ukrainians to release from 
fascist aggressors, among them: O. Teliga, I. Rogach, O. Chemerinsky, 
V. Samchuk, I. Tiktor. 
Analyzing the conditions of education in the occupied Ukrainian territory, 
it should be noted that Ukrainian children successfully studied at schools of 
the different directions: initial, four-class national, professional, the highest, 
etc. But actually, a considerable part of schools in Ukraine was closed in 
November 1941 and at the beginning of 1942. Only on Donbas, in the need of 
the qualified labours, the German administration supported the activity of 
craft vocational schools (Донецкий вестник 1942, 4). As the number of 
teachers sharply decreased (by “reliability”), and also the number of schools 
decreased (Донецкий вестник, 1942, 4). 
From document No. 60 of separate orders of the department of army 
No. 34 of Wehrmacht, we see educational instructions in occupied territories 
regarding school policy in particular. It was said that according to order No. 
30 of 08.12.41 pupils of primary school of national schools had been allowed 
to study. As far as higher educational institutions and schools they were 
forbidden: the universities, technical colleges, gymnasiums, lyceums and 
equivalent educational institutions (Косик, 1998, 368). 
Despite it, it should be noted that in the periodic press it was constantly 
noted that Germany brought the European education on the Ukrainian lands, 
publications about opening and work of high comprehensive and vocational 
schools constantly were published in newspapers. So, we read in 
“The Donetsk bulletin” of November 15, 1941, that in Stalino since 
November 20, 1941, there were 9 schools (Донецкий вестник 1941, 4). 
In Artemivsk and vicinities, 14 schools were opened, but most of them were 
closed until the end of June 1942 (Бахмутский вестник, 1942, 4). In the 
“New Zaporizhia” newspaper No. 105 of 1942, it was reported about craft 
school where studied115 pupils and were taught mechanics, physics, 
technology and drawings (Нове Запоріжжя 1942, 4). In the “Volyn” 
newspaper of September 1, 1941, we read messages that from the beginning 
1941–1942 academic year in Berdichev it would be opened gymnasiums for 
128 
girls and boys separately. In addition, women’s teacher’s seminary had been 
organized (Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1941, 4). 
About opening and running of primary and four-grade national schools 
was reported by “Putivlsky regional Department of Propaganda” and 
formation of the Sumy region. This report gave detailed information on 
applied improvements by the inspectorate and directors of schools. And in the 
report of educational institutions of Putivlsky district it was noted that since 
September 1942 started 46 elementary national school started to work. From 
them there were the forty-three in the countryside and 3 in the city of Putivl 
where studied 3797 pupils (Державний архів Сумської області, 6, 7). 
It should be noted that in newspapers it was constantly told about 
education at schools and about what importance has it for Ukrainian. There 
were less students at most of the schools. If we consider the documents 
confirming the movement of children of school age, then we will see that, for 
example, in Deneshivsky national school of the Zhytomyr region at the end of 
September studied 385 pupils and already on January 1 1942 there were  
203 pupils (Державний архів Житомирської області, 36). In Shpetsko-
BUDSKY elementary school at the end of September studied 70 pupils, and 
for December 1 of 1942 there were 57 pupils (Державний архів 
Житомирської області, 70). The reason was the next that because children 
were forced to throw school and to help parents somehow to live. 
The administration issued instructions not to open a large number of 
schools and to close those which had been already worked. So in Rivne all 
schools were closed on November 14, 1941. It was explained by the shortage 
of fuel and in order to avoid the danger of spreading of infectious diseases 
caused by war (Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1941, 1). The requirement that 
in a class there were not less than 42–48 pupils was another reason which 
actually restricted opening of schools. (Державний архів Житомирської 
області, 6) It is clear that such number of pupils could not be among the 
Ukrainian pupils so they were closed. There were some more reasons which 
interfered with work of educational institutions. It was lack of textbooks and 
insufficient quantity of notebooks and writing-materials, absence of libraries 
(Державний архів Житомирської області, 7–9). Here it should be noted that 
the Soviet textbooks were destroyed previously and new ones were not 
produced. 
To support necessary moods among the population of occupied territories, 
the occupational administration constantly published in newspapers information 
on the activity of agricultural workers, about good harvests which are received 
by the Ukrainian peasants in collective farms, about the creation of various 
organizations and circles which helped the Ukrainian peasants to increase the 
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cultural and professional level. In the “Volyn” newspaper of September 7, 1941, 
an article was printed. It covered activity of regional Land department of a 
district justice placed emphasis on labour productivity as fundamental principles 
of the welfare of the Ukrainian peasantry destroyed by Bolsheviks. It started the 
organization of “Rural Owner” community, in all areas (Волинь. Часопис для 
Волині 1941, 3). The regional department began an active promotion among 
the population of the Rivne region. From the first days of the activity there was 
published in the same newspaper that Ukraine was always the rich country and 
supported by the resources Europe. It was stated that Ukraine had everything to 
develop industry to be a separate and independent state. But the Bolshevist 
administration used the richness of Ukraine in their own interests. The collective 
farms created by Bolsheviks finally destroyed the Ukrainian village (Волинь. 
Часопис для Волині 1941, 3). 
Rather effectively occupying authority used policy of withdrawal of the 
Soviet troops in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In articles it was told how 
roughly Soviet power destroyed crops, the plants and factories, mines, 
destroyed water supply systems and roads when receding and for this reason, 
it is so difficult to restore everything and to adjust normal life (Салата, 2005, 
113–116). There were no difficulties for the German occupational 
administration to give this kind of information in newspapers for the local 
population. Actually, people saw what occurred during the withdrawal of 
Bolsheviks. In the “New Zaporizhia” newspaper No. 109, 1942 in article titled 
“Way to a Victory” the author wrote that Germans who had come to the 
Ukrainian land were struck with vandalism of Bolsheviks. The author focused 
the attention of readers that everything that was made and constructed by 
hands of peasants and workers. An iron, highways, bridges, crossings, the 
horse and motor transport, bakeries, bakeries, industrial and the enterprises 
were ruthlessly destroyed by Bolsheviks. The author called the Ukrainians to 
cooperate with the German administration and urged to undertake the 
recovery of the agricultural industry (Нове Запоріжжя 1942, 4). 
Unfortunately, many people witnessed such “activity” of the Soviet troops and 
therefore propaganda got positive. 
For strengthening of propaganda among the population practically in all 
territories of “Reykhskomissariat” of Ukraine and in a zone of military 
authorities public and educational societies known as “Prosvita” and the 
“Union of the Ukrainian Writers” were created. Since October 1941 there 
were published messages that in the cities and the regional centres earlier 
operating societies “Prosvita” would have been opened. Readers got 
acquainted with the main aim of those societies and a plan of their activities. 
But the main thing what it is necessary to pay attention is that all societies 
130 
were taken by occupational administration under the strict control and all 
activity completely either was regulated to a German administration or 
submitted to them. Actually occupational administration used society 
“Prosvita”, as well as other public and educational organizations, for the 
dissemination of necessary information and for influence on the Ukrainian 
population. Despite strict control from the occupying authorities, most of the 
figures of “Education” sought to awake national consciousness and help to 
survive under critical conditions. One of the first societies “Prosvita” began to 
act in Vinnica. In October 1941 local society was created. It was told that it 
was made for strengthening national consciousness of Ukrainian and for 
development of the members, to give them good knowledge, to help to assert 
the civil and national rights, to teach to spend substantially the time. Among 
tasks which society “Prosvita” set for itself there were such: 
 to open libraries, bookstores, reading; 
 organise public readings, lectures, reports, conversations; 
 to publish books, newspapers and leaflets for ordinary citizens; 
 to create schools for adults and children; 
 to open children’s communities; 
 to organize evenings, Christmas Eves. (Вінницькі вісті 1941, 2). 
The same society worked also in the territory of Kharkiv. In February 
1942 in the draft copy of the protocol of board of the Kharkiv society 
“Prosvita” we read about acceptance of citizens in the list of society members 
and about the estimate approval. It was also accepted the Charter and definite 
purposes and tasks for work among the population (Державний Архів 
Харківської області, 1–3). 
On January 3, 1942 the meeting of Council of “Prosvita” in Lyubomla was 
held. It accepted the resolution about new organizational forms and methods. 
During this period some sections began to work. They were of different 
directions as the cultural, educational, youth and female section. Besides it 
was made a decision to create “Public Court of Honour” which should be 
coordinated by a Chairman of “Prosvita” society (Волинь. Часопис для 
Волині, 1942, 3). 
The activity of “Prosvita” was completely regulated. Its activity 
demonstrated in administrational messages from local communities in Kyiv.  
It is noted that “Prosvita” bore responsibility for the local activity of societies 
and developing it only according to the directions which would be formed by 
the local administration. Without permission of occupational administration 
no one society could be created in the area. Unauthorized societies were 
considered to have been illegal organizations. Also, it was noted that  
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“the organizational scheme, as well as democratic methods and bases of 
societies “Prosvita” will be changed and adapted for modern requirements” 
(Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1942, 4). 
In Kyiv the theatre’s repertoire was developed in on the initiative of the 
“Prosvita” office. It included dances and songs, small representations 
(Волинь. Часопис для Волині 1942, 4). In Kyiv “Department of 
propaganda” the “Union of the Ukrainian Writers” was founded. At the 
disposal of Department there were all culture authorities of the city as the 
periodicals, cinemas, theatres and radio. Elena Teliga headed the “Union”. 
Boris Vinnitsky and Ivan Irlyavsky entered it also. The “Union” set the task to 
unite all Ukrainian writers and to direct their creative activity in favour of the 
Ukrainian national culture. Own publishing house “Kultura” was created,  
It prepared a series of literary and publicistic works. With the assistance of the 
“Union” for the third day after Hitler’s troops captured Kyiv, the diary 
“Ukrainian Word” began to appear. Since October 19, 1941 seemed to issue 
the literary supplement “Literatura I Iskusstvo” which was compound the 
“Ukrainskoye Slovo” magazine (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 4). 
O. Teliga made a lot for the activity of the Union and the edition of the 
“Ukrainskoye Slovo” newspaper. After the arrest of an edition of 
“Ukrainskoye Slovo” she did not take the resolution of the German power into 
account and continued to defend the position ignoreing instructions of 
Germans provocatively and essentially. 
Periodicals gave an opportunity to the population of occupied territories to 
monitor the activity of societies “Prosvita” and, at first sight, the picture 
developed very well: as if Ukrainians had an opportunity to realize all the 
talents and abilities to develop national culture and to realize the national idea. 
But actually, as it was already noted above, all activity of this organization 
was controlled tightly: printing editions which appeared were exposed to strict 
censorship, library stocks were formed according to requirements of the new 
government, performances and evenings were held on the specified subjects 
and contents, etc. 
The problems concerning a cultural life were brightly covered on pages of 
the occupational press. It can be explained with the fact that the occupying 
authority sought to gain trust among the local population, especially Ukrainian 
intellectuals which remained in occupied territories. 
Through the press, the occupational administration tried to influence also 
youth and its education. A set of newspapers devoted the pages to units for the 
education of younger generation Ukrainian. In the Volhynia territory the 
newspaper “Information service” began to publish. On its pages much 
attention was paid to the education of youth and questions of culture. In one of 
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the issues of this newspaper, it is told that the Ukrainian men and women who 
visited Germany and saw the high level of culture would try to be well-
mannered, cultural people if they wanedt to develop their. “It is necessary to 
send Ukrainian youth to Germany where it will be grown up in such 
conditions”. The author of article urged to send every Ukrainian to Germany 
where they would see the beauty of the “Reich” and get a knowledge and 
speciality which would be so necessary for the development of their own state 
(Державний архів Рівненської області, 5). 
In the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper activity of the Ukrainian National 
Student’s Union of the Vinnytsia (SUOS)” is propagandized and emphasized 
that “it is the only youth organization capable to deal with various problem 
tasks facing the nation and its youth during the war. The main objective of this 
organization is the education of the Ukrainian youth in the spirit of the fight 
for statehood against remnants of slave spirit among individuals” (Вінницькі 
вісті, 1941, 4). 
Newspapers printed not only articles but also propaganda pictures and 
video records which were prepared by the Ministry of National Education of 
Promotion. On the picturesque landscapes were shown the Ukrainians 
working in Germany. They were well dressed, smiling, happy, working with 
pleasure behind machines. It was shown how they had a rest after a day of 
work. Letters of the Ukrainian workers published from Germany with certain 
comments called for join them and other young people for the sake of the 
future of Ukraine (Гальчак, 2004, 57). 
Materials of the majority of newspapers about the good life of Ukrainian 
population under the German occupation were prepared in advance. 
Authorized representatives, travelling on “Reykhskomissariat” took pictures 
of the best corners of the Ukrainian nature, indicative work of peasants and all 
this placed in Nazi newspapers in Germany in newspapers which were issued 
in the occupied territory. These pictures had to convince the population of 
Germany and Ukrainian that the Hitler’s power really brought on the 
Ukrainian lands freedom and welfare (Центральний державний архів 
вищих органів влади та управління України, 40). 
Exposing people in the USSR became a widespread subject in the local 
periodical press. In the “Podilya” newspaper which appeared in Kamyanets-
Podilsky it was published the feuilleton “About Ivan Ivanov”, articles “Soviet 
Paradise”, “Picture of Streets from Moscow” where in comic style there was 
told about the life of the population of the Soviet Union. 
The message was published in the same newspaper in which the Ukrainian 
committee of Kamyanets-Podilsky urged to offer money for the families of 
scientists who were killed or deported by the Soviet government 
133 
(Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління 
України, 11–12). 
One of the departments of East Occupied Territories was engaged in the 
production of pictures about the life workers and peasants in Germany. They 
intended for use in the German periodicals for the population of Germany and 
also in the newspapers issued in Russian for residents of temporarily occupied 
areas of the USSR. Among them there were pictures of the working industrial 
enterprises standing at machines and showing products which they made and 
the peasants who were working with pleasure at the wheat field and spending 
leisure-time: reading books, playing soccer, celebrating birthdays among the 
friends, etc. (Державний Російський воєнний архів, 7–24). 
Actually, it was not so easy for the Ukrainians to work in Germany. 
Everything depended on two important factors: places and the owner. From 
testimonies of the Reich Minister of Arms and Ammunition A. Speer we can 
study how they forcibly transported workers from all occupied countries and 
distributed on the enterprises and in what awful conditions they had to work. 
Those who violated working conditions were sent to concentration camps 
(Допрос подсудимого Шпеера 1946). In the resident’s memoirs of the 
Vinogradnoye village (Murovanokurilovetsky Region, Vinnytsia region) who 
were taken out for work to Germany shown that conditions of accommodation 
were extremely heavy and inhuman. The camp where they lived was enclosed 
with a four meter fence connected to the power supply network so that 
workers did not run away. The people were fed very badly moreover and 
constantly beaten. Fascist security guards noticed: “You are not people you 
are cattle. Faster you will die, better would be for you and for us”. 
Also workers from Ukraine were dying daily. They were dumped in a hole 
which was often forgotten even to be estimated (Державний архів 
Вінницької області, 7). 
The same memoirs of the Nemirovsky Region of Vinnytsia region told 
that they “lived in Stuttgart, in the barrack where placed 12 people because 
none of the owners hired them”. There stayed for 6 months. Food was very 
poor: in the morning – the 2nd swede and 1 cup of tea, in the afternoon – 
bread “brick” for 10 people. Children who constantly were ill had been visited 
by the doctor and after sent back home” (Державний архів Вінницької 
області, 724). 
During the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the recruiting campaign 
still was somehow conducted. But already at the beginning of 1942 it was 
almost impossible to send voluntarily from youth or mature age to Germany. 
Therefore newspaper became one of the most important form of propaganda 
towards departure for work to this country. 
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Caricatures became a very effective instrument of dissemination of 
necessary information. 
In T. Lawson and D. Gerrod’s Dictionary reference it is one of media 
images which reproduced culture and society through mass media and led to 
the creation of stereotypes (Лисенко, 1998, 218). It was a genre of the fine 
arts of the main form of graphic satire. It had an accurate social and critical or 
political orientation. 
By the beginning of World War II, there were already two types of 
political caricatures: caricatures of active perception and caricature of passive 
perception. The caricatures of active perception provided a rich imagination of 
the prepared reader and saving freedom of interpretation to it through 
depersonification of heroes. But the population of occupied territories had 
been in special conditions. Firstly, under pressure of Bolshevist and then the 
Hitler’s information attack. The German occupational administration used 
caricatures of passive perception which did not demand a special reflection 
over the image. There was no opportunity to interpret a caricature in own way 
because it was followed by a determined inscription. It imposed others 
opinion in advance. The caricature took the important place not only in 
newspapers but also in leaflets, brochures (Стернин, 1970, 428). 
As it was already noted above, caricatures often placed on pages of the 
regional newspapers “Svobodna Ukrainf”, “Volyn”, “Golos Volyni”, “Gazeta 
Horlivka”, “Donetsky vestnik” and others. So, for example, in the 
“Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper for 1941–1942 almost in each issue there was 
a political caricature of Stalin and his administration. In newspaper No. 43 of 
May 31, 1942, a political caricature, on Stalin and Churchill who in a team 
carry Roosevelt and under the image there was the text “Step by step. The 
“lord of a lie2 Churchill to Stalin’s father: 2My dear Stalin, a year ago I sat on 
goats and invited you to sit down2 (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 3). Authors of a 
caricature tried to distort the relations between three Presidents and to show to 
the population of occupied territories that these three leaders who made 
among themselves the agreement did not worth attention. 
In September 1942 amount of caricatures increased. On the pages of 
occupational newspapers one more interesting caricature was placed with 
headline Liars at the microphone. It represented three Presidents at the 
microphone with the text “U.S. President Roosevelt: “Our purpose is a 
freedom”. Britain Prime Minister Churchill: “... and everlasting peace!”. 
Father Stalin: “... and the Soviet paradise” (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 2). 
In October 1943 the army of Wehrmacht was forced to conduct defensive 
actions and to recede on the West. It tried to take away industrial and 
agricultural property from Ukraine and to take out people. The caricatures 
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published in newspapers seemed to have been of other character. 
They showed attractive to Bolsheviks Ukraine “which was being saved by the 
German army” (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1943, 2). 
Really caricatures impacted on the population of occupied territories and 
made everyone Ukrainian be in a state of a big impression. They forced to 
think over the situation which developed at that time. Often, to share an 
impression, the Ukrainian citizens paid t attention to this or that caricature, 
again and again, discussing it, giving it new sense. 
The periodical press was an effective remedy of propaganda. But even the 
Hitler’s administration which used huge material resources to print and to 
extend the circulation of occupational newspapers, could not capture all 
population of occupied territories of the USSR. Not often periodical press got 
to the Ukrainian villages. Therefore the local administration was forced to 
organize conversations about the situation on fronts and a new land reform 
and many other questions. About these problems we learn from the 
Information message of the German Retaliatory Divisions No. 48. The 
message was dealt with an economic and a political situation in temporarily 
occupied territories in April-May, 1943. The document demanded that the 
periodic press and book should observe among the local population and 
arouse the interest to daily news especially from the occupied territories. 
Providing with the press was very bad because of the delivery problems. 
In this regard, the administration decided to start regular speeches of local 
commissioners and heads who carried out political informing (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 7). 
From the message of the German Retaliatory Divisions No. 32, we have 
got and analysed information how Zhytomyr commissariat had compensated a 
small number of newspapers because the local population wished to get news 
and read those newspapers with a great interest. The Commissariat offered 
that “broadcasting should be about the latest news only in Ukrainian at least in 
market days. It was even made the map of a warlike situation tagged with 
fights of the fascist army” (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, 21). 
Except for periodicals on Reykhskomissariat’s territory various literature 
delivered for the population. Books from fascist Germany were distributed in 
the libraries which still remained in reading rooms opened in the cities for the 
purpose of dissemination of necessary information. Actually, they became the 
centres of propaganda. 
Thus, the German occupational administration set periodicals to the first 
place with the purpose to create information space. It applied various forms of 
propaganda by issuing newspapers and magazines in Ukrainian; showing 
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movie theatres; releasing evident propaganda in the form of posters and 
leaflets and also documentary exhibitions; through theatrical performances, 
broadcasts in Ukrainian, Russian and other languages. It was all modern 
methods of using the press in war conditions. 
The population of temporarily occupied territories of the USSR demanded 
news as the only opportunity to be guided in those difficult conditions. For 
this reason, the Hitler’s administration used the press as one of the effective 
tools applied not only on the mind but also on the consciousness of the 
population of temporarily occupied territories. The German occupying 
authority tried to use the information hunger reigning after the temporary 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops and to fill the information vacuum with own 
propaganda. For this purpose, almost in each area the city newspapers and 
magazines were issued. In the rural zone where newspapers extended, 
arranged limited special boards where they hung out separate releases with 
comments of local authorities. 
One of the components of information space in occupied territories were 
radio and film promotion propaganda. Radio, as well as periodicals, treated on 
the consciousness of the person and in the conditions of war – on troops and 
the population of the enemy. The analysis of properties of radio technologies 
which has been carried out by the famous Russian scientists V.L. Petrov, 
S.M. Sholokhov and A.V. Snegurovim demonstrates that radio was rather 
powerful information weapon. It was many-sided on the nature of the 
manifestation (Петров, Шолохо, Снегуров, 2001, 60–66). In 30–40th years 
of the 20th century radio and television were still insufficiently developed but 
their influence was powerful. 
Radio and television were considered to be more easy for perception by 
the person rather than printing promotion. It is important that it should 
perceive not only through judgment but also aurally and visually. For this 
reason as technological tools of information weapon they quickly strike 
consciousness of the person and destroy ways and forms of its identification 
on own societies. 
From the beginning of World War II of 1939 methods of radio propaganda 
and promotion were developed and improved. Then a radio favourably 
differed in the fact that it easily overcame borders of the states and worked 
instantly. Radio propaganda became the integral element of military tactics 
and the strategy of Nazi Germany where psychological processing of the 
population preceded before military operations. This technology was adopted 
by the majority of the European countries as opponents of Germany. So, Great 
Britain, having conceded in war ought to at once organize broadcastings 
abroad in German. Also it was done by the United States of America. There 
137 
were different types of radio stations and types of propaganda corresponding 
to them. Among them “white” radio propaganda stations were officially 
registered. They transferred the authentic but thinly picked up for the solution 
of specific objectives information. Another type known as “grey”, as a rule, it 
was official station which used as the checked, reliable, and unchecked, 
unreliable information: rumours, conjectures, etc. As far as “black” 
underground stations they transferred frankly false information misinforming 
the population, committed information diversions. Often “black” stations were 
conducted by means of the transmitters installed on cars which moved along 
the border of the state to which it is sent “black” broadcastings or along the 
front line. Quite often the ships which plied in neutral waters acted as carriers 
of transmitters of “black” radio stations. Both “white” and “grey”, and “black” 
were used by the conflicting countries (Шариков, 2008, 514). 
Thus, already today we have to understand that radio and television as 
information weapon became an important factor in the war of Hitler’s 
Germany against Britain, France, the USA and against the Soviet Union 
during 1941–1944. 
Seeking to capture as it is a possible large audience, the fascism adopted 
the new, still a little developed communicative technology as radio. Thanks to 
new technology, dissemination of information, activity covered broad masses 
of the population that the most important, at the same time kept the most 
effective method of communication as an oral speech. Loudspeakers were 
installed at restaurants, at the plants, in public places (Jowett G., O’Donell, 
1992, 187). 
Germany had experience of maintaining radio war at the sea even during 
World War I. It rather effectively influenced the fleet and troops of enemies. 
Thus during an initial stage of war Nazi Germany fixed big advantages over 
the enemies. Not only radio as military technology but also radio and 
television as public communications actively were developed in the interwar 
period in Germany. Broadcastings occurred not only within Germany but also 
for the European community in what the German radio had already certain 
experience. 
Since 1929 in Vusterkhauzen, near Berlin, “German Wave” which 
problem was preparation of broadcast for the Germans living outside 
Germany began to broadcast the transmissions. After the fascist revolution in 
1933, this activity assumed an extremely wide. During the same period the 
government institution known as “The German broadcasting society” was 
created with Department of Foreign Countries Broadcasting”. At the disposal 
of Hitler and Ministry of National Education and Propaganda headed by 
Joseph Goebbels there was one of the most modern radio station in the world. 
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From Konigsberg it was possible to conduct broadcasts to Poland and from 
Hamburg and Bremen to Great Britain, from Stuttgart, Frankfurt – am-Main 
and Saarbruecken to France and other European countries (Энциклопедия 
третьего рейха, 1996, 387). 
Opened in April 1933 transferring of broadcast radio to North America 
where at that time there was rather powerful German diaspora which had 
about 10 million People (Международный интернет-журнал “Русский 
глобус”, 2004) became one of the most powerful activities of the German 
radio. 
During the period from 1933 to 1939 German broadcastings extended to 
Africa, Latin America, East and Southern Asia, Central America, Brazil and 
the Arab world. By the beginning of World War II Nazis conducted broadcast 
round the clock for 8 regions in seven languages. Their average daily volume 
was equal to 75 hours (Радиожурналистика, 2000). 
Extending broadcastings to foreign countries fascist promotion sought to 
reach such popularity which would allow it to compete with mass media of 
these countries and broadcasts of foreign states. Almost all programs of Nazi 
promotion were focused first of all on consolidation of ethnic Germans 
abroad. The significant role was played by broadcast which propagandized the 
greatest mission of Germany. 
Having secured European radio space, the propaganda headquarters of 
Hitler began the real radio war in Europe. As one of striking examples 
aggression against Austria could show that fact. Motivating ethnic unity 
between the German and Austrian people existing for a long historical period 
the Austrian earth was considered to be a part of the German living space. The 
Nazi leadership of Germany began an active radio propaganda against the 
government of Austria. It was ended by the entrance of the German troops on 
its territory. The powerful propaganda campaign was conducted as well 
against Czechoslovakia. The propaganda directed against the Slavic people 
was the main maintenance and the direction of these broadcasts. 
Poland became the following subject of Nazi political propaganda. The 
information war against this country began in January 1939. The Polish 
government was accused that it threatened Germany and rendered pressure on 
German ethnic minority. Exactly here the radio also played an important role. 
On September 1 Nazi radio distributed the false version about an invasion of 
Poles to the German territory having declared aspiration of the German 
government to the peaceful resolution of the German-Polish conflict 
(Радиожурналистика, 2000). 
Such activity of the fascist government of Germany demonstrates that 
carrying out provocations, shifting responsibility for the aggression to other 
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countries. That’s no doubt that radio propaganda promotion played a very 
important role and became the effective tool of Nazi policy. 
Information weapon of broadcasting became not less powerful also in the 
territory of Germany. It was one of the main mechanisms of the formation of 
information space of the “Third Reich”. 
A special attention in the broadcasting of the 30th years was paid to the 
organization of the audience. Nazis organized the all-German campaign under 
the slogan “Each Citizen of the Country – the Radio Listener”. The active 
work on collective listening to radio programs in public places and at the 
enterprises was conducted. Drastic measures were taken to save Germans 
from foreign broadcasting. For this purpose since 1933 new types of receivers 
for collective listening were begun to release “the national receiver” and “the 
receiver of the German popular front”. Those devices did not allow to accept 
foreign stations. The receiver intended for mass listening was known to appea 
for the first time that year in Germany under the name “Kamerad”. It could 
serve the audience up to 500 people. Special short-wave receivers were 
released only by two firms called “Telefunken” and “AEG”. They intended as 
it was specified in the advertising price list “for the Germans who are located 
abroad” (Радиовещание в Третьем Рейхе, 2009). 
Right after coming to power the Nazi leadership, as well as all other mass 
media placed radio to themselves at service. According to the decree of 
September 22, 1933, the “Imperial Chamber of Culture” was created. It was 
under control of the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda.  
It consisted of seven departments such as press, broadcasting, 
cinematography, theatre, literature, music and fine arts. Membership in one of 
those chambers was obligatory for each creative specialist of Germany.  
Any creative activity without the existence of the relevant member documents 
was punished by the Nazi authorities, up to imprisonment. 
Radio and cinemas, as well as the press, quickly became the major tools 
and levers on the population having placed at service to the state. Goebbels 
considered radio and later television as the main tools of propaganda in the 
modern society. Through the Department of Radio of the Ministry of National 
Education and Propaganda and through the Chamber of Broadcasting it was 
established a complete control forming such contents of the program on the 
radio. It helped with the achievement of the Nazi purposes to adapt their 
contents for the ordinary listener. 
It should be mentioned that the task was solved successfully due to the fact 
that the state had a monopoly on broadcastingwas as in Germany so in other 
of Europe. In 1933 Nazi government became the owner of broadcasting 
corporation of the Reich (Ширер, 1991, 279–280). 
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The cinema remained in the hands of private companies but the Ministry 
of National Education and Propaganda and Chamber of Cinema controlled all 
aspects of film production. They set the task to remove the film industry from 
the sphere of liberal and economic ideas and to allow it to carry out the tasks 
assigned to it by the National Socialist Party and the Nazi government. In the 
middle of 1936 cinema was subordinated to the Ministry of National 
Education and Propaganda of Germany. The film industry completely passed 
under control of the state and began to be financed by the National-Socialist 
government (Ширер, 1991, 281–282). In both cases the identical result was 
achieved. As a result an empty radio programs and movies were offered the 
German people. 
Hitler turned well-developed mass media as the instrument of propaganda. 
From all media which influenced masses, Hitler preferred radio. By means of 
broadcasting, the Nazi government carried out reorganization in the 
consciousness of many Germans. For quite a short term Nazis turned the most 
part of the population into the followers. 
Character and extreme effectiveness of Nazi propaganda at that time was 
the fact that Goebbels before others analysed possibilities of scientific and 
technical progress in the field of media and communication, including 
propaganda opportunities of radio. In Germany of the 20–30th years of 
65 000 000 population, 26 000 000 listened to the radio. In the country, 
despite the crisis, there was one of the world’s best networks of radio stations: 
10 main transmitters and 15 auxiliaries. Radio conveyed information 
including propaganda of NSDAP. In all corners of the country and, thanks to 
low cost and availability, it was much more effective even than the press.  
It was only necessary to provide penetration on radio. Disinformation of the 
population seemed to give automatically. It existed on a national socialist 
information background receiving an ideological interpretation of any events 
necessary to the National Socialist Party which took place in Germany and in 
the world. After 1933 the Minister of Promotion of the “Third Reich” 
Goebbels recognized the force of the radio: “Our descendants will be forced 
to note that the radio as means of spiritual impact on masses was the same 
value presently, as to the Reformation the invention of the press. It is possible, 
without being afraid of an exaggeration, to tell that if there was no radio and 
planes, then the German revolution could not take place in such form as it 
came” (Киевский телеграф, 2005). 
With coming to power of the National Socialist Party the control of work 
of the German radio stations was entrusted to Y. Goebbels. 
In March 1933 Goebbels transferred national broadcasting from under 
guardianship of the “Head Post Department” to submission of the Ministry of 
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National Education and Propaganda. Work of the German radio stations was 
rather carefully controlled personally by Goebbels. At the head of Imperial 
radio chamber which was a part of the Ministry of National Education and 
Propaganda as administration, he appointed Euzhen Hadamovsky who got 
down to business transformations of radio to the effective instrument of Nazi 
propaganda not only in Germany and Europe but also in occupied territories. 
One more public authority directly was engaged in broadcasting in East 
occupied territories. It was a Ministry of East Occupied Territories. Within the 
directions of the activity departments were engaged in propaganda activity 
and creation of broadcast for the East which were broadcast through Radio 
named “Vostok Radio” station. The staff of departments formed short reports, 
comments, debates, etc. (Державний Російський воєнний архів, 1). 
Listening to foreign radio in the territory of Germany without the 
permission of the Information Bureau of Germany was strictly forbidden. 
Information bureau controlled this process and gave permissions to the 
listening of foreign broadcast to individuals (Державний Російський 
воєнний архів, 27–35). The ministry of East occupied territories prescribed 
punishment for listening to foreign broadcasts without special permission. To 
avoid mistakes and to strengthen control of propaganda by the department it 
was made the list of persons and firms which already got such permissions 
(Державний Російський воєнний архів,17–23, 48–54). 
Under the leadership of Goebbels broadcasting in Nazi Germany was 
controlled and extended three divisions: leadership of the Nazi party, Ministry 
of National Education and Propaganda and Department of Culture of the 
“Reich”. 26 radio stations represented institute of the all-German broadcasting 
known as “Big German radio”. Political programs and speeches of the 
“Fuhrer” went synchronously on all stations (Энциклопедия третьего рейха, 
1996, 388). 
Providing broadcast the Ministry at the beginning of World War II the 
Ministry of National Education and Propaganda developed the project of 
creation of a transmitting centre which power would reach 1000 kW. But in 
connection with the shortage of financing and rather a capacious process of 
production those plans were not carried out. But at the beginning of war 
6 long-wave and 10 mediumwave motorized stations of the facilitated type on 
20 kW were created (Жолквер-Краснопольской). These stations were rather 
mobile, They were easy to be thrown by rail in occupied territories or to areas 
of the front. The fact that they could be dismantled quickly was positive. 
It was possible to collect for 2:00. Such mobile radio stations were used in the 
occupied territory of Ukraine. 
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With the attack of Germany on the USSR, the German radio cardinally 
changed into the military direction of the work. From now on the main place 
by air a block of political and military programs was taken Since 1940 the 
Soldier’s Voice broadcast began to leave. It was created a special information 
and political program about war events on fronts which were called 
“Spot news”. There was one more program later. It is called as “The Message 
from the Front”. Broadcast of its messages went straight in the air from planes 
when the cities of Britain were bombed from the advanced parts of the 
German troops entered on the territory of other countries. 
Having entered on the territory of the USSR, troops of “Wehrmacht” 
understood that radio propaganda at this stage was almost impossible as the 
Soviet power confiscated all radio receiver devices from the population. The 
German newspaper titled “Nakhtausgabe” of March 11, 1942, in the article 
headlined “Low Level of the Soviet Radio” noted that in the Soviet Union 
radio had been a very poorly developed. There were only 350000 radio sets on 
170 million population (Державний Російський воєнний архів, фонд, 34). 
The leadership of Hitler’s Germany had to create a new network of 
powerful broadcasting centres and to adjust broadcastings in occupied 
territories. It was created the Ukraine radio group whose main transmitter was 
in Vinnytsia. By November 1941 in Ukraine there were 7 radio stations. 
Subsequently the number of radio stations increased to 15. 
Thus, practically in each settlement radio transmitters which informed the 
local population on the current events and new directives were located. 
(Окороков, 2007, 44). 
The advisor of the East department of the Ministry of National Education 
and Propaganda doctor Taubert in the report noted that in occupied territories it 
was necessary to create a radio network with the centre in Berlin. For its 
effective work he proposed it was necessary to unite the work of a staff of radio 
and heads of the group. “To recruit whenever possible such employees from 
among local population was to involve them in cooperation” (Федеральний 
архів Німеччини, 55). This report proved the fact that that the majority of 
broadcast which East department of the Ministry of national education and 
propaganda sent to the East was generally aimed to the German soldiers and the 
population of the occupied eastern territories. Broadcast for the population was 
being conducted in the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, Latvian and 
Estonian languages. The majority of messages arrived directly from Berlin. 
It was caused by the need of fast transfer of various information as orders, 
directives, resolutions and urgent messages for coordination of control of the 
population at the occupied eastern territories and implementation of necessary 
actions (Федеральний архів Німеччини, 56). 
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Propagating the political goals and military aspiration among the 
population of occupied territories of the USSR the German occupying 
authority paid much attention to broadcasting as means of dissemination and 
the instrument of control. At the beginning of 1942 the Supreme Command of 
the fascist army sent the special operation manual of radio under title  
“The Organization of Hearing of Broadcasts in the Occupied East Areas” to 
troops of Wehrmacht. In it it was noted that the German troops which had 
involved in the military operations in the East and also the occupied areas 
which were in the rear had to understand how important for further warfare 
would have been the coverage of all population with political propaganda.  
It was noted including the fact that all technical equipment which was in 
military units at that time and was not used for the duty purposes could have 
to be used for propaganda (Юденков, 1971, 71). 
At the Ministry of East Occupied Territories the sections which were 
responsible for propaganda were created. They were carried out in various 
directions. Among them there was the “Department of Group 18th” which was 
responsible for work of cinema and radio in occupied territories of the USSR. 
Among its main objectives of the Department, there was a submission to the 
interests of Hitler’s Germany of cinema and radio for eastward propaganda. 
Demonstration of week reviews, display of short films, propaganda, 
educational and documentaries was planned. Through a radio network 
planned to broadcast news, reports, temporary events and other broadcast. 
Also, musical funds of propaganda were raised. To powers of this department 
control and supervision of cinema, radio, theatres, etc. (Державний 
Російський воєнний архів, 39). 
The similar department of “Group 18” of the same Ministry which 
directed by doctor Goyenstein had a political focus. Its functions were the 
regulation of radio and cinema to the political course, the organization of 
programs of special maintenance, control of secret radio stations, care of the 
equipment and control and the management on the central society of cinema 
of the East (Державний Російський воєнний архів, 42). 
All materials which arrived on radio had to be transferred to 
“Reykhskomissariat’s territory” and other territories occupied by the German 
army. Underwent political processing in the Department of Propaganda of the 
Ministry of East Occupied territories (Державний Російський воєнний 
архів, 12). broadcasting of “Radio East”, in particular for “Reykhskomissariat 
of Ukraine”, was prepared in two language Russian and Ukrainian.Daily 14 
Russian, 14 Ukrainian broadcast came out. They consisted of news, short 
reports, comments and pieces of music (Державний Російський воєнний 
архів, 2). 
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From the correspondence of the Ministry of National Education and 
Propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany it was studied 
which attention was paid by the Hitler’s administration on the radio as to one 
of the main instruments of formation of information space. Both branches of 
power were also involved in forming up programs for occupied territories of 
the Soviet Union. Together with the Ministry of East Occupied Territories 
they developed the programs directed to discredit of the Soviet government 
and military authorities of the USSR, for obtaining favour of local population 
(Державний Російський воєнний архів, 90, 15–27). 
Already during the Great Patriotic War technological achievements of 
broadcasting were used not only the Nazi but also Britain, the USA and the 
USSR. A famous American intelligence agent P. Laynbardzher who 
investigated features of the psychological war came to the conclusion that the 
German radio propaganda had been carried out by means of specially 
developed receptions and methods. Among them he called the following: 
official reports in which favourable news obtained in details and 
unfavourable. They were the next to have worked as methods: superficial; 
repetition of official reports of the opponent with a definite propaganda 
purpose to undermine belief in success of the opponent; sensational broadcast 
in which the attention focuses on one important subject or an event; transfer of 
absolutely counterfeited materials, that is fictional what listeners can 
understand not at once; transfer of official programs or with reference to 
fictional sources and also such broadcast based on information source which 
is secretly controlled by Germany, etc. (Волковский, 2003). 
In instructions on propaganda application according to the plan Barbarossa 
it was noted that loudspeakers should be used not only to impact on the 
military of “Wehrmacht” but also for the population of occupied territories 
(Волковский, 2003). 
To influence the population of occupied territories with more force, the 
Hitler’s government created the system of “black” radio stations. In 1942 one 
of such radio stations sounded for the population of occupied territories of the 
USSR on behalf of “Old Lenin Guard” (Орлов, 1985, 133, 134). 
With the arrival of the fascist army on the territory of Ukraine all radio 
receivers were confiscated from local population. And though how many the 
administration of occupied territories did not speak about freedom of the 
social and political relations in occupied territories, the fact that it was 
forbidden to have radio receivers and furthermore to listen broadcasts of other 
countries, especially Soviet radio stations, testified to true their intentions 
concerning to the Ukrainian people. A luminescence of such policy was the 
case occurred on January 17, 1942. The sentence of the Velikooleksandrivsky 
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commissioner in which Alexander Sosnovsky who listened to Soviet 
broadcasts on the radio receiver designed independently (Немецко-
фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.), 1965, 75). It was also 
forbidden to read and distribute information from the Soviet newspapers, 
through guerrillas fell into hands of the local population. 
Radio programming schedule of the German radio stations prepared for 
the population of occupied territories was standard. So, for example, if to 
consider the program of a radio station of “Vinnytsia” for a week from 
October 5 to October 10, 1941, we can see that actually overview of events 
being happened in “Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine” took place in the same 
time. The messages were transferred in German but music, poetry and prose 
were more prime time. Broadcast continued from 12 o’clock and till 
14 o’clock. Music programs alternated with short news and messages of local 
occupational administration. In separate days there were economic messages 
in German and the sowing calendar generally for ethnic Germans. From 
16 o’clock and till late on radio evening there was classical music.  
The Ukrainian poetry and prose, the Ukrainian songs were sounded. 
Periodically changing short news were broadcast in Ukrainian and German 
languages and survey of the press in German. On the weekend for local 
population music programs where it was possible to hear the Ukrainian 
chorus, symphonic orchestra and brass bands, arias of the Ukrainian operas 
were broadcast too (Ведєнєєв 2003, 4). Thus, the German occupational 
administration minimized informing the local population. For Ukrainian there 
was information on achievements of the German army on fronts and the 
orders of local administration and music programs. 
From the first days of occupation the German military authorities 
organized continuous or incidental broadcastings in the cities and settlements. 
For example, the “Vinnytsia Broadcasting Centre” had began to broadcast 
since August 5, 1941. The first day of the work it was began with the German 
march from 4 loudspeakers equipped on the Ukrainian avenue having notified 
the population of the city. The majority of broadcasting centres of Vinnytsia 
region, as well as in other areas of Ukraine, was destroyed during withdrawal 
of the Soviet Army. In a year 161.65 km of a radio network was repaired.  
It was included 3.095 receivers. 809 loudspeakers were repaired, 
1087 damages of a radio network were (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3). 
With the arrival of the fascist army and introduction of the occupational 
mode in Kyiv the so-called “Sector of Information” was created. The main 
task of that branch of informational power was to “Sectors...” collect data in 
the field of public opinion of the city. That authority collected an information 
about the response of people to actions of the power and the illumination of 
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news about work of city institutions. It was important that administration of 
the “Sector of Information” should be informed about people and their life, 
structure of authorities, etc. The realization of these tasks was enabled through 
the press, radio, exhibitions, during the visit by locals of theatres and also 
through the “Ukrainskye Slovo” newspaper later “Nove Ukrainskye Slovo” 
(Державний архів Київської області, 2). 
It’s proved by documents that the most part of work in that direction fell 
just on the radio. Nearly every day on the radio letters of citizens were read 
and given answers on them. There were transmitted messages about meetings 
of citizens through loudspeakers if it needed to be carried out urgently, etc. 
As a part of offensive troops of Germany near Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk in the 
fall of 1941 two central radio stations for East countries were created. They served 
as so-called repeaters of transfer and dissemination of information from Berlin 
across all territory of “Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine2 and zones of military 
authorities. Under their direct control began the activity of mobile broadcasting 
stations (Федеральний архів Німеччини, 56). 
Since December 1941 from Kyiv “The central Radio Station of Ukraine” 
began to work. Further amount of fascist radio stations seened to be in the 
territory of “Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine”. Their number was 16. During 
1941–1942 the fascist occupational administration actively created a network 
of broadcasting in all territory of “Reykhskomissariat”. They were controlled 
by occupational administration and troops of “Wehrmacht”. Since January 
1943 when the position of the Hitler’s army on fronts against the Soviet Army 
reeled, the occupational administration began to create the cable agencies and 
stations of broadcasting together with local government showing the loyalty to 
locals. In this regard “Society of Information for Ukraine” was founded.  
It was located in Rivne but conducted broadcastings spread almost to all 
territory of “Reykhskomissariat” (Коваль, 1988, 157). 
In many regional cities there were created Ukrainian Administrative 
broadcastings. So in Kyiv, such administration was created in December 
1941. It had to broadcast in Ukrainian anti-Comintern and anti-Bolshevist 
propaganda. Its tasks also included propaganda of the ideas of New Europe 
and the leading role of the German people in the creation of a new system and 
partnership of the Ukrainian people in this work. The obligation to organize 
educational, literary, music and other programs contributed the cultural 
development of the population and its rest on the radio were assigned to an 
administration. Besides, Ukrainian administrative broadcastings had to submit 
the message of the Supreme Command of Germany and allied armies. These 
were the main announcements of the government of Kyiv relaying of a 
programme of the German stations, reviews of the press, articles of national 
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and educational contents, broadcast of God’s service, broadcast of 
performances, concerts of classical and modern western and Ukrainian music, 
Ukrainian national songs, literacy programs, etc. (Державний архів 
Київської області, 3). 
It should be noted that the religious policy of Nazis in the occupied 
territory during an initial stage of the war was rather loyal. It was caused by 
the need of positive influence on the population. Giving certain opportunities 
for the activity of Orthodox church the Hitler’s leadership sought for 
reduction of oppositional moods among the Ukrainian population. Such 
“religious freedom” promoted the revival of the Orthodox church life. So, the 
Orthodox church in “Reykhskomissariat of Ukraine” and in a zone of military 
authorities was used as a lever on the population for the purpose of carrying 
out a more effective occupational policy of the Reich (Гордієнко, 1998, 107). 
In early 1942 an active recruiting campaign of Ukrainian workers began in 
Germany. In Kharkiv the recruitment of workers began in December 1941. 
Even with the active propaganda and agitation those who wanted to go to 
Germany became less and less. In this regard the occupation authorities of the 
Kharkiv region and the Kharkiv city administration began to increasingly use 
radio and speakers to appeal to young people and middle-aged people to work 
in Germany (Скоробагатов, 2004, 113). 
From the report of the former professor of history of church at theological 
faculty of the Konigsberg University Hans Koch who well knew Russian and 
also Ukrainian languages, character of East Slavs and during World War II 
was the officer of the German intelligence we know and can do conclusion 
that the Hitler’s government considered radio as the most influential media. 
But as it was stressed above in the villages and the towns of Ukraine there 
were catastrophically not enough receivers. If in the cities it was carried out a 
radio communication, in villages the occupying authorities could install only 
loudspeakers. Thus, most of the population lived in villages propaganda in the 
rural zone had a smaller effect in comparison with rural population. By the 
beginning of September 1942 in the Ukrainian regional cities the leading role 
of radio was adjusted. There were 2000 loudspeakers for 200000 people. 
It was not enough. The posters were a less effective remedy than 
broadcastings. Due to the shortage of loudspeakers of local administration it 
was offered to apply photomontages which somehow would have shown new 
war events, pictures of working Ukrainians in the “Reich” and a trip of the 
Ukrainian workers and peasants across Germany (Центральний державний 
архів громадських об’єднань України, 9). 
In Kirovohrad the leading radio had with 35000 loudspeakers. 
It transferred messages and music from Kyiv and from “Gustav” radio station 
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of Dnipropetrovsk. The city commissioner who was engaged in work of radio 
was responsible for the work of radio and content of broadcast (Центральний 
державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 11–12). 
In September 1943 when fascist troops conducted defensive actions under 
the pressure of the Red Army radio among rural workers became more active. 
So, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, the occupying authority explained to the 
Ukrainian peasants that the German army would return soon and therefore the 
Ukrainian did not need to be supported Bolsheviks who would bring on the 
Ukrainian land a grief and tears (Поліщук, 1998, 19). 
Oral broadcasting was widely used together with printing propaganda. 
The texts of programs of oral broadcasting were, as a rule, simple according to 
contents and short. They repeatedly transmitted them through loudspeakers as 
announcers used captured Red Army men and also often girls from the local 
population (according to the German experts in the field of the psychological 
war, female voices better perceived by soldiers). 
In radio propaganda promotion, except trophy Soviet long-wave stations, 
mobile radio stations of “Wehrmacht” were used. They carried out 
broadcasting in German for the troops and on the population of occupied 
territories. Especially Ukraine population happened historically to be 
experienced powerful radio brainwash. 
Often various forms of propaganda were used at the same time and in a 
complex. Most often it was a combination of printing production and oral 
broadcasting through loud-speaking installations. 
Generally broadcastings played an extremely important role in Hitler’s 
informational propaganda. to sum it up we can conclude that despite a large 
number of loudspeakers and a wide network of fascist radio the majority of 
villages remained out of the German information space. In the rural zone and 
small towns, there was practically no press. There was one loudspeaker on all 
settlement. But the message of guerrilla connections got into the most remote 
corners of occupied territories. It very much disturbed occupational 
administration and forced it to apply certain measures. 
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SECTION 3.2. 
PROPAGANDA FILMS AND THEATERS DURING  
THE WAR YEARS: THEIR TOPICS, GOALS,  
TASKS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
Cinematography was an integral part and means of forming the 
information space in the occupied territories. 
Cinematography as a means of propaganda can make an extremely high 
emotional impact. It actively generates an illusory picture of the world in an 
idealized form in the imagination of viewers. In accordance with the author’s 
conception, the film may arbitrarily create in the viewer a sense of “justice” 
and moral rightness of a particular character, regardless of its true role in 
history. At the same time, a propaganda impact on a person is hidden on an 
emotional level, beyond his/her conscious control. 
Any rational counterarguments do not work in this case. For example, at a 
rational level, we all well understand who Adolf Hitler was and what he did. 
However, using the game of talented actors and special dramatic techniques, 
the film director may well create and demonstrate everything so that the 
sympathy of the audience will clearly be on the side of the Führer. His terrible 
crimes may not seem like a crime, but rather a noble cause – because the 
victims themselves will look like villains who deserve to be destroyed. 
Cinematic art is an important and powerful tool, which was not ignored by 
any of the belligerents – neither Germany nor the USSR. In the 20–30’s of the 
twentieth century German cinematography has gained world recognition due 
to the identity and talent of German actors and directors. But since the first 
years of the National Socialist Party’s coming to power in Germany, cinema 
has become a part of the “Gleichschaltung” program – the conquest of all 
German spheres of life by Nazi ideology. Even then, J. Goebbels, who was 
appointed as a Minister of Public Education and Propaganda, was entrusted 
with the control of cinematography at all stages – from production and 
“racially alien elements” to rental and creative process openly declared: 
“I want to use cinema as an instrument of propaganda” (Энциклопедия 
третьего рейха, 1996, 256). 
Imperial Chamber of Cinematography was created for the development 
and control of cinema. It supervised the film industry of the Third Reich, and 
membership in it was a must for creative film production workers. It existed 
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organizationally as a sub-chamber of the Imperial Chamber of Culture. 
In 1937 J. Goebbels established control over the last independent film 
company in Germany – the UFA film studio. From that moment, all funding 
for film production was concentrated in the hands of the Nazi authorities. 
J. Goebbels was especially proud for the opportunities of the German cinema. 
He wanted every newspaper and a book read by the people, each film and radio 
broadcast were permeated with the spirit of a great idea of victory, then, in his 
opinion, people would no longer be able to reflect on something else. Goebbels 
openly admitted that historical truth should not be objectively truthful. The only 
goal of the country’s leadership should be success. He proclaimed that 
Machiavelli proclaimed 500 years ago, namely: the sole purpose of propaganda 
was the artistic management of affairs (Родс, 2008, 18). 
The film for Goebbels has become a special tool of propaganda and a 
means to create the necessary information space. Both in Germany and on the 
territory occupied by the German-fascist army of countries, this new kind of 
art could reach a larger audience than literature and theater. In addition, 
cinema with its usual themes – intense interest, adventures, love, crimes, and 
murders – should be addressed to the poorest human intelligence. Thanks to 
the government’s stimulus the visiting of cinemas in Germany during ten 
years from 1933 to 1942 grew fourfold. One of the most important tasks of 
cinematography was the imposition of a certain way of thinking among young 
people (Родс, 2008, 19–21). 
Despite the fact that films were created by well-known filmmakers and 
producers, the creative level of new films was not always high. This is due to 
the fact that all films were subject to mandatory censorship for the Third 
Reich ideas. Thus, almost all of the films had propagandistic content. Between 
1933 and 1939, such well-known films as “The Fierce SS Fighter”, which 
glorified the exploits of the attack aircraft, films by Leni Riefenstahl 
“Triumph of the Will” and “Olympia”, which featured Olympic Games in 
Germany in 1936, series of anti-Semitic films “Rothschild in Waterloo”, 
“Jewish Zuss” and others (Родс, 2008, 257). 
The German authorities conducted massive reviews of such films. But, 
apart from the organized columns of assault rifles, which stepped to the 
cinemas, virtually nobody watched these films – the civilian population 
simply ignored them. 
In the early years of the Second World War, Nazi films praised the 
triumphant feats of the Wehrmacht soldier, in a caricatured form showing the 
opponent as weak, sneaky and timid. The German newsreel daily reported on 
the victories of the war fronts to the population of Germany and the 
inhabitants of the occupied territories. Since 1943 the content of most films 
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has begun to change. Then, due to every battle took place in difficult 
conditions for the Nazis, they gave false information to raise the fighting spirit 
of the army and the nation. 
Having convinced that film propaganda is an effective means of creating 
the necessary information space; the Nazi command began to actively work 
on the creation of films for the population of the occupied territories. These 
were predominantly films about the difficult life in the Soviet Union in the 
prewar period (about hunger, collectivization, repression, etc.), about a highly 
cultured life in Germany, how to work well for eastern workers at German 
enterprises, and more. 
In the structure of the Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories, a 
department of the 18th group was created which was responsible for the 
activities of cinematography in the occupied territories of the USSR. 
It provided the occupation administration with film production, which 
included weekly reviews, propaganda films, educational films, short films and 
documentaries that demonstrated the life in Germany (Державний 
Російський воєнний архів, 39). 
In many cities of occupied Ukraine, German fascist invaders opened 
cinema halls. German security and intelligence officials reported on their 
work to Berlin: “Film propaganda is much more convincing than leaflet and 
newspapers propaganda, it is affecting the Ukrainian population not only by 
word but also by moving pictures. Unfortunately, in most cases such films 
come only in the third grade and do not constitute a very high value in 
propagandistic terms. First of all, the chronicle, documentary films on the life 
of the Germans in Germany are of interest in, as well as some valuable 
German movie films, which, on the one hand, satisfy the desire of the 
population, and on the other, provide a broad opportunity to knock out the 
ground from under the feet of propaganda of the enemy” (Энциклопедия 
третьего рейха, 1996, 258). 
The first motion pictures, which served as propaganda, appeared in the 
occupied territory of Ukraine in the first days of occupation. These movie 
theaters about the “friend of Russian nation – Adolf Hitler” (Hitler-liberator, 
1941 and others) talked about the liberation mission of the German army. 
In order to promote propaganda of the film production, a special division 
was established – the Central Cinematic Association “East” with two 
branches: the “Ostland Film” with the authoritie in Riga and “Ukraine-film” 
with the authorities in the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine in Kyiv. This 
cinematic society specialized mainly in two types of products – a weekly 
review of events abroad with the translation on the languages of the peoples of 
the USSR and full-length propaganda films. 
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All propaganda cinematographs shot at the Berlin Film Studios were 
shown in the occupied territories of Ukraine. These film studios also 
duplicated weekly reviews in the Oriental languages. Great popularity in 
Germany and in the East used films about the culture of Germany 
(Федеральний архів Німеччини, 59). 
Significant interest in the population of the occupied territories was caused 
by feature films, both German and Soviet. But the Nazi authorities were not 
interested in watching Soviet films by the local people that influenced the 
patriotic feelings of Ukrainians. The demonstration of purely propaganda 
materials, which according to eyewitnesses, were later triggered by the 
population of the occupied territories only disgusted. Subsequently, the vast 
majority of locals tried to avoid watching German films (Окороков, 2007, 38; 
Салата, 2009, 125–126). 
So, already in the first months of the Great Patriotic War the German 
filmmakers created the “Ninochka”, set in the Russian scenario. But the film 
was only a few weeks left. The German Occupation Administration decided 
that the film “Ninochka” was too political, and that local people needed 
something easier, and therefore took it out of revision (Федеральний архів 
Німеччини, 7). 
The first German films were without translation, so most Ukrainian 
viewers did not understand what was happening on the screen. Subsequently, 
the German occupation administration began to recruit translators from among 
the locals, and the vast majority of documentaries were translated into 
Ukrainian and Russian. Despite the fact that very few people attended 
cinemas, German propaganda authorities wrote about watching such films in 
the newspapers that local people were happy to go to their viewing, got 
aesthetic pleasure from playing actors and music (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 4). 
During April-September 1942 in order to increase the moral and 
psychological impact on the local population, the Nazi command almost in all 
clubs in Podilia, demonstrated the propaganda film “The Road to Germany” 
(Гальчак, 2004, 59). In order to attract the attention of the population, in a 
number of places were equipped photo-treadmills, opened the traveling 
exhibitions that praised the “Nazi paradise”, talked about the happy life of 
workers from the East. 
In March-September 1943, the German Armed Forces Staff and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the South issued an order for the 
work of cinemas in the regional centers: Korostyshev, Fastiv, Bila Tserkva, 
Vasilkiv, Zhytomyr, Ovruch, Nizhyn, Kyiv, Pereiaslav and other cities of the 
Reichskommissariat of Ukraine (Державний архів Київської області, 136). 
A separate order was issued on the work of the cinemas in the Kyiv region. 
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The Nazi occupation authorities paid special attention to the population of this 
region, since Kyiv and the region are a politically active region formed prior 
to the occupation (Державний архів Київської області, 154–169). 
From October 1941 the expulsion of Ukrainian citizens to work in 
Germany was expanded. At first they were trying to recruit voluntarily. For 
this purpose, propaganda films about good working conditions in Germany 
and about what modern enterprises were waiting for employees to work began 
to show. 
An example of propaganda material can be a propaganda film intended to 
demonstrate to the population of the occupied territories of the USSR, about 
Ukrainian youth, exported to work in Germany. The film tells how well the 
girls and boys live in Germany. Girls work on farms of German masters, 
where their children are cared for and work on the plots, and the boys work in 
modern well-equipped enterprises... (Центральний державний кінофото- 
фоноархів України імені Г.С. Пшеничного). 
Next, one of the German newspapers “German Weekly Review”  
in 1943 has shown how prisoners of war from the Soviet Union lived well, 
in particular, in Berlin, Soviet prisoners of war, who have just arrived, fit 
on clothes and shoes at the store before being sent to German enter- 
prises (Центральний державний кінофотофоноархів України імені 
Г.С. Пшеничного). 
About the workers exported from the Donetsk region and the Kharkiv 
region, tells the film magazine “German Weekly Review” № 615, 1943. The 
viewer can see a huge shop, with a large number of heavy machines, which 
are used by Ukrainian specialists: turners, welders. Though their faces are 
tired and exhausted, the announcer tells us that they are learning new 
professions that they can then apply in their native country, about how 
workers from Ukraine work and rest well (Центральний державний 
кінофотофоноархів України імені Г.С. Пшеничного). 
Practically a film “We Go to Germany” shot by the German director 
G.A. Dalstv and operator V.F. Ludtke was demonstrated in all cities of 
Ukraine. 
The film tells about the journey of Ukrainian girls and boys who 
voluntarily went to Germany. The journey begins from the village to Kyiv in 
carriages, then by rail to the large German industrial city. The announcer, 
commenting on the screen, remarks that those who go to Germany is provided 
with good food rations, a bottle of vodka, hot food at each station, medical 
care. In Germany, at the destination, a solemn meeting and a comfortable bus, 
which takes them to places of work, are waiting for those arriving (Окороков, 
2007, 39). 
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This film shows the working conditions at German factories, life and 
leisure. The audience sees clean shops, living rooms of the hostel, and shelves 
of shops where you can buy any trifle. See also the dining room, hairdressers, 
shower room, swimming pool, stadium, where the workers from the Eastern 
countries are happy to play football (Окороков 2007, 40). 
The film director tried to convince the population of the occupied 
territories that the workers from Ukraine in Germany felt really good, that 
there was peaceful work for the Great Germany and Ukraine. Throughout the 
film, the idea that working in Germany gives prospects is imposed, that you 
can become a master and return to the Motherland and, with modern 
engineering knowledge, become a great specialist. 
As we see, cinema is a very effective means of propaganda, it is capable of 
influencing human emotions and consciousness. The films featured by the 
occupation authorities for the population were intended to show Germany as a 
highly cultured state that carries the culture of the occupied territories and 
freedom from the Bolshevik regime. According to the plan of the German 
authors and directors, the cinema had to produce great moral and 
psychological influence on people, to provide support to the local population 
and to facilitate the Nazi military moving further east, into the country. 
The propaganda effect of such films on a person was hidden, on an 
emotional level, beyond its conscious control, creating the picture of the 
contemporary present, necessary for the occupation authorities. For example, 
as already mentioned above, it would seem that the population of the occupied 
territories is well aware of who Adolf Hitler is, what army he led and why 
came to the Ukrainian lands, but after watching propaganda films, people 
sometimes rethought about it. Here is one of many examples of such cinema 
propaganda: “Hitler’s Children”, “The Union of German Girls” and others, 
which show Hitler’s infinite love for children. Most of population, watching 
such films, thought: if Hitler so loves children, he could not carry out those 
terrible crimes that accused him. 
There were people who, in the first months of the war, believed in such 
propaganda, believed that Ukrainian workers lived well in Germany, and they 
worked at the enterprises side by side with German workers, but later, when it 
was possible to communicate with the fugitives, the population of the 
occupied territories understood, what was actually “Hitler’s Paradise”. Here 
are some eyewitness comments that were taken to Germany, but they tried to 
escape. They testified to the Ostarbeiters’ journey: “They are dying in trains. 
Women give birth on the road and newborns are thrown into the windows ... 
Those who die fall in the train even without straw, and sometimes the dead 
fall out of the trains and remain on the railroad canvas” (Двинов, 1950, 41). 
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In the “Sumy Visnyk” newspaper of October 22, 1941, we can read 
information on how the population of the occupied territories visited cinemas, 
where German films were shown. So, on Sunday, October 20, a film 
screening was conducted for the population – with chronicle and artistic 
content. The first review of German films, based on the testimony of the 
occupation authority, took place in the full hall, and featured films were in 
great demand (Сумський вісник 1941, 2). It is clear that the population went 
to watch films due to curiosity or fear, but the point that the films had a great 
influence on the consciousness of the population of the occupied territories is 
an indisputable fact. 
In another edition of the same newspaper, we can see a message that there 
a cinema was created for the population in Sumy, where the best German 
films are shown twice a week: “Personal secretary”, “Ride for Germany”. 
According to the author of the article we can see that documentary and 
chronicle films about the greatest in the world history of war, the war for 
justice, the war against communism (Сумський віник, 1941, 2) were very 
popular. 
Most newspapers by the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” and in the zone of 
military occupation tell how you feel friendly and cozy in the city cinemas 
and that German films gained great popularity among the local population. 
It is also noted that the cinema chronicles from the place of hostilities are 
particularly popular (Сумський вісник, 1941, 4). Such articles were written 
by those who supported the occupation power, and it is unlikely that this 
testimony can be fully trusted, but among them there were also people who 
frankly believed that the German authorities would promote the development 
of Ukrainian culture. 
In an information message from the occupied eastern regions № 32 from 
December 4, 1942 to January 15, 1943, we see that the first German films 
shocked Ukrainian viewers in Kyiv. These were mostly comedies about love 
or movies from the secular life of the Germans. Such films should not be 
shown to the population of the occupied territories. For the show it is 
necessary to select films that are propagandistic, and not show the secular life 
of the wealthy circles of Germany (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, 7). 
In each occupied city, a city administration was established, which in fact 
was responsible for the mood of the local population and advocacy work, 
conducted in conjunction with the occupation administration. Thus, in 
Kharkiv, with the advent of the Nazi troops, a Kharkiv city administration was 
set up, in which the propaganda department acted. The authority of this 
department was to provide leadership and control over political propaganda in 
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the city and surrounding villages. The workers of the propaganda department 
were supposed to detect hostile elements on the territories occupied by the 
German-fascist army, and at the same time resolutely apply appropriate 
measures; to provide political control over theaters, cinema, radio, concerts, 
meetings, exhibitions, etc. (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, 55–56). 
The structure of the propaganda department also included a cinema 
inspection. Its task was to organize and assist in the management and 
demonstration of motion pictures, control over their subjects, provision of 
technical support and equipment installation, etc. (Центральний державний 
архів громадських об’єднань України, 59). 
The Kyiv City Council, headed by Doctor of Historical Sciences 
Oleksandr Ogloblin, also worked under the close supervision of the 
occupation administration, but could solve certain economic issues on its own. 
Water pipes, tramways and electricity were restored. Along with this, 
significant work was carried out in the field of culture and education, the 
functioning of research institutions, sports, artistic and religious institutions, 
museums, libraries, and preservation of architectural monuments. 
The employees of the board decided on the development of the Ukrainian 
theater, the opening of the “Music Hall”, the conservatory, the formation of 
the Writers’ Union (Українське слово, 1941, 4). 
With the assistance of the City Council in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Red Cross 
was created to help orphans and prisoners of war. The supervision of the work 
of the institutions of the health care system was left by the Nazi 
commandant’s office also in the area of authority of the city administration 
(Українське слово, 1941, 4). 
The occupying power actively used all possible means of influencing the 
population of the occupied territories. Film propaganda has become one of the 
most widespread means of influence on the Ukrainian population, since it was 
perceived much easier than other means of propaganda. But the use of active 
propaganda, in particular cinematography in the struggle against the 
population of the Soviet Union, was unsuccessful only at the beginning of the 
war. This is due to the positive mood of a certain part of the population of the 
occupied territories and their favorable attitude to Hitler’s authorities during 
the initial period of the war. 
Film propaganda has made a great contribution to the formation of the 
German information space in the occupied territories. The main goals pursued 
by the Nazi authorities, using film propaganda, were: 
– creation of the necessary public opinion regarding the occupation power 
and the USSR; 
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– discrediting the Soviet regime; 
– undermining the morale of the Red Army and the population of the 
occupied territories; 
– psychological adjustment of the population of the occupied territories to 
the fact that the Nazi army is invincible. 
Summing up the above, it should be noted that the conviction of the 
population of the occupied territories that the German army was invincible 
was denied already at the end of 1941. Film propaganda, although it was 
widespread, but could not properly affect the population, since it was shown 
mainly entertaining and adventure films, which did not have a significant 
propaganda burden. The documentary films showed extremely rarely and with 
obvious propaganda exaggerations that gave rise to the population not to trust 
their content. Nazi propaganda in the occupied territories, despite its large-
scale character, was generally ineffective. The population of occupied Ukraine 
in general did not trust the Nazi authorities and the “new order”, since after 
the Stalingrad campaign, the real state of affairs did not meet the propaganda 
promises and declarations of the Nazis. 
Theaters were played equally important tasks in the intensification of 
information space in the occupied territories of Ukraine which used by the 
German authorities as radio and cinema to promote and propagate their own 
power and new order. 
Part of Ukrainian artists: writers, painters, actors and other theatrical 
figures – remained in the occupied territory by the German army. The German 
administration understood the influence of these people on the consciousness 
of the local population, but in order to demonstrate their loyalty in the first 
period of occupation, they encouraged the work of theaters, the publication of 
works of Ukrainian writers in the newspapers, and printing of Ukrainian 
artists’ works. 
The new order set strict requirements for the activities of Ukrainian artists 
and cultural figures. The German administration encouraged them to create 
cultural and educational organizations through which they sought to influence 
the population of the occupied territories. The activities of such organizations, 
which stood in the position of struggle for rights to Ukrainian independence, 
were not limited to educational, cultural and social measures. A widespread 
phenomenon was the revival and the founding of new educational 
organizations. Thus, already on October 17, 1941, an article on the revival of 
the “Prosvita” organization and its task was published in the newspaper 
“Vinnytski Visti” (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2). 
The departments of the military administration of the feld- and 
ortsmenedatur and local self-government bodies helped to establish new ones 
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and to revive existing theaters. The development and the activities of the 
theaters were also engaged in the propaganda of the Wehrmacht. They were 
engaged not only in the cultural service of the Wehrmacht military, but also in 
the propaganda processing of the occupied territory. All issues related to the 
organization of the theaters were to be agreed with the Nazi occupation 
administration (Титаренко, 2005, 101). 
Thus, the order of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces and the 
commander-in-chief of the land forces of the South oblige to involve the 
Ukrainian population in cultural work to increase their cultural level, we see 
that the occupation administration paid much attention to cinema, theaters and 
concert activities. Among them is the activity of the theatrical society “Power 
through Joy”, which offered works of Western European, in particular 
German authors (Державний архів Житомирської області, 27–29). 
From the report for the month of the Main Department of Enlightenment and 
Propaganda of the Ministry of Education and Publicity for June 1941, we can see 
that the theatrical society “Power through Joy” was fully assured of the ministry 
and also engaged in the collection of corpses and theatrical groups that were tested 
for reliability (Державний архів Київської області, 5). 
In the first months of occupation, the German occupation authority 
encouraged the activities of educational institutions, theaters, museums, and 
individual scientific institutions. On the other hand, the German occupation 
administration carried out regular campaigns to check on political confidence all 
those who agreed to cooperate, and first of all, lecturers and teachers. The actors 
from the local theaters, who were supposed to bring the inhabitants of the 
occupied territories the idea that the occupation authorities want to preserve the 
Ukrainian culture and give it a new life, were also checked for reliability. As a 
result of such events, theaters and educational institutions became led by people 
completely loyal to the “new” power (Шайкан, 2005, 313). 
Under such conditions, during the first months of occupation, for example, 
in the territory of the Vinnytsia region, a cultural revival began; social life was 
partially intensified, new and opened previously founded various professional 
and amateur creative circles, performances of theatrical performances, movie 
theaters were shown on the works of Ukrainian and German authors. Much of 
the editors and journalists involved earlier in the press publishing house also 
continued to work with the only difference that they printed products under 
the close supervision of the German administration (Безсмертя. Книга 
Пам’яті України. 1941–1945, 2000, 518). 
The theater was played an important place in the information space and the 
impact on the population of the occupied territories. So, in Zhytomyr – the 
city theater under the direction of I. Klepachenko staged performances 
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“Zaporozhets after the Danube” (ukr. Zaporozhets za Dunaem), “Natalka 
Poltavka”. The first performance of the Ukrainian theater on the works of 
S. Vasylchenko “On the first party” (ukr. Na pershi guli) and V. Dmytrenko 
“Godfather Miroshnyk” (ukr. Kum Miroshnyk) took place in Berdychev, on 
August 26, 1941. In Lutsk, under the direction of the theatrical figure P. Orla, 
a theatrical ensemble was organized, which began its theatrical season on 
August 31, 1941 (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 4). 
As V.A. Nesterenko notes, archival materials collected in Sumy region, 
show the development of theatrical art in the military zone. Dramatic theaters 
in Konotop, Sumy, Okhtyrka, Hlukhiv, Romny, Shostka were acting in Sumy 
Region, the performances took place in Krolevets, the drama group acted in 
the village of Chausy, Shostka district, and the puppet theater in Sumy. 
In Chernigiv region there are theaters in Chernigov, Nizhyn, Ostriv, Pryluky, 
Novgorod-Siversky. In the Kharkiv region, theaters were in Kharkiv 
(5 theaters), Krasnograd, Merefi, Bogoduhov. In Voroshilovgrad Region, 
theaters were in Voroshilovgrad (2 theaters), Lozovo Pavlivtsi, Krasnyi Luch, 
Popasna; theatrical circles in the villages Uspenka, Chuguev, Almazne. In the 
Donetsk region they were in Yuzivka (3 theaters), Bakhmuti, Kostyantynivka, 
Druzhkivtsi, Mariupol, Slavyansk and other cities and regional centers 
(Нестеренко, 2005, 55). 
With the beginning of the German occupation in the cities of the Ukrainian 
SSR – Lviv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrivsk and others – artists who did not have time 
to evacuate or remained at their own discretion, sought from the German 
authorities the permission to open theaters. For example, there was an opera 
theater in Lviv, the “Standart Theater” was opened in Dnipropetrivsk, 
T. Shevchenko Theater in was opened in Mariupol and others. 
Theater and concert activity in some areas of occupied Ukraine was quite 
active. The theaters acted not only in the cities, but also in the regional 
centers. For example, T.G. Shevchenko Theater showed 138 performances 
and 172 concerts, of which for the military – 109 concerts during only one 
year activities in Mariupol (Титаренко, 2004, 167). 
In Dnipropetrovs’k, the “Variete Theater”, the Ukrainian Drama Theater, 
the Doll Theater, and the M. Lysenko Chorus Chapel acted. Most of these 
theaters worked not only for the Wehrmacht armies, but also for the local 
population and for the “Ostarbeiter” in the Reich. Repertoire of the Choir 
Chapel consisted of 100 performances in which Ukrainian songs in artistic 
processing were. Only the march of the Wagner’s Tangaiser Operetta was 
performed in German language (Шайкан, 2005, 326–327). 
The activities of local theatrical groups had an important place in the 
spiritual life of the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” and the zone of military 
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administration. Their repertoire consisted mainly of folk household 
performances. So in Vinnitsa Ukrainian Theater on September 7, 1941 a big 
concert took place, where a large number of residents of not only the city but 
also the environs were gathered. Prominent Ukrainian artists of the ballet 
Meribel and Peresolov and singers Gutnikova and Kovalska performed there 
(Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3). 
The performance of Hulak-Artemovsky’s opera “Zaporozhets after the 
Danube” (ukr. Zaporozhets za Dunaem) was demonstrated on two acts in the 
City Theater on September 14, 1941 (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 4). On Saturday, 
October 4, the Ukrainian audience was offered a performance entitled 
“Wedding in the Goncharivka” (ukr. Svatannia na Goncharivtsi), where the 
soloists and the whole composition of the ballet were involved (Ведєнєєв, 
2003, 4). Both performances gathered a significant number of residents, most 
of whom perceived the restored activities of theater groups as a revival of 
cultural life in Ukraine. 
Comedy performances were quite popular among the local population 
during this period, and the German occupation authorities immediately drew 
attention and encouraged their first showing. Confirmation of this was the 
show of “May Night” for the 4 actions in February 1942 in Starytsky City 
Theater of Comedy. The inhabitants of the city came to such performances, 
often not only in order to watch the performance, but also to communicate, 
hear news, and more. (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 8). 
The repertoire of the theaters in Donetsk and the region was diverse. 
It included works by Western European, Ukrainian, Russian playwrights, 
composers. As already noted, the local occupation authorities allowed theaters to 
predominantly entertain performances, avoiding appearances with politico-
ideological content. The performance and demonstration of the performance 
depended on the material base of one or another theater. Taking into account the 
material support and staffing of the theaters, the Yuzovsky Musical Drama 
Theater and T. Shevchenko Mariupol Music and Drama Theater were the most 
popular. The repertoire of Mariupol Music and Drama Theater consisted of 
18 plays, and Yuzovsky Music and Drama Theater consisted of 17 performances 
and concert programs. (Гайдабура, 1998, 34–35, 61). This indicates that the Nazi 
occupation authorities paid attention to this type of propaganda activity. 
The plan of conducting performances of the Kyiv Opera House in April 
1942 shows that the performances were shown not only to the viewers of 
Kyiv, but also for inhabitants of the cities and towns of the Kyiv region 
(Державний архів Київської області, 189). 
From the correspondence of the standard commissant with the 
commandant department of the 393 Main Field Commandant’s Office on the 
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theater group “Power through Joy” we can see the confirmation of 
performances during 1942. Among them, the repertoire of the Small Drama 
Theater: “From Kyiv to Shanghai”, “Everything goes by ...”. The performance 
“Hotchpotch” (ukr. Vsiaka Vsiachyna) was demonstrated an Kyiv and the 
oblast – in the cities of Fastov, Bila Tserkva, Lubny, Khorol, Yagotin, 
Brovary and others (Державний архів Київської області, 8, 61). 
In the German propaganda among the population, the theater was given an 
extremely important role. It was one of the most influential means of agitation 
and propaganda that was used by the Nazi authorities in the occupied 
territories. Activities of theaters were an important part of public life which 
actively influenced the consciousness of the local population. 
On the other hand, it was during the period when the national theater 
directed its spiritual energy to contacts with its own nation. The theater 
became such an artistic center that helped Ukrainians to preserve national 
artistic traditions. 
Summing up, it should be noted that the authorities of the Third Reich 
before the Second World War, and especially the Great Patriotic War, had 
modern technical means, technologies and methods of forming the 
information space. The most relevant in this context was the use of 
broadcasting, cinema and theater activities. 
In order to place on own side the creative Ukrainian intelligentsia, the 
Nazi authorities created the conditions for their activities, which during the 
initial period of the war gave the possibility to honour national traditions, 
open educational institutions, dream of an independent Ukraine, and so on. 
In this regard, the methods of psychological action were used when the 
occupation administration compared the repressive policy of the Soviet power 
with its own; a method of distorted truth when the work in Germany was 
propagated as for the future of Ukraine; misinformation about the real state on 
the fronts, which led to the loss of hope among intelligentsia for the liberation 
from the Nazi invaders. 
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SECTION 4. 
INFORMATION CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE  
ON THE MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION  
OF THE POPULATION IN THE REICHSKOMMISSARIAT 
“UKRAINE” AND IN THE ZONE  
OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 
 
Needs of working in the conditions of the new information mode forced 
both Germany and the Soviet Union to create a special system of 
informational and analytical activity. Considering that both states had 
totalitarian mode this process considerably became simpler and accelerated. 
The formation of the information space became more active in Germany. 
As far as the Soviet Union the process of foundation of information space  
I was began in the 17–20th years of the 20th century and was caused by 
Bolshevist ideology. 
In occupied territories tasks of the formation of specialized system 
institutions and divisions, various military, propaganda organizations and 
analytical services started developing from the first period of the occupation. 
Informational and analytical services appeared to be in all spheres and began 
activities in Germany and much earlier in the Soviet Union. Their main aim 
was to concentrate and process powerful information flows for the purpose of 
the political and economic problems connected with influence on the 
population of occupied territories. 
There were certain differences between the German and Soviet 
information and analytical services and conditions in which they were forced 
to work scurried about. The Hitler’s leadership had an opportunity to create in 
occupied territories libraries and to deliver necessary books and newspapers, 
to distribute necessary information also directly through broadcastings and 
cinema. The Soviet leadership worked only through “partisan movement” and 
“Soviet underground” from among local population by way of the distribution 
of leaflets and brochures. The Soviet leadership hoped that the 
“Nonaggression Pact” signed 1939 would constrain Hitler’s army from 
aggression. A evidence of that there was a document prepared and addressed 
to Stalin by G. Zhukov with the assistance of S. Tymoshenko and 
A. Vasilevsky. There was one copy. It is told: “I report on your discretion of a 
reason according to the plan of the strategic expansion of Armed Forces of the 
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Soviet Union on a war case with Germany and its allies”. But, according to 
G. Zhukov, Stalin was very careful and therefore regarded this document for 
an attempt to provoke Germans (Король, 2002, 27–28). 
The fascist leadership of Germany understood that completely it was 
impossible to hide large-scale military preparations from the attention of the 
Soviet and the other countries researches, therefore. It was examined carefully 
and prepared the plan of actions on their covers. Disinformation was carried 
out by the government’s administration: “Ministry of National Education and 
Propaganda”, “Ministry of East Occupied Territories” and “Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs”. Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop directly participated 
in the development of these actions. 
The German propaganda made the first great progress in 1940 in the 
period of the occupation of France. Several months prior to invasion into 
France Germans began to use actively so-called “black” transmitters giving 
them for the French radio stations. Through these stations there were spread 
critic information about the French government to form the uncertainty and 
panic moods among the population and the French army. As a result of such 
active promotion before the German troops, the moral and combat spirit of the 
French army was undermined and they could not show serious resistance to 
the opponent (Daugherty, Janowitz, 2001, 671). 
After the conclusion of the “Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact” on 
August 23, 1939 in the structure of the German propaganda concerning the 
USSR, there was a cardinal reorganization. Misinformation of soviet 
leadership was the main objective of this reorganization. According to the 
specified purpose Goebbels gave the instruction to abstain from open attacks 
to the Soviet Union. “The opponent needs to be held in information 
disinformation about plans of Germany” (Панарин 2006, 152) The “Ministry 
of National Education and Propaganda” established cruel censorship on all 
materials where there was any information about the USSR and demanded 
from mass media to show restraint in publications about Russian 
achievements. In the confidential instruction of Goebbels of January 30, 1940 
it was spoken and about expediency to place in periodicals any “positive 
materials about Russia... because thanks to policy of last years readers are 
ready absolutely in a different way and would be absolutely confused by 
sudden change of the direction of contents of publications in the press” 
(Панарин, 2006, 152). This statement, one of the biggest mistakes of the 
USSR and a victory of the German propaganda and diplomacy. 
Such information policy brought invaluable benefit to Hitler’s leadership. 
The Soviet Union responded to it by own means of anti-fascist propaganda. 
Attempts of separate newspapers to give an objective assessment to events 
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which took place in Germany were exposed to sharp criticism. A last plea in 
misinformation of the country was the statement of agency “TASS” of June 
14, 1941 in which it was said about “obvious senselessness” massed in foreign 
the seals of rumors about “proximity of war between the USSR and 
Germany”. It was claimed that “rumors about attempt of Germany to begin 
attack on the USSR are deprived of any bases”. But, despite unwillingness to 
go for confrontation with Germany in the spring of 1941 in Moscow there was 
decided to apply some “veiled” anti-German actions. In March in “Award 
meeting” Stalin gave awards authors of the feature film “Alexander Nevsky” 
(1938). It was the first Soviet movie which carried anti-German orientation. 
In April 1941 when there was a tension in the Balkans and there was an article 
about S.N. Eisenstein’s creativity in the “Pravda newspaper” (Невежин, 
2007, 265). 
In March 1941 agency “TASS” began a direct preparation for 
informational wars against Goebbels’s department. The corresponding 
materials were collected (excerpts from the book “Main Kampf” by Hitler, an 
article about Nazi “New order” in Poland and Yugoslavia, etc.). As a part of 
“TASS” there was a new edition of promotion led by Y. S. Hanson. At first, it 
worked secretly, officially developed the activity only after June 22, 1941. 
For fascist Germany became obvious that the Soviet leadership had 
understood a situation which developed in the East of Europe and therefore 
stirred up the information and propaganda activity even more. 1940 became 
the year of extreme activity in propaganda activity of Germany on the Soviet 
Union. From the end of the year the German departments, carried out 
propaganda activity against the USSR, began active work on collection of 
information for the benefit of holding promotional campaigns: materials of the 
Soviet military newspapers of border military districts and other periodic 
literature, even large-circulation editions of the plants and departmental 
magazines were processed illegally receiving. 
Those who well knew political, social and economic and cultural features 
of the people of the USSR, Russian and Ukrainian, in particular, were 
involved. They prepared analytical materials for propaganda, defined 
especially weaknesses of the Soviet military personnel, opened obvious 
problems of the Soviet society, developed recommendations on information 
and psychological impacts on the staff of the Red Army and the population 
taking into account national and psychological features, traditions and culture. 
Army intelligence known to all “Abwehr” banished on the territory of the 
Soviet Union with intelligence agents and saboteurs (except for the main 
objective, they had to spread the rumors compromising materials about the 
country leaders and the command structure of the Soviet Army) specially 
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trained agents propagandists – the former emigrants, were fluent Russian, 
Ukrainian in languages and languages of other people of the USSR and also 
emissaries propagandists of various national organizations. So, one of 
“Abwehr” schools directed the first agents propagandists in February 1941, 
the second – in May 1941 Having received a task prior to military operations 
“to pave the way” for psychological actions against the fighting structure of 
the Red Army and the population, they began to act in border military 
districts. Agents for the performance of the tasks hired the persons offended or 
dissatisfied with the Soviet power, distributed through them leaflets, rumors, 
brochures with incriminating evidence of the Soviet government, promoted 
kindling of national discord and other (Панарин, 2006, 153). 
At the end of 1940 the “Department of Propaganda prepared the Directive 
in the operation “Barbarossa”. It also became the main document on the 
organization and conducting a psychological war against the USSR. In the 
Directive there were defined the purposes of propaganda, its forms and 
methods. On June 6, 1941, it was sent to troops. 
The USSR also understood the international situation and therefore much 
attention was paid to the strengthening of ideological and political work 
among the staff of the Red Army and the population. In particular, on May 13, 
1941, at a meeting of film committee of the USSR V.V. Vishnevsky proposed 
certain measures which according to him should be immediately carried out 
for comprehensive preparation of cinema for a war. Vishnevsky stopped on an 
image of the enemy in a future war. He emphasized: “In skilled, skilful hands 
of writers and directors of film editors, materials will turn into propaganda 
military movies” (Невежин, 2007, 286). 
All types of promotion applied by the USSR actively affected the 
consciousness of the population. So, conversion propaganda influenced 
valuable reference points of people with the purpose to change their setups, 
attitude, thoughts and views, concerning country policy. During 1941–1945 
the Soviet military and political leadership tried to convince the population of 
Germany and fighters of the German army that war from the German army 
was unfair and aggressive. It was announced that the Soviet Union did not 
show any aggression to the population of Germany. But, unfortunately, the 
propaganda of Hitler’s leadership was so powerful that a considerable part of 
the staff of the German army until the end of war remained under the 
influence of fascist ideology. 
Allies of the USSR used also propaganda of intergroup contradictions on 
the basis of religious, social, professional character for disunity of the 
opponent. Propaganda’s content was being formed in the state circles. It could 
be the next example. The English propagandists dropped leaflets from the 
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plane over Germany and that period a gauylyayter Erich Koch filed to the 
German people a petition for danger which threatened Hitler by the side of the 
opponents in Germany too. With such cards English propaganda tried to 
convince the population of Germany that not everything was so good in the 
leading circles of the “Third Reich” because the Hitler’s leadership stated 
(Панарин, 2006, 159–160). 
Captivity propaganda was the most widespread. It was used by both the 
German leaders, and the Soviet power. There was a straight line psychological 
impact on the consciousness of people directed to the formation of positive 
feelings in relation to surrender as reasonable and safe an exit from the current 
situation. The specified type of propaganda acted on the territories of Ukraine 
occupied by the fascist army. The set of leaflets with the corresponding 
content was distributed. As a rule, such cards were divided into two parts. 
In one it was told about a bad life in Ukraine under the power of “Bolsheviks” 
or what sense to shed the blood for the sake of Bolsheviks if the German army 
won anyway. In another part the admission according to which it was 
promised all fighters, officers of the Red Army and political commissars who 
would come over to the side of the German army of war and peaceful life to 
their relatives (Гитлеровская пропаганда юдофобии в прокламациях и 
карикатурах, 2005, 106–107). Similar addresses were also to commanders of 
the Red Army. The Hitler’s military authorities convinced that their situation 
was hopeless and the fight was useless: They were promised: “You pass to 
Germans – there you are waited by good attitude and food and also fast 
homecoming” (Окороков, 2007, 30). 
Trying to resist the information attack from the German occupational 
administration, the Soviet propagandists distributed the leaflets not less 
actively. Their contents were a bit different. So, in leaflets of the Central 
Committee of RC(b) for the Ukrainian youth there was said that all 
remembered how the Soviet people always dealt shortly with traitors. There 
was given an example, taken from famous literary Ukrainian heroes as 
Andrey’s treason – the son of “Taras Bulba” – and punishment of the father 
over it (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління 
України, 200). 
In the following card of the Head political department of the Red Army 
turned to the population of temporarily occupied territories. It was said: “Who 
will go to Germans – that will die”. It is noted that the German army promptly 
receded under attacks of the Red Army, the Soviet power would not punish 
those who remained in the villages and the cities occupied by Germans. The 
head political department urged the population not to trust the German and the 
Soviet power and the Red Army had only one purpose: to clean the Ukrainian 
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land from Hitler’s army, as soon as possible to exempt its population from 
fascist bondage and to return quiet and joyful lives. Those appeals urged not 
to succumb to fascist provocation: “Make everything that Germans did not 
pursue you violently. You remember, companions. The business of Germans 
it is hopelessly lost. The Red Army successfully clears the Soviet land of 
fascist aggressors... Wait for arrival of your native Red Army and all means 
help it with the fight against Hitler. Do not allow Germans to take out the 
bread and to take away the cattle. Destroy bridges and roads on which 
Germans will run. Set fire to the German ammunition and food warehouses. 
Help guerrillas to beat fascist robbers” (Советская пропаганда в годы 
Великой Отечественной войны: “коммуникация убеждения” и 
мобилизационные механизмы, 2007, 492). Actually such propaganda was a 
lie and hypocrisy too. It is known that the people who remained in the 
territory occupied by the Fascist army or escaped from the German captivity 
were pursued the Soviet punitive machine ruthlessly (Сборник 
законодательных и нормативных актов о репрессиях и реабилитации 
жертв политических репрессий, 1993, 94–96). In this occasion there are 
many opinions, historians differently assess a situation in the conditions of 
war and operation of orders and resolutions of Stalin. Administration of 
“People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs” concerning the persons which 
left in due time the German environment and remained in the occupied 
territory or were prisoners. So “About members of traitors families” we see 
Resolutions of the State Committee of Defense No. GOKO-1926ss of June 24, 
1942, actions were applied by the Soviet power to prisoners of war and their 
families. 
Firstly, to establish that full age members of families of the persons 
(the military personnel and civil) condemned by judicial authorities or the 
Special meeting at People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR to 
a capital punishment according to Article 58–1 “a” to CC RSFSR and the 
relevant articles of the Criminal Code of other federal republics: for espionage 
in favor of Germany and other countries which were at war with us for 
transition to the enemy, treachery or assistance to the German invaders, 
service in retaliatory or administrative organizations of the German invaders 
in the territory occupied by them and for attempt of high treason and 
treacherous intentions, are subject to arrest and exile to the remote regions of 
the USSR for a period of five years. 
Secondly, to establish that arrest and exile to the remote regions of the 
USSR for a period of five years are subject also families of the persons who 
are in absentia condemned to a capital punishment by judicial authorities or 
the Special meeting at People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the 
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USSR for voluntary leaving with occupational troops at release of the territory 
occupied by the opponent. 
Application of repressions concerning members of the families listed in 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 was carried out by societies of People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs on the basis of sentences of judicial authorities or decisions of 
the Special meeting at People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the 
USSR. As members of the family of the traitor could be considered to be the 
father, mother, the husband, the wife, children, daughters, brothers and sisters, 
if they lived together or were in his dependence by the time of crime 
execution or by the time of mobilization in army from the beginning of war 
(Сборник законодательных и нормативных актов о репрессиях и 
реабилитации жертв политических репрессий, 1993, 93–94). 
Such attitude towards fighters and to their families of the Red Army got to 
captivity was confirmed by the shorthand report of interrogation sent to the 
“Chief of the Central Headquarters of the Soviet Partisan Movement at the 
Rate of General headquarters T. Ponomarenko. In the shorthand report of 
interrogation of the aide-de-camp for special instructions at the chief of staff 
of the movement A.D. Rusanov, it was noted that the former prisoners of war 
who came over to the side of guerrillas often were disarmed, sent to the back 
and destroyed. Sometimes, if there was a need, they would be left in guerrilla 
groups. But after the war they would be able to be checked waited by 
department of “People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs”. Here A. Rusanov 
gave evidence that families of the Red Army men who were taken prisoner 
were pursued only if it was known that he was taken prisoner there and if it 
was considered the missing person, then the family was even supported 
(Безыменский, 1981, 418). The attitude of management towards prisoners of 
war was confirmed by order No. 270 of August 16, 1941. It was already 
mentioned above where it was said: “Commanders and political workers, 
which the during fight break signs of distinction from themselves and escape 
to the back or given in captivity to the enemy, to consider malicious deserters 
whose families are subject to arrest as families of deserters which broke the 
oath and betrayed the Motherland. All higher commanders and commissioners 
must shoot deserters on the place from a division” (Король, 2002, 49). 
For the purpose of maintenance of patriotic feelings among guerrillas by 
the Political administration of the Red Army there was given the order to hide 
carefully true situation in the Soviet Union. Nobody had to know about 
hunger in the rear of the USSR and the compulsory mobilization of women 
and teenagers, people’s losses and terror. For these reasons “Guerrillas 
movement” seemed to appear in the Soviet territory as a result of the arrival of 
the Red Army away. All possible measures were done to isolate Partisan’s 
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movement from other mass of Red Army with the aim not to get truth 
information from guerrillas who stayed in the German rear long time and had 
read the Nazi opponent’s literature, learned about the true situation in the 
USSR and Stalin’s criticism and the Bolshevism. The Soviet leadership 
recognized the danger of the situation in the Soviet Union and tried to avoid 
discontent among partisans and the population of the territories occupied by 
the German army. “Only an insignificant part of guerrillas – Soviet party 
workers and the staff of “People’s Commissariat for Internal Affair’s, – which 
were specially sent to German rear for the purpose of underground work, sent 
to other occupied areas for propaganda activities” (Білас, 1994, 420). 
The best specialists were involved. Among the, there were 
A.S. Scherbakov, L.Z. Mekhlis, M.A. Suslov, G.F. Alexandrov. They fixed 
mechanisms of fast a collection of the necessary information and its 
processing but often figures and materials which were collected were not true. 
So, for example, “the Message of the Soviet Information Bureau” prepared by 
A.S. Scherbakov gave figures of fighting losses. That digital material of 
messages was not true and consisted in the propaganda purposes. In the last 
release of the book “Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”. it was noted that 
losses of Germans in November 1941 in-ground forces were only 
750 thousand people (Никулина, Сорока, 1999, 56–60). The following data 
presented in M.I. Meltyukhov’s researches: was that Germans before the war 
with the USSR had only 3899 tanks and 4841 planes (Мельтюхов М.И. 
22 июня 1941 г.: цифры свидетельствуют, 1991, 18). Thus, we see that 
A.S. Scherbakov’s article “destroyed” military equipment of the military 
adversar approximately twice. 
Insufficient knowledge of the enemy – fascist Germany was one of the 
main reasons for failures of the Soviet promotion among troops of the enemy. 
A large number of specialists “germanists” of the various profile was for this 
purpose involved and each hostile connection was accepted fields. 
The work began among the population of the Soviet areas occupied by 
fascist troops. In the directive SNK USSR and Central Committee of the  
All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941, to the party and 
Soviet organizations of front-line areas in Stalin’s speech on July 3, 1941, it was 
indicated the need to explain to workers their situation; to organize 
uncompromising fight with everyone: alarmists and spreaders of rumors 
(Бутырин, 2006, 3–4). For the dissemination of this and other information there 
were given newspapers Pravda, “Communist”, “Izvestia”, “For the Soviet 
Ukraine” in the rear the Soviet Army and also other central periodicals. Among 
the listed periodicals, regularly there was printed a “Vesti Iz Sovetskoy Rodiny” 
newspaper. It appeared big circulations in the Russian, Ukrainian and 
177 
Belarusian languages for the population of Ukraine and Belarus. It was 
delivered to the occupied territory by planes and extended underground 
workers. It should be noted that this newspaper disturbed occupational 
administration very much which applied a set of means to its destruction. 
In one of the special messages of fascist occupational administration, it 
was noted that the Soviet leadership used psychologically active actions and 
means of propaganda comparison with an initial stage of war. The special 
attention was given to newspapers leaflets which were regularly dropped from 
planes (Всенародное партизанское движение в Белоруссии в годы 
Великой Отечественной войны (июнь 1941- июль 1944), 1973, 247). The 
newspaper made the real threat for occupying authorities. The fact that, except 
satirical materials there were also drawings and documentary photographs 
which illustrated fight of guerrillas and courage of the Soviet soldiers in fights 
for Homeland freedom. Regular informing the Soviet people who appeared in 
occupation about events at the front and in the country, about world situation 
strengthened in them the confidence of quick freedom, promoted 
strengthening and activation of the guerrilla fight against the fascist army. 
From the Order of the People’s Defence Commissar September 5, 1942 
“About problems of the guerrilla movement” and from the report of the 
Ukrainian Headquarters of the partisan’s movement we can see that guerrilla 
groups of Fedorov, Saburov, Kovpak, Melnik and other “partisan” heads gave 
out and distributed among the population of the occupied areas of Ukraine 
newspapers and leaflets. Only Saburov’s group issued more than 102 names 
of newspapers, leaflets and bulletins with a general circulation of 156183 
copies. For strengthening of printing promotion directly 56 portable printing 
houses, more than 350 libraries and mobile movie theatres were brought. 
(Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління 
України, 23). 
From November 1942 to April 1, 1943, it was published and widespread 
in temporarily occupied territory 103 newspapers in Ukrainian with a general 
circulation of 8100000. Besides, 1980000 are newspapers (“Communist”, 
“Soviet Ukraine”, “For Soviet Ukraine”). Planes with newspapers and leaflets 
went along such routes: Kharkiv-Poltava-Sumy, Nezhin-Kiev-Vinnytsia-
Priluki-Vorozhba, Kyiv-Zhytomyr-Chernihiv, Kharkiv-Dnepropetrovsk-
Zaporozhye-Stalino-Lugansk, Kupyansk-Kharkiv-Poltava, etc. (Центральний 
державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 24). 
Very effective results were yielded by mass and political work among the 
population during raids of guerrilla on the rear of the enemy. The Communist 
Party organized meetings, extended political literature. For example, from the 
shorthand report of a propaganda department meeting, from the report of 
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guerrilla groups, we see that with the population of occupied territories 
discussions were led and then there were given answers to a set of questions. 
The population, according to heads of guerrilla units raised many questions. 
People had a keen interest in problems of a political situation as in the rear 
and at the front. It demonstrated that the population of occupied territories did 
not trust messages from newspapers of the occupying authority (Цент- 
ральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 3) 
Work of “underground” was fragmentary as most the organizations were 
destroyed by occupational troops. With the participation of the “Kiev city 
underground” secretary Rudchenko in October-November 6 underground 
district committees were arrested. The former secretary of Kyiv regional 
committee and a city town committee of “Komsomo” Kucherenko, the 
instructor of the regional committee of LKSM of Ukraine Pustovoytov, 
Aristarkhova coherent of an underground city town committee were traitors. 
36 figures of the Kyiv administration in an underground were arrested. On the 
way of treachery there was also a secretary of the “Zaporizhia underground 
regional committee” Mosiyevich, He told about the structure of an 
underground and revealed the second secretary of regional committee Osipov, 
coherent Moshchenko, secretaries of underground district committees and 
itself continued to work for the enemy under the pseudonym “Konstantin” 
(Чайковський, 1994, 20). 
Guerrillas provided underground political workers with the central and 
local newspapers, brochures and leaflets. As a result of it, counteraction to 
fascist propaganda in large settlements became more expressed, especially 
during 1943–1944 (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань 
України). Evidence of that what work was done by the Soviet leadership and 
“Guerrilla units in occupied territories were reports and information 
certificates of the propaganda content, mass agitation activities on areas in 
February-March, 1942. (Центральний державний архів громадських 
об’єднань України, 4–7). 
“Guerrillas” widely applied various forms of verbal promotion. 
On numerous memoirs of participants of the “guerrilla, movement” there were 
mass meetings and even small demonstrations. So, for example, a broad 
success among the population received the meeting held on February 1942. 
In villages of the Sumy region – Dubovichi, the Gorozhanla, Gerasimovka, 
Shilinka – Putivlsky guerrilla group (Центральний державний архів вищих 
органів влади та управління України, 180). 
The Ukrainian youth of temporarily occupied by fascist aggressors 
territory actively participated in the edition of brochures and leaflets 
(Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 15). 
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Only from January to September 1942 it was given out and widespread 
special issues “Communist” with a circulation of 6 thousand, 31 card.Leaflets 
went to the occupied areas for the purpose of their distribution through 
Political Departments of Southwest and Southern fronts. Cards in large 
quantities extended mainly in Stalin, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, 
Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia, Voroshilovgrad regions. Except for cards, it 
was planned to distribute also brochures and newspapers (Центральний 
державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 95–96). 
Because a considerable part of political departments was liquidated, it became 
impossible. 
The “Komsomol organizations” of the occupied areas included a youth 
which conducted active counter-propaganda in the back of the opponent. Such 
groups which bore personal responsibility for timely delivery of literature 
were organized on the occupied territory (Центральний державний архів 
громадських об’єднань України, 8, 11, 15, 23, 45). 
According to the administration of “Wehrmacht” an important role in the 
dissemination of this or that information was played by an emotional spirit of 
the population which promotes the formation of the new power. commitment. 
Therefore the staff propaganda and troops of SS built the actions, considering 
first of all a moral and psychological condition of the local population. 
“Employees practically of all divisions with success used knowledge of 
psychology and policy, skillfully forwarding behavior of people to the 
necessary course. The success of Nazi propaganda was provided also with the 
ruse of the most modern materials and means of dissemination. In the Soviet 
propaganda activity was insufficiently equipment, materials and personnel. 
Only correspondents of the army newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda” and the 
government newspaper “Izvestia” had planes. Correspondents work interfered 
because of institute department selfishness (Советская пропаганда в годы 
Великой Отечественной войны: “коммуникация убеждения” и 
мобилизационные механизмы, 2007, 32). 
Nazi propaganda was carried out generally through periodicals, an air, 
motion picture art, exhibitions and also the distribution of small printed 
materials (leaflets, brochures, posters) on city streets, the enterprises, in 
educational institutions and so forth. Its large-scale character is explained by 
the application of similar methods in Germany which effectively affected 
public opinion. Defining the main propaganda objectives and the purposes of 
use of periodicals in temporarily occupied territory”, Reykhskomissariat’s 
leadership issued the special directive. In it, it was said: “The Ukrainian and 
other newspapers issued in “Reykhskomissariat” – an exclusive lever on the 
population promotion and policy, by order of “Reykhskomissar”. They do not 
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serve the national and cultural purposes of the population or even religion... 
Everyone their line has to help military occupational authorities with the 
implementation of a great mission of the Fuhrer in the creation of new 
Europe” (Коваль, 1988, 157–158). The German leaders cared for that anti-
Soviet propaganda captivated all space of the occupied areas and prevented 
the distribution of anti-Nazi propaganda. 
For counteraction, to enemy propaganda, the special broadcasts prepared 
toward “underground newspapers”. About it on September 16, 1942, at a 
meeting of Council of military-political propaganda of the Head Political 
Department of RKKA the issue “About Work among the Population of the 
Occupied Regions of the USSR” was discussed. It was offered to develop 
measures for improvement of work of broadcasting for the population  
of temporarily occupied areas (Партийное подполье в Белоруссии,  
1941–1944: Страницы воспоминаний, 1984. 132, 236). 
In this regard there was set the task to make the program schedule for all 
“Guerrilla Radio Committee”. Their contents had to include the following 
questions: 
– the materials characterizing situation at the front, statement of the 
message of “Sovinformburo”, special messages of “Sovinformburo”, losses of 
fascist troops; 
– the materials characterizing the situation in the Soviet rear; 
– fighting of “Partisan movement” of Ukraine; 
– commenting of information obtained from abroad; 
– articles exposing a lie of Hitler’s propaganda; 
– cards for the edition in “Guerrilla Units” (Ивлев, Юденков, 1988, 71–72). 
Time for carrying out these or those transfers for “Reykhskomissariat’s” 
population Ukraine and zones of military authorities was accurately 
determined. 
Soviet counter-propaganda could not solve completely all problems of war 
conditions. It could not capture all citizens of the occupied by the fascist army 
territory. The technical base of the Soviet propaganda on temporarily occupied 
territories was much weaker than German due to the lack of a possibility of legal 
activity. Newspapers and leaflets which were distributed by dumping from the 
plane not always got there where they were most necessary. The guerrillas had to 
make leaflets for distribution among the local population. 
Thus, information and ideological opposition between fascist Germany 
and the Soviet Union was not less powerful and significant, than armed 
struggle. At the level of information space, there was a fight for influence on 
soldiers of the Red Army and the population of the territories of Ukraine 
occupied by the fascist army. Informational opposition amplified counter-
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propaganda from nationalist forces, in particular, OUN, UPA and 
considerably weakened positions of both parties. Both Hitler’s occupational 
administration and soviet leadership applied all methods, means and methods 
of information fight possible at that time, resorted to various dirty 
technologies, often discrediting themselves. Both opponents intimidating the 
population and promising it the desirable, used aspiration of the Ukrainian 
people to peaceful work and creation of own state. The severe morale 
psychological state of the population of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” and 
zones of military authorities became a consequence of information opposition 
of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. It was formed in the conditions of 
difficult military opposition between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Difficult financial and economic situation of the population of the occupied 
areas had a great influence on it that led to the aggravation of a number of 
social problems. 
Political passions of the most part of the population of occupied territories 
shared between three main forces, had opposite views of a political situation 
which developed. One part of the population was suppressed and did not 
represent the future under Nazi occupation, another – small frank hoped that 
the new power would bring a contribution to the development of the 
Ukrainian society and revival of culture. The third part of population would 
like to live in the independent Ukrainian state promised by Nazi power. Big 
regional differences were also peculiar to political sympathies. In the East, as 
it was already noted, a certain part of the population stood in opposition to 
occupational administration, cooperated with guerrillas and underground 
workers; in the West, where liberating traditions were still alive, the 
population, the intellectuals and peasants, wished for restoration of own state 
and solution of the land question. 
The great influence on consciousness and moods of the population of 
Ukraine made carrying out within the 30th years of the policy of “military 
communism”, violent collectivization, mass repressions, cultivation among 
the population the concept “enemy of the people” and prosecutions of all who 
fell under this category (Куманев, 2005, 143). 
The events which were taking place in 1941 became the tragedy of 
improbable ranges that put the people and the Soviet Union on the edge of a 
chasm. The German tank columns which were followed by motor-infantry and 
were supported by aircraft managed to do irreparable harm to the Soviet troops 
in a short time. It is necessary to tell the German plans of fighting were 
implemented with some advancing. So, it was planned that boundary fights will 
last not less than four weeks (Загорулько, 1980, 7). By information, which 
Ukrainian historian V. Y. Korol gives us… “they ended in favor of the German 
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side by July 10. In total for the first three weeks of war the Red Army lost 
850 thousand soldiers, nearly 3.5 thousand planes, over 6 thousand tanks, 
20 thousand mortars. Catastrophic defeat received more than 100 soviet 
divisions. Germans took away a half of the warehouses located in the territory 
of these districts including strategic importance. Germans took in warehouses 
5 400 000 from a total 7 600 000 rifles. 191 thousand from a total of 
240 thousand machineguns. It became the captivity reason of 329 thousand 
soldiers and commanders in the first two weeks of the war” (Король, 2001, 5). 
The consequences of the first fights happened to be obvious because 
famous Soviet specialists engineers, officers of the Red Army were repressed 
even on the eve of war. In the first months of war to arrange production of 
new planes, specialists prisoners who were not managed to be shot or tortured 
yet were brought together in special scientific center-TsKB-29 where worked 
the famous aircraft designers and engineers – “enemies of the people” 
A. Tupolev, D. Tomashevich, R. Bartini, V. Petlyakov (about 30 people 
including from Ukraine) (Король, 2002, 14). Most of the minds of the large 
industrial enterprises in Ukraine were also repressed including the 
management of Azovstal, Krivorozhstal and others. It led to the fact that the 
majority of progressive engineering developers including the military sphere 
were not placed at production. Repressions on the West Ukrainian lands, the 
deportations of the civilian population which were carried out by the Soviet 
power led to the fact that a part of the population of Ukraine did not wish to 
struggle with aggressors. Therefore along with heroism of the Soviet people 
cases of panic escape from the battlefield of the whole military divisions of 
the Red Army were observed. (Костенко, 2002, 39). One more important 
aspect which influenced the population of occupied territories was forced the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops Receding, the Soviet troops made an awful 
impression. Without any control, without observing leaving tactics, fighters 
mixed up broke into separate groups of badly armed, demoralized people who 
tried to leave. Not all managed it, but the majority that got on the territories 
occupied by the German army lost any hope and trust to soviet leadership. 
The trust to Soviet leadership was lost also by inhabitants of temporarily 
occupied territories, in particular, Kyiv where after the withdrawal of 
“Bolsheviks”, in cellars of People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs several 
hundreds of disfigured corpses with shot wounds were revealed, injured by 
something heavy. Among them, locals recognized the Ukrainian engineers, 
actors, famous in Kiev, etc. No less terrible spectacles were seen in the 
“Lukyanovsky prison” and in other premises of Kiev. There a large number of 
corpses of the tortured people were found. Not less awful events followed 
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evacuation and of other cities. Some days before Odessa invading all 
criminals were released. 
The last two-three days prison was protected by the strengthened groups of 
“People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs”. “In the middle of the prison, 
there was some vanity. For the second day after the entry into the city of the 
Romanian army in numerous cellars of prison was revealed a large number of 
corpses” (Пігідо-Правобережний, 2002, 105, 107). When Germans found 
cruelly killed people they showed them to locals as the eloquent proof of the 
Soviet policy. It did not add the authority to the Soviet power. 
A week after the beginning of the war, the considerable territory of 
Western Ukraine was occupied. Residents of these lands were confused and 
therefore the first had to adapt to new conditions. In the “Report of the  
213th Security Division of Wehrmacht” of July 27, 1941 it was said that the 
Ukrainian population of the West Ukrainian lands at first apprehended arrival 
of the German troops as a relief from “Bolshevist” domination. Polish 
population also not refused to cooperate with the new power. But later the 
situation changed. Doctor of Historical Sciences of the Sorbon University 
(Paris) and Ukrainian Free University (Munich) Vladimir Kosik in the 
researches explains that Ukrainians had a long-awaited opportunity and 
conditions for the creation of own authorities and security. According to Nazi 
invaders, their political “will” began “to wake up”. At first, Ukrainians really 
showed readiness for cooperation with the German authorities. But over time, 
when the German troops moved ahead further in occupied territories and 
decreased, the aspiration of the population of Western Ukraine to 
independence raised more. Most brightly this desire was shown at residents of 
such cities as Lutsk, Rivne, Kovel, Ostrog, etc. The same V. Kosik noted that 
after “Germans decided not to allow Ukrainian to make autonomy in General 
Governorship”, they met rather serious difficulties in the relations with the 
population of the Western Ukraine, but “in East direction territories from the 
Soviet-Polish the population in the first weeks of war accepted Germans as 
liberators” (Косик, 1998, 181–182). 
The important role in moods of civilians of the most part of the Ukrainian 
lands played “agrarian question” and the policy of the occupying authorities in 
the agricultural industry. Most of the peasants were hostile in relation to the 
German authorities in the first months of war and showed readiness for 
cooperation. A considerable part of Ukrainians expected that Germans wiould 
bring improvements in social life. Also, increased people agreement with 
proclaimed private property law (Ніколаєць, 1999, 44–45). Innovations of 
enemies in the sphere of agricultural industry were not always approvingly 
perceived in all territory of Ukraine. For example, in the territory of Donbass 
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the German agrarian reforms met huge mistrust. The following was the main 
argument in this case: “Communists promised us so much, and so often 
deceived us, and Germans also only promise” (Ніколаєць, 1999, 54). 
Political moods of the Ukrainian intellectuals in the occupied territory 
were not a less important factor. The analysis of agents special messages of 
“People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs” in the years of war allow to draw 
a conclusion of political moods in scientific, technical and creative layer. 
Intellectuals that already divided at the beginning of the war in two categories. 
Those who loyally treated the Soviet power and those who became puzzled 
from constant losses and starving. 
Great efforts were required to the leadership of the USSR to recede from 
the administration mainline, about the leading role of the Russian people and 
to proclaim that the Soviet people were the citizens of the multinational state. 
At the same time, the country leaders urged Ukrainian and other people to 
protect the “Motherland” and its achievements. The reaction of the population 
of occupied territories to such changes in the policy of Soviet leadership was 
different. The behavior and political views of people depended on many 
factors: territories of accommodation, age, education, life experience, etc. 
Most of the population of the” Left bank of Ukraine was loyally adjusted 
to the Soviet power. Most of the locals did not expect change from the 
German authorities, but at the same time, each person had own feelings, the 
aspirations which influenced his relationship to the events happening on the 
front line and the areas of Ukraine occupied by the fascist army. Each person 
had a miscellaneous attitude towards the enemy and to the Soviet power In the 
first days of war the resident of Kiev Anna Trukhan wrote in the letter to the 
son: “You can give that feeling of hatred to German clique which started this 
war... Firmly I believe in the wise leadership of our country. I’m happy that  
I could grow up the defender – you, the sonny. Be quiet, firm, you know well 
what to protect...” (Рибченко, 2008, 252). 
Such mood of the woman was explained by the existence of ideological 
stereotypes. All life she faithfully worked for a “Bolshevist system” and 
trusted in its strong ideals which she gave to the son. 
But among inhabitants of the “Left bank”, there were those who after the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops had absolutely other feelings. Among them 
there was a writer Arkady Lyubchenko who was pursued more than once by 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs after the withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops. He noted: “It was feeling of freedom, independence. There are no 
meetings, plenums, conferences... It is not necessary to hurry anywhere – you 
are free. It is not necessary to report, does not prevail over you awful despotic 
and bureaucratic fists – you are free! Nobody interferes with your private life, 
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do that you want and as you want. Free! Nobody watches you though. But 
still, as a habit continue to look around, speak with lowered a voice, 
uncertainly, as the conspirator. Long-time I did not believe that it is already 
another reality, I can dispose of myself and the time as I want. Very pleasant 
feeling!” – he wrote in the diary (Рибченко, 2008, 253). Such feelings were 
short. As soon as the German administration began to show the true 
intentions, to kill people in large quantities, to send youth violently to 
Germany, to force to work for the sake of the “Third Reich”, etc., people 
began to understand a true essence of activity of the Hitler’s authority, and 
with it and to get rid of free life hopes and future welfare of the family and 
Ukraine. 
From the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany from 
August 31 till September 15, 1941, about a political and economic situation in 
Ukraine we see that the population of the Ukrainian SSR did not show a big 
political activity. Only an insignificant part pins hoped for the arrangement of 
the Ukrainian territory on arrival of the German army. In the report, it was 
also noted that Ukrainians expected, first of all, improvement of the financial 
position, realizing in what awful poverty they lived earlier. The population of 
“Eastern Ukraine” also did not show resistance. Moreover, the “Wehrmacht2 
was satisfied with the support of the local population in the organization of 
public life and local authority (Косик, 1998, 322). 
Change of a situation at the front and in moods of the population of 
occupied territories was confirmed by the Report No.191 of the Chief of the 
“Security Police and Security Service” (“SD”) on events in the USSR. The 
report defined the heterogeneity of the local population mood. It was shown 
that the Ukrainian intellectuals and student’s youth gathered hoping for the 
future independence of Ukraine. It should be pointed out the characteristic 
fact that a considerable part of the population did not have enough belief in a 
final victory of Hitler’s Germany over Soviet. They waited for a breakdown in 
the confrontation of two sides in order Ukraine would become independent. 
As far as a rural population the question about the “Land law” was in the first 
place. Political problems interested them much less. The population of the 
Central and Eastern Ukraine more depressed by the shortage of food and a 
question of survival in the conditions of occupation. In this part of Ukraine, a 
large number of the Soviet activists blowing up the power of the German 
administration which had not fixed on places yet. 
The negative attitude of the local population to the occupying authority 
since the end of 1942 had been caused also by the destruction of their housing 
and personal plots. The greatest damage to a dwelling stock was caused in 
villages of Left-bank Ukraine. So, in 197 areas from 10295 rural settlements, 
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the fascist power burned and destroyed 6226 country estates. Destruction of 
countryside estates was caused by a variety of reasons: The discontent  
of peasants who arose because of robberies and violence, the manifestation of 
disobedience from the local population, a failure to follow orders  
of occupational administration, evasion from labor service, departure to 
Germany and many other things (Перехрест, 2005, 138–139). 
The occupational policy of a Nazi government during this period was 
shown in two directions: robbery of the local population and its operation; the 
exile of people from own houses and their mass export for work in fascist 
Germany. On “East lands”, during 1942 all population: old men, women, 
pupils of schools were mobilized for forced labor. Corporations and factories 
made products only for Germans. Officers occupied places of the Ukrainian 
citizens and took them to hard work in Germany. It revolted the local 
population very much. People, as soon as could, evaded from sending for 
forced labor, disappeared, ran in guerrilla groups. The Ukrainian children 
peeled and hungry, wandered through the streets, and children of ethnic 
Germans – went out of town rest. The population was hostile to the Germans 
(Сергійчук, 2005, 54–55). 
Miscellaneous was a moral and psychological condition of the population 
of Donbas, Poltavshchyna, Dnepropetrovshchina, Voroshilovgradshchina and 
the Kharkiv region. Not all Soviet citizens of this region of Ukraine believed 
that the German authorities wouldl bring long-awaited freedom and 
independence of Ukraine. The situation was complicated also that the Soviet 
power continued to pursue political prisoners, and from the beginning of war 
began to shoot them. The number of death penalties to political criminals 
sharply increased from 1649 people in 1940 up to 9011 people in 1941 and 
23278 people in 1942. (Попов, 1992, 28). 
According to the “Guerrilla groups”, the moral and psychological 
condition and mood of the population of the Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kiev 
regions were such that the most part of the population looked forward to the 
Red Army. Even those who at the beginning of war waited for the arrival of 
the German army damned it and were ready to cooperate with guerrillas to 
bring closer arrival of the Soviet troops (Центральний державний архів 
вищих органів влади та управління України. Фонд, 72). 
During the war, both soldiers and civilians suffered from terror of two 
sides. “About 8000000 Soviet servicemen and 20000000 civilians were killed, 
died of diseases, hunger and other reasons connected with war” (Шевьяков, 
1991, 9–10). 
The moral and psychological condition of the population was influenced also 
by the policy of Hitler’s Germany and occupational administration by training  
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and culture. At the first months of the attack, the occupational administration 
opened initial educational institutions, various professional schools, gymnasiums 
and other educational institutions but the real policy of Nazis was shown in 
November-December, 1941 (Добров, Бистра, 2003, 57–58). 
The real aspiration and plans of fascist Germany on educations of the 
Ukrainian population were quite reflected in Hitler’s words that “the general 
education is decomposing poison. Everyone will have their own education level. 
Broad masses of slaves would blessed to be illiterate” (Ноэль-Нойман, 1996, 13). 
The policy pursued in temporarily occupied territories by Hitler’s 
administration led to the fact that in all territory of “Reykhskomissariat 
Ukraine” and in a zone of military authorities began closing of all educational 
and educational institutions, stage-by-stage restriction of intellectual potential 
of the population of Ukraine and its opportunity to receive through some 
education. According to the historian Y. Y. Gritsak, during the German 
occupation in the territory of Ukraine 32930 schools, professional schools, 
technical schools, higher educational institutions and research institutions, 
19200 libraries were destroyed and plundered. The majority of literature was 
taken out to Germany – 50 million. Books (Грицак, 1996, 30). 
With the arrival of the fascist army on the territory of Ukraine and 
“Reykhskomissariat’s Ukraine” the occupying authority allowed and even 
encouraged opening of the educational organizations, theatres and museums. 
It was caused by a variety of reasons. First, theatre put performances for the 
German soldiers, and, secondly, it was one more mechanism of dissemination 
of information among the population about helpful German state and its 
administration. Theatres were often used as the place for messages and the 
announcement of various resolutions and orders of occupational 
administration. Besides the loyal policy of Hitler’s leadership to the Ukrainian 
theatrical activity, authorized commissioners carried out constant actions for 
inspection of actors and production directors on political reliability. As a 
result of such actions not only educational institutions but also theatres headed 
by the loyal to “new order” authorities. Most of the population watchfully 
treated visits to the theatre, tried to avoid them more often. Theatres in 
Zhytomyr, Sumy, Konotop, Dnipropetrovsk, Nezhin, Chernihiv, Mariupol, 
Kharkiv, etc. which worked in the first months of the Great Patriotic War in 
November-December, 1942 began to be closed or used only for Germans. 
It was proved by publications in the monthly propaganda edition of OUN 
“Vilna Ukraina”. In the article “Across Ukraine” which appeared on 
September 8, 1943, it was noted that “the German terror did not stop. 
Germans burn down villages. It is burned northern areas of Kyiv region. 
Lately, Hitler’s government in Kyiv destroyed all manifestations of the 
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Ukrainian culture, all monuments... Cultural and educational life almost does 
not exist. Theatres and cinemas keep the German shelves only to catch the 
local population and to send to Germany...”. A similar situation took place in 
Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets-Podilsky and in Lutsk (Державний 
архів Рівненської області, 14–15). Bright picture of the real cultural policy 
of the German occupational administration and its influence on a moral and 
psychological condition into the Ukrainian population was shown also in the 
brochure of OUN “For Independence”. Here we read that in Kirovohrad 
cultural life faded. Newspapers appeared only in places of 
“Gebitskomissariat”. The Ukrainian intellectuals, students and youth of school 
age which were not taken out to Germany had to be expelled for work. The 
work mode was toughened, frequent audits of food and reserves of grain were 
carried out. 
The activity of occupational administration led to the fact that a 
considerable part of residents of the occupied areas began to think and 
compare the Soviet mode to existing. It directed to that Ukrainian citizens 
began support of Guerrilla movement. The “Nationalist Organizations” began 
the open fight against the occupying authority and troops of “Wehrmacht”. 
In spring of 1942 in the Polesia forests of Rivne there were first paramilitary 
groups which would act as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). Generally, in 
this military organization, there were active participants of the Ukrainian 
liberation movement and youth which threatened for work to Germany 
(Поліщук, 1998, 152–153). 
Reports of propaganda of battalions analyzed the population attitude to 
religion, that the occupying authority created favorable conditions for activity 
of all faiths and received the favor of local population (Титаренко, 2005, 
168–169). The revival of religiousness of the population of Ukraine under 
Nazi occupation was explained by the fact that at the time of political and 
economic problems when the faith in the power was lost, the person needed to 
hope for himself or for God. It was quite natural that in the conditions of Nazi 
occupation and hope for protection from the Soviet power people even more 
often began to address God. It should be noted that religious liberty of 
inhabitants was possible for two main reasons: tolerance towards believers 
from the German authorities and partial liberalization in the field of religious 
policy from the Soviet power. Except for the main faiths, during the German 
occupation actively began to carry out the promotion among the population 
various religious trends which activity was banned earlier. The historian, 
Y. Zinko claimed that revitalization of religious life, especially “Protestant 
Christian Communities” became an important consequence of the war in the 
USSR and Ukraine. (Зиновьев, 1991, 251). Representatives of various 
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religious trends carried out own promotion among the population. It was 
frequent even without the intervention of the occupying authorities. In the 
mentioned already German “Instruction on questions of carrying out the 
German policy in Ukraine”. It was said that in questions of religion it was 
necessary to show tolerance (Муковський, 1996, 54). Church attendants had 
an opportunity to begin the process of revival of religion. 
“Reykhskomissar of Ukraine” E. Koch influenced religious processes in 
Ukraine published the order which consisted of plans for separation 
“Orthodox Church” into several confessional associations. 
Adhering on the religious controversy he ordered that the Ukrainian 
autocephalous church being under Influence of “UAPT” should be supported. 
For years of Soviet power it was completely destroyed. In period of Nazi 
occupation the autocephalous church was restored gradually. In Western 
Ukraine a certain part of clergy and believers, especially Greco-catholic, 
supported the idea of creation of the Ukrainian state. Hoping for the support 
of the occupying authority metropolitan A. Sheptitsky addressed on July 5, 
1941 clergy and believers with the letter: “At will of the Almighty and 
Gracious God a new era begins in the life of our Motherland. We welcome the 
invincible German army which had occupied already the whole edge with 
pleasure and gratitude for liberation from the enemy. Everybody who feels 
Ukrainian and wants to work for the benefit of Ukraine let’s forget about any 
dismantling”. Lets work in unity and consent on the restoration of destroyed 
by “Bolshevik’s our economic, educational and cultural life” (Вільне слово, 
1941, 1). Similar moods dominated also among Autocephalous Ukrainian 
clergy at this time. 
The youth who were sent to Germany incited against the German 
occupational policy. The assistant commissioner of the Sumy’s Guerrilla 
Komsomol organization wrote in the report that the youth was disappointed in 
the occupying authority, nearly one and a half year it was forbidden to gather, 
sing the Ukrainian songs, to dance national dances, to speak loudly. 
With great desire, they came to evenings and discussions which were led by 
guerrillas, listened about achievements and victories of the Soviet Army 
(Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління 
України, 180–183). As a result of such policy, a considerable part of youth 
ran away to guerrillas and participated in performances against Hitler’s army, 
realizing consequences of Nazi domination on the Ukrainian lands. 
Peasants were undeceived that agrarian reform would be undertaken and 
they were revolted that their land and property again were given to the new 
owners. On the general order No. 1 of July 9, 1941 collective-farm the cattle, 
cars, the arable land transfer to the German occupying authority. Besides, all 
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collective-farm property, peasants managed to stretch after the departure of 
the Red Army. It was demanded to return to appropriate authorities 
(Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління 
України, 131–132). Awful situation and hopes of peasants for the better life, 
independent managing which was scattered in ashes became a reality of life. 
That time they ignored instructions of the German administration, A thicket 
helped guerrillas and waited for the arrival of the Soviet army. 
At the beginning of 1942 position of the Ukrainian peasantry in the 
territory of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” and moods of the population 
worsen. The occupying authority felt strengthening of resistance. Most of 
the population was dissatisfied with the policy of the German occupational 
administration because of the increase in the prices, frequent arrests in the 
cities, sending workers to Germany, the shortage of food. In the German 
report of May 31, 1942, it was noted that in Eastern Ukraine the 
population actively showed the discontent and even more often it was 
possible to hear the words of damnation towards the German occupying 
authority (Косик, 1998, 233). 
Considerably the moral and psychological condition of the local 
population in the fall of 1943 worsened. From the report of the commander of 
“Security troops” to the commander of the operational rear region of a group 
of “The South” armies of September 4, 1943, we know about worsens moods 
of the population. By the end of 1943. – beginning of 1944 resistance of the 
local population to the occupying authorities amplified. The youth which 
forced to go to Germany run away to forests. The orders of local 
administration were not carried out (Історія застерігає, Трофейні документи 
про злочини німецько-фашистських загарбників та їхніх пособників на 
тимчасово окупованій території України в роки Великої Вітчизняної 
війни, 1986, 151–152). From the information report of “OUN” in 
Kirovogradshchina, Nikolaev and Umanshchina in the fall of 1943 we learn 
that most of the population was adjusted bolshevism. However, they were 
afraid of the approach of the front and evacuation in Living in a moment. 
The fear of the German repressions was more than in other territories. 
In villages, many disappeared and did not go to Germany. Lots of talks about 
guerrillas, however, were not always favorable (Сергійчук, 2005, 301). 
Analyzing a situation which developed at the beginning of the Great 
Patriotic War, it is necessary to tell that short-sighted policy of the Stalin 
mode within which genocide of own people was carried out led to the fact that 
from the beginning of war against Nazi Germany, the Soviet people showed 
mistrust to the Soviet power, but also there were not mass actions against 
Hitler’s. 
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By the end of 1941 beginning of 1942 Stalin and Soviet government 
understood the need for special information space in the territory of the 
USSR, on occupied territories. What would convince the population that only 
the Soviet leadership was be able to create necessary conditions for a victory 
against the fascist army and development in the future of the state? Soviet 
leadership managed to create such information space thanks to which actually 
the victory also became indisputable. Fight of two conflicting military 
opponents led to considerable pressure upon a moral and psychological 
condition of the population of occupied territories. Therefore, the behavior of 
inhabitants of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” and zones of military authorities 
was different. 
The problem of effectiveness of German propaganda is considered to be 
extremely important. Influence of the German propaganda was during certain 
periods of war and in different territories of occupied Ukraine. Strengthening 
or weakening of influence depended on the activity of the Soviet propaganda. 
Impact on the consciousness of ordinary Ukrainian depended on what attitude 
to the Soviet power he population of the occupied territories expressed during 
the pre-war period. 
It is difficult to define the influence of information space quantitatively. 
It is rather behind the morale of the population, physical and a sort of their 
occupations. The Western Ukraine population the intellectuals and military 
caring had the idea of creation of the independent state. They were ready to 
cooperate with Nazi invaders. Rather Central and East regions, the 
intellectuals only partially supported the occupying authorities trying to 
survive somehow under trying conditions. The rural population underwent the 
influence of Nazi propaganda only because believed in the destruction of a 
collective-farm system, receiving own ground and opportunity to have an 
independent economy. It seemed to be an absolutely insignificant part of the 
population that Germany as the European country would help Ukraine to lift 
economic and social development and to lift culture to a high level. A certain 
part of the Ukrainian society, really, cooperated with the German occupational 
administration. It is known that in each settlement there was created Ukrainian 
auxiliary police. Its main objective was the organization of laborers and 
supervision of it, direct participation in executions. Ask ourselves a question. 
Is there any population in the world which during war did not cooperate with 
the purpose of protection of own life or maintaining statehood during war? 
If you turn to address Jewish documents showing the position of Jews, 
they can confirm the participation of Ukrainian in punitive actions. It is not 
confirmed by indications of the “Ynzattsgruppa” operating in Northern and 
Central Ukraine. In the territory of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” in one of the 
192 
reports, it was noted: “almost anywhere the population was not involved in 
actions against Jews”. In another report it was written that “the population 
almost has no anti-Semitism and racist ideological character” and “that for 
repressions against Jews the Ukrainian population lacks leaders and a spiritual 
heat” (Косик 1998, 157). 
Summing up, it should be noted that the influence of the German 
information space on the population of occupied territories was huge. It is 
proved also by measures which were applied by the Soviet power in the freed 
territories. “Regional committees of the Communist Party” of Ukraine 
undertook to restore a cultural and educational network of institutions in the 
shortest possible time, earlier functioned in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. 
2Regional committees” trained lecturers and speakers on gatherings of youth. 
Active work among pupils of schools and factory educational institutions was 
carried out. In those areas where recently there were German periodicals there 
was adjusted issue of large-circulation Soviet newspapers that period. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summarizing, it should be noted that the formation of the German 
information space in the territory of the Reich Commissariat “Ukraine” and in 
the area of military administration and its transformation took place in three 
stages, which were very different from each other. 
In the initial period from June 1941 to March 1942, when Hitler’s 
leadership realized that the war with the USSR would be complicated and 
long-lasting, the Nazi information policy aimed at convincing the population 
of the occupied regions of Ukraine and nationalist Ukrainian groups that the 
German war was over liberation from Bolshevik rule. Admittedly, she has had 
some success during this period. Some peasants and intellectuals believed that 
it was thanks to Germany that Ukraine would free itself from the Bolshevik 
regime and be able to independently build its own state and develop Ukrainian 
culture. The peasants were waiting for a solution to the painful land issue, and 
that is why the “agrarian reform” promoted by the Hitler administration 
attracted a large part of the peasants. During the same period, the occupation 
authorities created favorable conditions for the activities of the intelligentsia: 
educational institutions operated; theaters were opened showing performances 
of works by Ukrainian writers, mainly those whose works were banned in 
Soviet times; cultural and educational organizations were created and 
operated, including “Prosvita”, in almost every oblast, district or city 
periodicals were published. In the press and cinematography, Nazi Germany 
was positioned as a highly developed cultural country, and so in the first 
months of the war there were willing people among the local population who 
went to the Reich voluntarily. A small part of the population, under the 
influence of Nazi propaganda and their own ideas about preserving their lives 
and the lives of their family members, deliberately went to cooperate with the 
German occupation administration. 
Significant changes in the information policy of the German occupation 
power occurred in the second period – March-April 1942 – when the situation 
on the fronts for the German army worsened, the propaganda activities of 
representatives of the resistance movement, nationalist military groups 
increased. The German authorities immediately intensified the occupation 
regime, persecuting all those suspected of cooperating with the guerrillas, who 
did not want to go to work in Germany, who sabotaged the orders and orders 
of the local authorities, and so on. During this period, the propaganda slogans 
of Hitler’s power changed dramatically. They no longer promised a happy life 
in their own state, no word was heard about the implementation of the 
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“agrarian reform”; instead, educational, cultural and educational institutions 
were closed; the theaters worked mainly to entertain the Wehrmacht and the 
Volksdeutsche, became frequent raids in theaters and cinemas by locals and 
young people for forced labor in Germany, and increased violence with the 
locals as a result of the destruction of German soldiers and guerrillas. This 
situation could not leave people indifferent. The moral and psychological 
condition of the population was extremely difficult, the moods among the 
locals changed and people began to support the guerrillas and participate in 
the resistance movement organized by the OUN and UPA and the Soviet 
guerrillas. The main topic of German propaganda at this stage was the 
intimidation of local residents by punishment for cooperation with the 
guerrillas and the Soviet authorities. Despite the fact that since May 1942 the 
German army had been defeated by the Red Army, the newspapers 
maintained an optimistic mood among the population through reports of the 
benefits of the German army, the loss of the Soviet Army, and the defeat 
suffered by USSR allies on all fronts of the world. 
The third period of information policy of Hitler’s Germany was 
accompanied by difficult military and political conditions – defensive battles 
of the German army. Since the summer of 1943, under the pressure of the Red 
Army and as a result of the subversive activities of the guerrilla units, the Nazi 
leadership had to change its tactics and information policies on the territory of 
the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine and in the area of military administration. 
The content of the propaganda was filled with slogans calling on the local 
population not to respond to the guerrillas’ calls for support of the Soviet 
authorities, in periodicals and leaflets it spoke about the massacre of the 
Bolsheviks with prisoners of war and their families, with those who remained 
in the occupied territories, in the occupied territories will be denied the 
opportunity to work on their own land, etc. In particular, the activity of the 
occupying power on the deployment of “agrarian reform”, which had long 
been promoted by the German authorities but had not been implemented, 
intensified. In 1944, retreating, the Nazi troops urged the population of the 
Reich Commissariat and zones of the military administration to destroy all 
farms and retreat with the Wehrmacht troops. 
The formation of the German information space in the occupied territories 
of Ukraine was accompanied by counter-propaganda by the Political 
Directorate of the Red Army. The Soviet leadership also applied methods and 
means of informational influence on the personnel of the German army and 
the population of the occupied territories. 
The information-military confrontation between the two warring parties 
led to considerable pressure on the moral and psychological situation of the 
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occupied territories, so the reaction in the behavior of the residents of the 
Reich Commissariat of Ukraine and the zone of military administration was 
different. Much of the population was oppressed by the new regime and held a 
passive expected position, others went to guerrilla units and promoted and 
subversive activities among the local population – among the occupying 
German officials. 
Under the influence of Nazi propaganda and in the circumstances, most 
Ukrainians were forced to obey the invaders and passively obey German 
orders. However, a small part of the population actively, consciously 
cooperated with the invaders, and today historical science calls this 
phenomenon “collaboration.” At that time, this phenomenon was quite clear. 
Most of the Ukrainian collaborators were mostly USSR citizens, repressed by 
the Soviet authorities. However, there were not many of them than among the 
Russians or other nations of the occupied countries. 
In our view, the reasons for supporting part of the population of the Nazi 
occupying power were also the desire to at any cost free themselves from the 
Soviet regime and the collective farm system, which deprived the Ukrainians 
of all that they had. 
In spite of the powerful information policy and active propaganda, the 
information space formed by Hitler’s leadership was weakened by the brutal 
and careless policies of the Nazi administration in Ukraine. In pursuing a 
powerful information policy, the occupation administration could not hide the 
crimes it committed against the Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, Roma, Tatars and 
other national minorities. This further increased the resistance of the local 
population against the occupying power. It should also be noted that Hitler’s 
German policy toward the Slavic peoples was a major factor influencing the 
population of the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine and the zone of military 
occupation. 
The study of the impact of German information policy on the population 
of the occupied territories and its behavior on propaganda depended on the 
following factors: different nature of German propaganda depending on the 
period of the war and the territory in which it took place; the strengthening or 
weakening of Nazi propaganda also depended on the activity of Soviet 
counter-propaganda; attitude of the population of Ukraine to the Soviet 
regime, formed in the pre-war period and at the beginning of the war. 
Thus, it is impossible to determine the influence of the information space 
on the consciousness of the population of the Reich Commissariat of Ukraine 
and the zone of military administration quantitatively, faster by the state of the 
population and their occupation. In Western Ukraine, for example, the 
intelligentsia and the military, mostly concerned with the idea of creating an 
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independent state, were ready to cooperate and seek their own. In the central 
and eastern regions of Ukraine, the intelligentsia, while trying to survive in 
difficult circumstances, only partially supported the occupying power. 
The rural population was influenced by Nazi propaganda only because they 
believed in the destruction of the collective farm system, the acquisition of 
their own land, and the ability to have an independent farm. It seemed to a 
very small part of the population that Germany, as a European country, would 
help Ukraine to raise economic and social development and elevate culture to 
a high stage, but these ideas were quickly dispelled by the genuine Third 
Reich policy. 
It must be acknowledged that Nazi propaganda in the Reich Commissariat 
of Ukraine and in the area of military administration really contributed to the 
creation of a technologically powerful information space, in the formation of 
which the most modern mechanisms, means and methods of dissemination of 
information to the population were used at that time. The influence of this 
space is confirmed by the fact that some part of Ukrainian society really 
cooperated with the German occupation administration. But this collaboration 
was different in level and category. 
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LIST OF CONDITIONAL ABBREVIATIONS 
 
VKP (b) – Viskrievijas komunistiskā partija (boļševiki). 
Komjaunatne ir visas Krievijas Ļeņina komunistiskās jaunatnes savienība. 
ZhSU – Ukrainas sieviešu dienests. 
NKVD – Iekšlietu tautas komisariāts. 
NKDB – Valsts drošības tautas komisariāts. 
OUN – Ukrainas nacionālistu organizācija. 
OUN-B – Ukrainas nacionālistu organizācija, kuru vada S. Bandera. 
OUN-M – Ukrainas nacionālistu organizācija, kuru vada A. Melniks. 
PFT – testēšanas un filtrācijas nometnes. 
RNS – Tautas komisāru padome. 
ROA – Krievijas atbrīvošanas armija. 
CCU – Reiha komisariāts “Ukraina”. 
RSFSR – Krievijas Padomju Federatīvā Sociālistiskā Republika. 
SA – Vācijas Nacionālsociālistu partijas uzbrukuma vienības. 
SD – nacistu slepenais drošības dienests, SS izlūkdienests. 
SPD – Vācijas Sociāldemokrātiskā partija. 
Smersh – Padomju pretizlūkošanas nodaļa “Nāve spiegiem”. 
NVS – vācu meiteņu savienība. 
SS ir Vācijas Nacionālsociālistu partijas elites drošības vienība. 
UVO – Ukrainas militārā organizācija. 
UNKVD – Iekšlietu tautas komisariāta birojs. 
UNKDB – Valsts drošības tautas komisariāta birojs. 
UNS – Ukrainas tautas pašaizsardzība. 
UPA – Ukrainas nemiernieku armija. 
PSRS – Ukrainas Padomju Sociālistiskā Republika. 
CP (B) U Centrālā komiteja ir Ukrainas Komunistiskās partijas 
(boļševiku) Centrālā komiteja. 
PSKP Centrālā komiteja ir Padomju Savienības Komunistiskās partijas 
Centrālā komiteja. 
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